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P. 11 Footnote 21. Last line should read : largely 
responsible for drawing up the Town and Country 
Planning Act of 1947. 
p. 50 Five lines from the top should read : As in the case of 
the search for the Chairman of the Festival Council. 
p. 156 Footnote 126 should read : COI, CL593, Draft Proposal, 
6 April 1949. 
Footnote 127 should read : Ibid., see pp. 66-67 for 
Barry's speech on the aims of the Festival. 
p. 216 Four lines from the bottom the figure should read: 
£500,000. 
p. 237 First two lines should read : £535,777.12s. 4d, with the 
work being completed in fifty-four weeks; Dowsett's 
was £524.370 with the work completed in fifty-four 
weeks; and Kirk and Kirk's was £525,496 with a 
fifty-two week completion schedule. 
p. 393 Three lines from the top should read: Gasping with 
delight at what he saw, Abner wrote in the Architect 
and Buildings News that: 
ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
This Thesis sets out to examine an event which has been little documented 
and accordingly as comprehensive a view as is possible has been adopted. It 
will embrace an analysis of the origins of the Festival of Britain, its 
organisation, the content of its major exhibitions and events and finally, the 
impact and significance of what has turned out to be the last major exhibition 
to be held in post-war Britain. The content of the individual chapters is as 
follows: 
Chapter 1: The idea of staging a first category international exhibition, the 
movement away from this idea towards a national exhibition and the eventual 
emergence of the Festival of Britain concept. 
Chapter 2: The setting up of the Festival Organisation and the selection of 
its personnel; the influence of such selection on the Festival's aims and 
content. 
Chapter 3: The search for acceptable sites for the component exhibitions and 
the Organisation's plans to give the Festival a nationwide character. 
Chapter 4: The financial arrangements with particular reference to the 
economic climate of the time. The two major problems faced by the 
Organisation in their financial strategy occasioned by the London County 
Council claims for compensation and the difficulties sustained by the Festival 
Gardens Company Ltd. 
Chapter 5: The publicity arrangements. A general description of the Festival 
elements and the official opening ceremony. 
Chapter 6: A description of the South Bank site with particular reference to 
the architecture and design of selected pavilions as representative of certain 
architectural trends exemplified in pre-war exhibitions and elsewhere. 
Critical reaction and assessment of the contribution to British architecture 
of the South Bank. 
Chapter 7: A survey of the other London exhibitions and of the Pleasure 
Gardens at Battersea. 
Chapter 8: Festival activities throughout the rest of the United Kingdom. 
Chapter 9: -Art and Design in the Festival with reference to the growth and 
development of the Arts Council and the Council of Industrial Design. 
Chapter 10: The argument for the Festival's opening to be extended; the 
dismantling of exhibition material; the closing ceremony. An assessment of 
the general impact and significance of the Festival. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"'f Mention of the Festival of Britain to anyone under fifty 
usually elicits an uncomprehending stare. Sometimes a hesitant 
question follows as to whether-it has anything to do with 1851. It 
is a striking fact that while the legend generated by the Crystal 
Palace and the events of 1851 has been passed down, very few if any 
of the younger generation can point to one significant reminder of 
the chronologically nearer Festival of Britain. This is not 
altogether surprising, for -although few realise it, many 
institutions, museums, schools and colleges have been built from the 
proceeds of the Great Exhibition of 1851. Whenever the facts of the 
legacy of 1851 are understood, the impact and success of the event 
become rooted in the mind. 
The Festival of Britain, on the other hand, left behind few 
such tangible legacies. The Royal Festival Hall on the South Bank 
would have been built regardless of the Festival; there are no 
Pleasure Gardens at Battersea; the show flats, schools and churches 
built in Lansbury for the Festival's Live Architectural Exhibition, 
although visited at the time, are hardly considered suitable or 
worthwhile places to visit today. These two landmarks of the 
Festival are not as emotive or as memorable as the Victoria and 
Albert Museum, Imperial College, the Natural History Museum, the 
Royal Albert Hall, or any of the other twenty-two institutions and 
scholarships created as a result of Victorian enterprise during 1851. 
The legend of the Great Exhibition has, moreover been 
sustained by a plethora of books, chapters and articles on the 
subject, as well as references to be found in biographies on 
ii. 
Victoria and her Prince Consort Albert. In architectural books and 
surveys, the Crystal Palace stands as a milestone and tribute to 
Victorian innovation in building and design, and is indeed part of 
British history. The Festival of Britain cannot be so easily found 
in any of the many books on post-war Britain - if it is, only a few 
pages or paragraphs are devoted to it. There is only one book 
available on the subject. It was compiled by Mary Banham and Bevis 
Hillier, and published in 1976 to accompany the Retrospective 
Exhibition on the Festival of Britain held at the Victoria and 
Albert Museum. At the time this book was written none of the 
Festival of Britain files was opened to the public. As befitted its 
function., the book comprised in the main, interviews and articles 
from the major participants and visitors to the Festival of 
Britain. As such the authors did not attempt, in the circumstances 
of limited official evidence, to write a comprehensive account of 
the event. As an exposition to accompany the Retrospective 
Exhibition it served its purpose and has become a point of reference 
for more detailed work on the subject. It was therefore clear 
from the beginning of my research, that the story of the Festival of 
Britain had to adopt a chronological and narrative approach. In 
order to do this I would have, not only to tell it comprehensively 
by also to rely very heavily on the primary sources at the Public 
Record Office which were opened at the time I started my research 
into this topic. In conjunction with these sources, I was fortunate 
enough to be able to get verbal accounts during interviews with some 
of the men who were involved in creating the Festival. In order to 
visualise the Festival especially its showpiece on the South Bank, 
and to attempt to capture the prevailing mood and spirit of the 
iii. 
summer of 195111 listened to tapes and watched available documentary 
materials. 
Newspapers and journals of the period proved an invaluable 
source. I have ventured to submit a fraction of the mammoth 
collection of photographs in the Public Record Office, the Design 
Council and BBC Hulton Picture Library. It seemed to me vital in an 
event so little researched as the Festival of Britain to examine 
available visual documentation and examples of my findings are 
provided to supplement the text. The overwhelming visual technology 
of the twentieth century reached a new threshold - printing 
technology was rapidly developing, television was maturing. Visual 
documentation in print and photography assumed a greater importance 
in information technology than had been hitherto the case. The 
Festival of Britain has a contextual place in these achievements, 
since its subject matter was interwoven with imaginative visual 
effects which stimulated the response from available visual 
resources of the time. 
The Festival of Britain's origins lie in the history of 
international and national exhibitions, but due to the exigencies of 
the time, developed a character and style of its own. The concept 
of the International Exhibition has its roots in the holiday feasts 
and market gatherings of ancient Greece and the drama and colour of 
medieval fairs. The International Exhibition and trade fairs that 
developed came into prominence as a result of rapid 
industrialization and advancing communications. It was, therefore, 
only natural for the countries who had mastered this mode of display 
and profited from them to want to show their skill at such 
iv. 
ventures. 
1 Moreover mass producers needed international mass 
markets for their goods and the International Exhibitions and 
World's Fairs provided display cases reaching millions of potential 
customers. The first of these exhibitions was the Great Exhibition 
of 1851, which was primarily an industrial international exhibition, 
displaying all the products of the 'civilised' world. conceived in 
an era full of hope and promise, housed in a building composed 
entirely of glass, using the, effect of lighting to present an image 
of technological achievement, it all gave to the British an 
undeniable sense of status, power and prestige. The presentation of 
the 1851 exhibition started a world-wide trend in exhibitions that 
has continued for one hundred and thirty-five years. 
The International Exhibition as it developed adopted a variety 
of roles. It was not only selling goods, it was also selling ideas: 
ideas about the relations between nations, the spread of 
education, the advancement of science, the form of cities, the 
nature of domestic life, the place of art in society. They were 
presenting an ordered world. 2 
Furthermore, the International Exhibition became a fashionable form 
of international public relations and competition among the 
expanding western nations. Indeed the hosting of the International 
Exhibition was a mandatory exercise if a country was to be 
considered a world power. This competition between the developing 
western nations meant that each succeeding exhibition had to be seen 
as greater, and more epic than the last, especially if the nation 
hosting the exhibition considered itself as having a significant 
role in world affairs. 
1. John Allwood, The Great Exhibitions, p. 7-8. 
2. Burton Benedict, The Anthropology of World's Fairs, p. 2. 
V. 
If London built a Crystal Palace in 1851, Paris topped it with 
an Eiffel Tower in 1889, Chicago with a Ferris Wheel in 1893, 
San Fransisco with a Tower of Jewels in 1915 and New York with a 
Trylon and Perisphere in 1939.3 
Showmanship and prestige became the primary priorities, cost and 
financial profit became less important - to make or lose money was 
not a pressing point, the main issue was the spectacle. 
As the nineteenth century progressed and industrialization was 
becoming more commonplace, another reason had to be provided for the 
vast expenditure of public funds. It was now thought necessary to 
celebrate historical landmarks, or for the exhibition to be designed 
with definite thematic delineation. The four hundredth anniversary 
of the discovery of the Americas by Christopher Columbus in 1492 
prompted Chicago to have an International Exhibition in 1893 - the 
organisers could not quite meet the 1892 deadline. The French 
celebrated their idealized version of the French Revolution by an 
Exposition Universelle in 1889, which gave birth to one of the 
greatest attractions of Paris - the Eiffel Tower, designed by 
Gustave Eiffel. 4 
The International Exhibition also had a further dimension: it 
became a means of recapturing lost prestige, suffered as a result of 
being defeated at war or sometimes even by being victorious. The 
exhibition in this context was now also seen as a means of 
diversion. The 1878 Paris Exposition Universelle was mounted to 
show Europe that France was still an important cultural and 
political centre, despite the defeat that she suffered at the hands 
of Prussia. That France could not afford either the cost or the 
3. Ibid., p. 3. 
4. Allwood, p. 75. & p. 81. 
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effort while she was still rebuilding and recovering from the 
humiliating effects of defeat was not given excessive 
consideration. What was important was that the Government, which 
bore the total cost of thirty-two million francs (none of which was 
recovered in profits), felt justified in doing this because they 
believed that the exhibition would achieve its intended purpose. 
The visitors to the exhibition, like one Mr George Hadfield of 
Ross-on-Wye came away with the desired impression: "Everything on 
this visit struck me amazingly. The French are certainly a great 
people. The exhibition must affect everyone with the greatest 
wonder". 
5 As exhibitions increased in size and frequency it was 
felt necessary by 1912 to set up an International Commission to 
regulate them. 
Within the context of Exhibition history the Festival of Britain 
falls into a unique category. It began with the concept that the 
centenary of the Great Exhibition of 1851 should be marked and 
celebrated. Underlying this view there rested the assumption that 
any effort to honour the event of 1851 must of necessity be carried 
out in a manner and style befitting the great occasion. 
It was therefore originally conceived as an International 
Exhibition. On examination it was found that Britain's economy 
could not sustain the taxing demands of hosting such a display. The 
International Exhibition regulations which are still in force today 
make provision for two types of displays. The first, described as 
the 'first category', rules that the countries invited to 
participate in the Exhibition, must construct their national 
5. Ibid., p. 58. 
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pavilions with material and labour provided by the host country on 
an area which is equivalent to the overall space used by the host 
country to build its own pavilions. In the 'second category' the 
host country provides the site and, using its own architects and 
Exhibition planners, constructs the pavilions for the participating 
nations. The only type of display that a country which considers 
itself a world power can hold is a first category International 
Exhibition, showing as it does an ability to provide and fulfil all 
essential services and requirements. 
In 1945, when the idea of Britain hosting a first category 
International Exhibition was raised and subsequently investigated by 
a Government appointed committee, it was found that Britain, greatly 
impoverished by war, could not possibly afford the colossal expense 
estimated at E70 million to host such a display. The Festival of 
Britain evolved as Britain's answer to its inability to host 100 
years later a worthy successor to the Great Exhibition of 1851. 
Britain's completely altered circumstances dominated the early 
origins of the Festival. The Britain presented in 1951 by the 
Festival was far removed from the Britain inaugurated by the Great 
Exhibition in 1851. The overtones of prosperity and self-confidence 
that were the hallmark of the era immortalised by the Great 
Exhibition, could not be matched in the atmosphere of 1951. It was 
more properly a period of reassessing Britain's role in a changing 
world and how best to cope with the economic, social and 
psychological aftermath of war. 
Out of necessity the celebration of 1951 was national in 
scope. In terms of exhibition history this type of display is 
limited by definition to a single nation, but is otherwise 
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comprehensive in structure and range. The national exhibitions were 
never held as frequently as the international exhibitions, and when 
held were 'hosted by smaller nations unable to undertake anything 
more ambitious, or by new or remote countries wanting to emphasize 
their- existence in the world of nations'; 
6 
There are examples of 
smaller developing countries hosting this type of exhibition. The 
Florence Exhibition of 1863 began as a Tuscan Exhibition and was 
extended to represent the whole Italian peninsula, united two years 
before. In 1875 Uruguay held an exhibition in Montevideo, and 
Poland held an exhibition in 1929 in Poznan. In 1933 in Zurich the 
Swiss mounted a national exhibition. 
The Festival of Britain, however went beyond being a static 
national exhibition. The festival planners chose to create a 
display, that was nationwide, thereby breaking with the traditional 
national exhibition format. The national displays were for the most 
part mounted on one site such as was the case with the Swedish 
national exhibition in Stockholm in 1930, which was built along the 
shores of the River Djurgardsbrumbinken. Further, there was a 
centre-piece of the South Bank, which also broke with traditional 
exhibition history by being the first multi-pavilioned -exhibition, 
which not only presented a theme - that of 'British contribution to 
civilization in the Arts, Science and Technology and Industrial 
Design', but as such, told a continuous story throughout the 
pavilions on the site. In addition, however, to the main exhibition 
on the South Bank, there were the composite parts of the Festival of 
6. K. W. Iuckhurst, The Story of Exhibitions, p. 167. 
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Britain: the Exhibition of Science and Technology, the Exhibition of 
Architecture, Town Planning and Building research, three Exhibitions 
of Books, one in London and two in Scotland, two travelling 
exhibitions - one by land, the other by sea, the Exhibition of 
Industrial Power in Kelvin Hall, Glasgow, the Farm and Factory 
Exhibition in Belfast and the Dolhendre Hill Farm Scheme in Wales. 
The net effect of such a layout as devised by the exhibition 
planners in 1951, was that visitors to the exhibitions from home and 
abroad were given a good opportunity to study the industry, culture 
and way of life in Britain as a whole. 
7 
The comprehensiveness of the Festival presented its own 
peculiar set of problems during the course of my research. Apart 
from the twelve official exhibitions sponsored by the Festival 
Organisation, they encouraged local festivals in most parts of the 
country. The Arts Council working as a constituent body within the 
Festival Organisation sponsored twenty-three Arts Festivals in 
centres in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. From the 
outset I found that general knowledge of the festival was so 
limited, that before I could analyse the significance of the events, 
I had to research and write about the Festival as a comprehensive 
narrative. This, however, presented further difficulties. The 
first of these was the quantity and diversity of the material. 
There were files on the proposals to hold an international 
Exhibition in 1951, files of the proposed national Exhibition in 
1951, and finally files on the Festival of Britain. These files 
fell into three categories which were not always so clearly defined: 
7. Ibidy p. 169. 
X. 
the files of the Official Committee, the Festival Council and the 
Executive Committee. As the Festival of Britain developed, there 
were files available for individual committees within the Festival 
Organisation. These included the Science `and Technology Council, 
the Architecture Council, the Presentation Panel, the Publicity 
Planning Group, the Councils for Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, the Arts Council and the Council of Industrial Design. 
Apart from these files, the Public Record Office also houses a 
complete collection of plans, maps and architects' drawings of the 
pavilions erected on the South Bank, miscellaneous items such as 
programmes, stamps and catalogues as well as over thirty-five 
volumes of photographs of the Festival of Britain. Added to the 
Documents at the Public Record Office there were documents related 
to the Festival at the Design Council, the Arts Council as well as 
photographic evidence of the event at the Design Council and the BBC 
Hulton Picture Library. 
Once involved in the research on the event, it became clear to 
me that the best possible course of action would be, to be as 
selective as possible. Examining the evolution of the Festival and 
its organisation I could not for example become over-engrossed in 
the work of the numerous sub committees which the Science Council 
created to ensure that the exhibits on various subjects such as 
horticulture, agriculture, metallurgy and physics were relevant and 
correct. Moreover it became evident that the research into the 
Festival would take me into many diverse aspects such as Government, 
Science, Architecture, the Arts and Design. ' In view of the large 
body of diverse and specialised nature of the evidence it became 
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immediately clear that any treatment of the Festival would require a 
high degree of selectivity. 
Using the available primary source material presented some 
problems. It must be borne in mind that many of the primary 
sources, written as they were in the jargon of the Civil Service had 
certain peculiarities of style which for the sake of authenticity I 
have decided to preserve. There were also problems of chronology. 
A great deal of the early planning of the Festival took place 
simultaneously. This difficulty was particularly evident in the 
Festival Organisation's search for sites to hold the proposed 
festival exhibitions. Many of the decisions related to this issue 
were initially discussed as a whole and agreed to. To present the 
material in this manner would have caused confusion in the mind of 
the reader. Therefore I decided to divide the early chronological 
events of the Festival even if they happened simultaneously or 
overlapped. Further, there were the difficulties with the dating of 
minutes. I had to decide which date to record - the date of the 
meeting or the date on which the minutes were typed up and sent to 
the various individuals for approval. In all cases in which dates 
of minutes are shown these are dates on which the meeting actually 
took place. On some notes and memoranda dates were not given, and 
in some cases, issues that were raised, which I was examining were 
not resolved. Where this has happened I have explained in a 
footnote. 
Furthermore, in the course of my research I have been 
fortunate enough to have been able to interview some of the men who 
shaped the Festival. Once again, where I have quoted from the 
transcribed tapes, I have been reluctant to change the style of 
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conversational interviews which of necessity differs from well 
thought out written answers. For the verification of what I heard, 
I used where possible facts that I had come upon in the minutes, as 
there has been no other secondary source to fill this gap. 
In trying to describe what the exhibitions looked like and 
what displays were shown, I have had to rely on the planners' 
intentions and the exhibition catalogues. There was no other 
alternative and this involved a certain amount of inevitably bare 
enumeration of exhibits. 
On the basis of the diversity and quantity of the material on 
the Festival, it seemed wise to give the thesis not only a 
chronological and narrative order, but to divide it into two parts. 
The first part deals with the origins and organisation of the 
Festival. The emphasis in this part naturally is on the problem 
encountered by the Government and the Festival Organisation in 
attempting to stage an exhibition in post-war Britain. This part 
reveals most clearly how in the space of one hundred years, 
Britain's position had altered radically from the one inaugurated 
and symbolised in 1851. The second part of the thesis shows what 
the Festival of Britain was in terms of its exhibitions and the 
other activities throughout the summer of 1951 in all parts of the 
Kingdom. However, in this part, with the Festival exhibitions 
displaying approximately 10,000 items, it was necessary to be 
selective while giving a broad picture of how each of the 12 
official exhibitions were designed and what they displayed. Some of 
the exhibitions, such as the South Bank, the Exhibition of 
Architecture and the Exhibitions of Industrial Power naturally lent 
themselves to well ordered visually stimulating description. Others 
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such as the Exhibition of Books and the Arts Festivals which had to 
be included in the discussion did not lend themselves as easily or 
readily to stimulating description. Regardless of this however, the 
aim of the approach I have adopted in this thesis is to give the 
reader an idea of the great vision and achievement of the men who 
presented Britain in the face of adversity with a viable 'persona' 
with which to enter positively into the second part of the twentieth 
century. Furthermore it was the Festival Council's last request, 
made initially to the incumbent Labour Government who agreed to it 
and then repeated to the newly elected Conservative Government, that 
the Government should give consideration to the publication of an 
authentic and illustrated record of genuine scholarship on the 
Festival of Britain. This History, the Council felt was important 
not only to give the public some concrete idea of how their money 
was spent, but also because: 
In accordance with the established principle that where some 
unusual type of experience has been gained in circumstances 
which it is hoped will not too shortly recur (such as a major 
war or a Festival of Britain) the experience of how to do and 
how not to do it should be properly recorded and made 
available for future administrators and students. 8 
This type of account of the Festival was never published, because 
the country's economic position as in the early years of the 
Festival's planning could not provide for it. Moreover it was the 
Treasury's maintained position that such a history or even a report 
on the Festival as also suggested by the Festival Council,, was 
unnecessary. It was their opinion 'that the British public had had 
as much Festival literature as it could stand'. 
9 
In the end a 
8. United Ringdom, Public Record Office, Cab 124/1252, Ismay to 
Eccles, 14 November 1951. 
9. Cab 124/1252 Johnstone to Nicholson, 22 November 1951. 
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short report entitled The Story of The Festival Of Britain 1951 
was compiled and published in 1952. The British public soon forgot 
about the summer of 1951. Thus thirty five years on, the process of 
rectification has begun. Not solely because of the exhibition's 
intrinsic interest to exhibition and design enthusiasts but also 
because of the standards it initiated and set in many areas of 
British life and most important of all, because of the new vision, 
persona and lease of life it gave the nation in 1951, at what might 




A PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION IN 1951 
THE IDEA OF STAGING AN INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION IN 
LONDON IN 1951 
The idea of holding an International Exhibition in London in 
1951 was first raised in December 1943 at a council meeting of the 
Royal Society of Arts, the body which had, as the Society of Arts, 
sponsored the first International Exhibition - the Great Exhibition 
of 1851. Despite the fact that the end of the war was not yet in 
sight, the members of the Society, understanding that such an event 
required early planning, set up a committee in January 1944 under 
the Chairmanship of Viscount Samuel (Vice-President of the RSA) to 
investigate the whole matter. This committee then approached the 
Royal Commission for the 1851 Exhibition with their ideas for an 
International Exhibition. However, although the Commission warmly 
received the Society's ideas, no definite action was taken. 
1 
The matter was not raised again until the end of 1945 when 
John Gtoag, an architect and member of Gordon Russell's Design 
Panel, wrote to The Times about celebrating the Centenary of 1851. 
In the letter, published on 11 September 1945, GC. oag simply asked 
for an International Exhibition to be held in 1951 to commemorate 
the anniversary of "the first occasion when the British Empire 
displayed to the world the results of its enterprise". He wrote, 
"By this time the period of shortages would be over, we could show 
for the benefit of our trade and our national prestige, our new 
mastery of industrial art". Furthermore he added, "the next six 
years offer a great opportunity for our designers and manufacturers 
to be inventive and for our statesmen to be farsighted". Is it too 
1. United Kingdom, Public Record Office, Cab 124/1252, Secretary 
of the RSA to is Lidderdale, 13 March 1951. 
1 
early", he asked, "to begin making plans for 1951? "2 
The second more notable letter appeared in The News Chronicle 
of 14 September 1945, addressed to Sir Stafford Cripps, President 
of the Board of Trade, and signed by the Chronicle's editor, Gerald 
Barry. Barry presented cogent arguments for the necessity of 
holding an International Exhibition in Britain in 1951. It would he 
stated, "provide a powerful stimulus to both manufacturers and 
designers, as well as a challenge to engineers and architects", 
moreover, "it would be the means of attracting to this country not 
only traders with millions of pounds at their disposal but large 
numbers of foreign tourists who would spend their money in the 
country and we may hope - would be encouraged to repeat their visits 
in future years". But above all, an International Exhibition would, 
he believed, "afford an opportunity for assembling in London an 
international collection of exhibits in the fields of the arts and 
of science and of representing developments in the arts and crafts 
which have taken place in the world behind the cultural blackout of 
the war". 
3 
Barry then went on to offer suggestions of possible sites for 
such an exhibition in central London : Hyde Park, Kensington 
Gardens, Green Park (with St, James's Park Lake nearby) Regents 
Park, and Battersea Park, "with its incomparable river frontage". 
They would all, he said, "provide ample space for an exhibition in 
which the north and south sides of the river could share the honours 
2. The Times, 11 September 1945. 
3. The News Chronicle, 14 September 1945. 
2 
and the advantages". If the public objected to the use of these 
parks for such a purpose, he continued : 
I can only reply that the citizens of London, who for six 
years of war were necessarily restricted in the use of these 
spaces, would surely welcome their temporary use for a project 
which would bring both credit and profit to the capital of the 
Empire while at the same time providing millions with 
enjoyment. The Thames River could come into its own as a 
highway for sightseers. It may even be that many of the 
landing-craft and ducks which would otherwise rot away on 
scrapheaps might be put to attractive use in the transport of 
visitors. 
Barry concluded his letter by stating : 
I commend this suggestion to you, sir, in spite of the immense 
preoccupations of reconstruction which are now your 
responsibility, because I believe that here is an opportunity 
for the Labour Government to give an imaginitive lead to the 
nation and the Empire in a project which would be of great 
practical help to British traders while affording active 
testimony to the spirit of enterprise and skill of the British 
people. 4 
Sir Stafford Cripps who had, in his role as President of the 
Board of Trade, been trying to encourage the British people to 
re-establish their economic position in the world by their own 
exertions, accepted the sense of Barry's arguments seeing perhaps 
another way to achieve his goals. 
5 
Thus, on 25 September 1945, a 
4. Ibid. Barry's argument that the public's use of London's 
parklands has been restricted by wartime operations was 
similar to the argument that would be put forward by Max 
Nicholson to the Lord President as to why the Government 
should allow the Festival Organisation to use Battersea Park to 
house the Festival of Britain exhibitions. This will be 
discussed more fully in Chapter 3. 
5. By the end of 1945 and the beginning of 1946 Sir Stafford was 
involved with plans to mount an exhibition in conjunction with 
the Council of Industrial Design which would highlight the 
essence of his ideas. The exhibition entitled "Britain Can 
Make it" was held in 1946 at the Victoria and Albert Museum 
and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
3 
committee was formed by B. A. Marquand, the Secretary for Overseas 
Trade (a section of the Board of Trade), "to consider in general the 
part which exhibitions can play in the promotion of export trade in 
the post-war era and in particular to consider the desirability of 
organising an International Exhibition in London in 1951". 
6 
The 
Ramsden Committee duly convened and presented its findings to the 
Government in December 1945.7 Published in a report on 27 March 
1946, they stated that the members were "strongly of the opinion 
that a first category International Exhibition should be held in 
London at the earliest practicable date, to demonstrate to the world 
the recovery of the United Kingdom from the effects of war in the 
moral, cultural, spiritual and material fields". 
8 
The 
recommendation of the committee, attractive as it was to the British 
Government, brought in its train a number of almost insurmountable 
difficulties if the standards implicit in holding a first category 
International Exhibition were properly adhered to. For example, a 
site of not less than 300 acres would need to be found, which would 
provide not only enough space for the fifty-odd participants but 
6. Cab 124/1330. 
7. The following men sat on the Ramsden Committee : Lord Ramsden 
(chairman), Sir Thomas Barlow, Sir Peter Bennett, F. B. Duncan, 
W. Evans, A. Lyles, L. Fawcett, E. W. Goodale, W. A. Lever, W. 
Lines, Sir Guy Locock, J. McLean, J. Davidson-Pratt, Lt. Col. 
A. Riggall, Sir E. Raymond Streat, R. A. Wilson. (Cab 124/1330) 
8. Board of Trade Report of the Committee appointed by the 
Secretary for Overseas Trade under the Chairmanship of Lord 
Ramsden to consider the part which exhibitions and fairs 
should play in the promotion of Export Trade in the Post War 
Era and to advise on the policy and plans to be adopted to 
derive the maximum advantage from such displays. (1946; Cmnd. 
6728) para. 66. 
4 
ensure that the total area provided for the foreign participants was 
at least equal to that of the national section. Furthermore, the 
Government would have to provide all the necessary labour and 
materials with which they could construct their pavilions. In 
addition to this, the host nation would have to bear full 
responsibility and cost for transporting not only its own exhibits, 
but those of the guest countries to and from the site, that is, to 
the guest country's chosen point of departure, be it by rail, sea or 
air, thus making adequate transportation of prime importance. If 
these initial problems were not daunting, the Committee's further 
specifications were. They stated that "since the International 
Exhibition of 1851 achieved an overwhelming success, any celebration 
of its Centenary must be staged on a scale to ensure a repetition of 
that success". In case anyone was unsure of the kind of success 
they envisaged, they specified that the planned exhibition "should 
surpass the New York World's Fair of 1939 in scale and technical 
achievement and the Paris Exhibition of 1937 in aesthetic excellence 
and personal appeal". 
9 
With the last two stipulations, the 
Committee placed the planners in a most awkward position. If the 
proposed British exhibition were to surpass the New York World's 
Fair, it would require both an unlimited supply of funds and a very 
great deal of flair and imagination, features which always 
characterize and seem to be abundant in any American undertaking. 
In addition they would need a site of considerable dimensions if 
they were even to approach the layout of the American exhibition 
which occupied 1,216.5 acres. Zb attempt to better the Paris 
9. Ibid., para. 68. 
5 
exhibition of 1937, 'in aesthetic excellence', would require that 
the layout of the city of London be as naturally magnificent as the 
city of Paris. 
10 
The Committee decided that the proposed 
exhibition's best hope of success lay with the choice of a 
suitable site. The members insisted that the exhibition be mounted in 
a capital city, which essentially meant London. Furthermore, they 
felt that it should be sited in Hyde Park with its natural beauty 
and strong historical associations. 
11 
However, in order to counter any possible critisism of the 
expense that such a vast undertaking might incur, the Committee 
cautioned the Government that : 
any such exhibition must result in considerable expenditure 
and the diversion of labour and materials at the expense of 
other urgent forms of post-war reconstruction. To justify the 
heavy expenditure of money and the large allocation of labour 
necessary to make an International Exhibition a success, it is 
essential that in the meanwhile there must hive been adequate 
progress made in the provision of dwelling-houses, schools and 
other public institutions already promised, and in addition 
sufficient industrial buildings of all classes provided to 
enable industry to function efficiently. 
12 
The recommendations of the Ramsden report were accepted at a 
10. The layout of the 1937 Paris exhibition, set in the heart of 
this great city, as were all the previous 19th century 
exhibitions was its strongest point. The architectural 
designs in the exhibition unfortunately did not live up to the 
grandeur of the site. This exhibition will be discussed more 
fully in Chapter 6. 
11. Ramsden Revatt (1946; Cmnd. 6728) paras. 69-70. 
12. Ibid., para. 72. 
6 
meeting of the Lord President's Committee on 15 March 1946.13 On 
3 April, A. A. Marquand made the following statement to the House of 
Commons: 
The Government are impressed by the views expressed in the 
Report and have decided to accept the recommendations. I am 
arranging for the necessary preparatory work to be put in 
hand. This will include the choice of a suitable site. As 
suggestions have been made that Hyde Park should be the site, 
I may as well make it clear at once that the Government are 
not prepared to see Hyde Park used for this purpose. 14 
The Government's refusal to allow Hyde Park to be used for the 
exhibition was based on the assumption that such use would encroach 
on the public's enjoyment of the park over a period of two or three 
15 
years. 
Following this announcement an Interdepartmental meeting was 
held on 30 July 1946 at the Board of Trade. Present at this meeting 
were members of the Board of Trade (including the Export Promotion 
Department), the Lord President's Office, the Treasury, the Colonial 
Office, the Scottish Office, the Ministries of Health, Town and 
Country Planning, Transport and Works. The Chairman, J. R. C. 
Helmore of the Board of Trade, explained that the meeting had been 
called in order to select sites worthy of investigation to house the 
International Exhibition. In the discussion which followed, F. J. 
Root, the representative for the Ministry of Works, pointed out that 
13. Cab 124/1330. The Committee of the Lord President of the 
Council: This Committee, headed by Herbert Morrison, the 
Lord President, contained the most senior Cabinet Ministers 
from various domestic Departments. It acted as a sort of 
preliminary Cabinet and clearing house for domestic policy 
issues from items of minor detail up to the broadest questions 
of national planning. B. Donoghue and G. W. Jones, Herbert 
Morrison Portrait of a Politician, pp. 348-349. 
14. United Kingdom, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 
5th Series, 421 (1945-46) 1251. 
15. Cab 124/1330. 
7 
the Government's rejection of the use of Hyde Park consequently 
ruled out the use of any Royal Park and probably all public open 
16 
spaces. 
The only alternative left to the members was to 'investigate 
and discuss further the possibility of using sites which were little 
used for recreation: Barnes Common, Ranelagh Club and Putney Lower 
Common, which together provided 285 acres. This combined site was 
selected because of its proximity to central London though it 
depended upon the development of transport facilities in order to be 
readily accessible, and upon the willingness of the Ministry of 
Health to consider the possibility of deferring their plans for 
housing 17,000 people on the Ranelagh Club estate; Heston Airport 
which provided 200 acres; Crystal Palace which also provided 200 
acres; Trent Park which provided 950 acres; Wormwood Scrubs which 
provided 193 acres; and Professor Holford's scheme for using the 
North and South Banks of the Thames which provided 92 acres, with an 
amusement area to be sited in Regent's Park. Although the site 
proposed by Professor Holford was by far the smallest, there were 
disadvantages in splitting up the site, as well as administration 
and transportation difficulties. The members felt that 
investigations should be made into these riverside locations on the 
basis of using the South Bank for permanent buildings. 
17 
The 
members decided that the most suitable way of investigating any of 
the sites was to set up a Working Party consisting of the 
representatives of the Ministries of Town and Country Planning, 
16. Cab 124/1330, BoT Interdepartmental Meeting, 30 July 1946. 
17. Ibid. 
8 
Transport and Works, the London County Council and the 
ExportPromotion Department of the Board of Trade, which would 
investigate further only four of the six sites already mentioned. 
The sites in their brief were: Barnes Common and Ranelagh Club and 
Putney Lower Common, Wormwood Scrubs; the South Bank of the Thames; 
and Crystal Palace. The members concluded their meeting by stating 
that it would be desirable for the Working Party to submit a 
considered report, within a month, stating the relative suitability 
of the four sites in question with due regard to the 
responsibilities of the other departments concerned. 
18 
18. Ibid. The men who formed the Working Party were: W. M. Ogden, 
of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning; A. R. Lintern, 
H. B. Aldington and A. H. G. Trench, of the Ministry of 
Transport; R. A. Barker, F. W. Wright and D. W. Odell, of the 
Ministry of Works; H. R. Oswald, of the London County Council; 
R. E. J. Moore and C. J. Homewood, of the Export Promotion 
Department of the Board of Trade. 
9 
THE SEARCH FOR A SITE 
In the course of its short investigative life (they presented 
their final report to the Interdepartmental Committee on 17 
September 1946) the Working Party was able to reveal the numerous 
problems that the austerity-ridden nation would encounter by trying 
to host a first category International Exhibition. In considering 
the four sites presented to them by the Board of Trade, the Working 
Party reviewed each site with regard to the size of the area, the 
location and amenities, ' available transportation facilities, the 
absence of conflict with other projects and finally suitability for 
the erection of a permanent building for the British Industries 
Fair. 
19 
Barnes Common, Ranelagh Club and Putney Lower Common was 
the first site to be rejected on the grounds that part of the site 
had been earmarked by the Ministry of Health for housing 17,000 
people, thus reducing the total available acreage considerably. 
Furthermore, the proximity of, the area to Putney and Barnes 
Cemetries presented a visual disadvantage. Added to these 
difficulties, an adequate transportation system would have to be 
installed exclusively for the exhibition. 
19. Cab 124/1330, Report of the Working Party on the 1951 
exhibition site, 17 September 1946. The Ramsden Report 
recommended that the BIF should be concentrated in one 
centre. A site, preferably, but not necessarily in central 
London should be secured for the erection of permanent 
buildings, to house both the BIF and other exhibitions, which 
should be of a type capable of extension and adaptation as 




The Working 'Party felt that the 193 acres provided by the 
Wormwood Scrubs site would be insufficient because there was little 
possibility of extending the site to the south and east, and in 
addition to this, the problems of providing suitable access by road 
were almost insuperable. However, the Working Party's most important 
reason for rejecting this site was for what they described as the 
area's "bad psychological associations" which they felt could not 
even be overcome with a change of name and a prolonged publicity 
campaign. 
20 
The third area examined by the Committee was the South Bank 
scheme decided by Professor Bolford: the scheme provided 69 acres on 
the South Bank and 23 acres on the North Bank in the St. Paul's area 
which, when combined, would give an overall area of 92 acres. The 
amusement park, an obligatory feature of every international 
Exhibition, would be situated in 150 acres in the undeveloped part 
of Regent's Park. 
21 Herbert Morrison (the Lord President)' had 
been so strongly in favour of this scheme that he had written to 
A. A. Marquand on 21 March 1946 indicating his approbation: 
I would, therefore, urge that before any other site is chosen 
a very careful examination should be made of the possibilities 
of the South Bank of the Thames in the area between say London 
Bridge and Vauxhall Bridge, or between Waterloo and 
Westminster Bridges. For instance, between Southwark Bridge 
and Waterloo, or between Lambeth Bridge and Vauxhall Bridge, 
there are quite considerable areas which seem worth 
investigating and there is a possible (though smaller) site 
adjoining the County Hall and Waterloo Station. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Professor Holford: Professor of Planning of London University, 
Chief Research Officer for the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning. Together with P. Abercrombie he devised a scheme 
for the redevelopment of the blitzed City of London, as well 
as the reconstruction of the South Bank Scheme. He was also 
largely responsible for drawing up the Town and Country- Act of 
1947. 
11 
Morrison acknowledging- the South Bank's physical defects, 
still defended its selection, saying : 
I appreciate the difficulties of securing a large enough site 
without coming up against railway viaducts, but given anything 
like as much ingenuity as was shown at Paris this handicap 
could be overcome and, as long-term plans for the development 
of the South Bank and for the removal of the railway viaducts 
mature, the buildings could be added to and the amenities 
improved. In choosing the South Bank we would be able to make 
use of the waterfront with the historic landmarks of the North 
Bank as a background. The publicity advantages would be 
immense ... I know there will be all sorts of arguments on the 
other side, but a decision to combine the exhibition with 
giving the South Bank its natural place in London's life will 
provide an impetus for the whole scheme which we cannot afford 
to ignore. 22 
Despite Morrison's arguments, the Working Party ruled out the 
use of the South Bank site stating, "we cannot believe that 
the legal and physical problems involved in using this area for 
the exhibition would be solved in time to allow the completion of 
the necessary work". Although the South Bank could eventually yield 
125 acres, the legal problem to get this acreage would involve the 
massive resettlement of the local commercial and residential 
population that inhabited the area despite its war-ravaged state. 
The physical obstacles included: a discontinuous frontage, 
transportation problems and linkage difficulties of the four 
principal areas lying near to the site and to the amusement ground 
which, they said should be situated possibly in Battersea Park. 
23 
The last site to be investigated was at Crystal Palace, but 
this too was ruled out= factors in its favour had been its 
historical association with the Great Exhibition, its established 
reputation as an exhibition centre, and the known readiness of the 
22. Cab 124/1330, Morrison to Marquand, 21 March 1946. 
23. Ibid. Working Party Report on the site, 17 September 1946. 
12 
Crystal Palace Trustees to. do all in their power to make the 200 
acres available. However, there was little hope of securing any 
former 
substantial additional space adjoining the grounds of the^ Palace. 
Furthermore, the existing access by road and rail was regarded by 
the Ministry of Transport as insufficient and any improvements made 
would, they felt, only be useful during the life of the 
exhibition. 
24 
Realising the difficulties of searching for an exhibition site 
in London, the Working Party decided to consider another scheme 
devised by Professor Holford, this time set outside London in 
Osterley Park. Of all the sites the Working Party examined, they 
recommended Osterley Park as the most suitable area to house the 
proposed exhibition. 
25 
It was a well laid out and spacious site, 
providing 640 acres and, with the use of the adjoining lands, a 
total of 800 acres was available. Furthermore, being situated near 
to the proposed London Airport, the transportation facilities which 
were being planned for the airport could, they believed, be adapted 
with comparative ease to meet the needs of the exhibition. However, 
despite the site's obvious advantages, the Working Party felt it 
necessary to point out certain facts which finally established, 
without doubt, the serious miscalculation on the part of the 
Government in thinking that the British post-war domestic economy 
could possibly support the overwhelming burdens that an 
International Exhibition would inflict. The Working Party explained 




of £20 million in labour and materials alone, and a further £50 
million for improving the transportation facilities, specifically 
two new railway routes required from central London, as well as 
roadworks. 
26 
Furthermore, the vast constructional work involved 
would, the Working Party felt, cause a serious drain on the labour 
force available for other priority works, requiring as it would 
approximately 20,000 men in 1948,25,000 in 1949 and 28,000 in 
1950.27 
The final report of the Working Party was presented to the 
Interdepartmental Committee of the Board of Trade on 17 September 
1946. Two days after the presentation of the report, the Committee 
met to discuss the Working Party's recommendation that the 
exhibition should be situated in Osterley Park. The members decided 
that before any decision was made or a report presented to the 
Ministers on Osterley Park, the proposal should be submitted to the 
Investment Working Party (IWP) for their consideration. This view 
was fully supported by their Minister, Sir Stafford Cripps, the 
President of the Board of Trade. ' The IWP, which was composed of 
representatives from the Treasury, the Central Statistical Office 
(Cabinet Economic Section), the Board of Trade, the Ministries of 
Health, Labour, Agriculture, Supply, Transport, Works and Town and 
Country Planning and the Scottish Office, met on 25 October 1946. 
The Chairman, Sir Bernard Gilbert, opened the, meeting by stating 
26.. A very substantial part of this expenditure on transport 
facilities would they pointed out be necessary in any case in 
connection with the proposed London Airport and other 
long-term needs. 
27. Work 25/7. 
14 
that the normal function of the IWP was to consider the timing of 
investment projects but, as far as the 1951 exhibition was 
concerned, this function was clearly inappropriate as the exhibition 
had already been fixed for 1951. He therefore proposed that the 
members should discuss the consequences of holding an exhibition in 
1951 and produce a factual report on the economic cost of the 
exhibition as soon as possible, which would be sent to Sir Stafford, 
who had asked for the report to be made. 
28 
The IWP's request confirmed the initial warnings made by the 
Board of Trade's Working Party. Their report, concentrating on the 
effects which the proposed exhibition would have on types of 
building and civil engineering works, confirmed the Board of Trade's 
Working Party's figures for labour requirements from 1948-1950, 
although it stated that the works(that is road and rail) carried out 
by the labour force would ultimately be needed as part of the 
general plans for improving communications in and around London. 
Moreover, the effect of the exhibition, the report confirmed, would 
be to "bring forward into the immediate future schemes which would 
otherwise not be started for seven or eight years". 
29 Regardless 
of this, however the report went on to state that judging from the 
requirements already submitted to the Ministry of Works by various 
Departments, for direct work and licenced private work, it would be 
fair to assume that there would be a shortage of about 70,000 people 
in the building industry in the London region throughout the period 
28. Cab 124/1331, Investment Working Party Meeting, 25 October 
1946. 
29. Ibid. Investment Working Party, Report on 1951 Exhibition, 1 
November 1946. 
15 
in which the exhibition was being constructed. The priorities in 
that period were, the report stated, essential projects such as 
housing, railways, waterworks, sewage and generating schemes, as 
well as maintenance work, which could no longer be shelved. 
Furthermore, the labour required for the construction of Heathrow 
Airport and the new Government office had to be considered, and the 
Board of Trade and the Ministry of Supply estimated further that 
between 20,000 and 30,000 building workers would be required in the 
London area for the construction of private factories and offices. 
The labour requirements were, the report continued, between one 
quarter and one third of the requirements for all other major new 
works in the London area. The report concluded that the exhibition 
would make very heavy demands on building materials, the extent of 
which could not be fully assessed. As an example of the 
exhibition's building materials requirements, the report highlighted 
the needs of the new underground railways which were regarded as 
essential ancillaries to the exhibition= for their construction, 
about 50,000 tons of steel and between 400-500,000 tons of cast iron 
would be required. The report concluded that "as the prospective 
shortage of steel (and correspondingly of iron) will amount to some 
2 million tons in 1947 and is unlikely to disappear in the years 
immediately following, the exhibition will have a substantial impact 
on this sphere as well". 
30 
The findings of the Investment Working Party were presented to 
Sir Stafford Cripps who, on seeing these figures, was forced to 
admit that the prospect of diverting such a substantial proportion 
30. Ibid. 
16 
of the labour and materials available in the London area was not 
feasible and that perhaps the project ought to be abandoned. 
However, before announcing a definite decision as to the fate of the 
proposed exhibition, Sir Stafford felt that the views of the Royal 
Society of Arts' members should be canvassed. On 18 December 1946, 
the members of the Committee set up by- the Royal Society to 
investigate the 1951 exhibition, led by Viscount Samuel, visited Sir 
Stafford and presented strongly to him their view that the 
Government's decision to exclude Hyde Park, as a possible site for 
the exhibition, was taken without any real knowledge of the probable 
reactions of the public to such a proposal. 
31 
To find out what 
the reaction of the public would be, the members of the Society 
proposed to hold a conference of representatives of interested 
organisations and groups within the community in order to consider 
the feasibility of a large international exhibition in Hyde Park 
either in 1951 or later. 
32 Sir Stafford decided to wait for the 
outcome of this conference before announcing the Government's 
decision. 
33 
The Conference was held on 6 February 1947 at the RSA with 
representatives from 101 organisations present. The response of the 
delegates to the proposition of holding an exhibition in 1951 in 
Hyde Park was mixed. While the majority of representatives felt 
31. Cab 124/1331, Memo by Sir Stafford Cripps to Lord President's 
Committee, March 1946. 
32. U. K. Royal Society of Arts, "Memo by Viscount Bennett to 150 
organisations", Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, XCV (17 
January 1947), p. 115. 
33. Cab 124/1331, Memo by Sir Stafford Cripps to the Lord 
President's Committee, March 1946. 
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that there should be an exhibition in 1951, some, like Mr. Jacobs, 
Secretary of the London Trades Council and C. H. Gilkes of the 
Headmaster's Conference, disagreed.. Both Jacobs and Gilkes based 
their objections on the March 1947 shortages of materials and 
labour. Jacobs said that his Executive opposed the scheme "as an 
unwarranted waste of men and materials at the present time". He 
continued : 
Hundreds of thousands were homeless, and whatever the press 
said, materials were short. Hundreds of thousands of work 
people, and some of the best craftsmen the unions could supply 
would be required. They could not be spared from building the 
houses of ordinary people. The exhibition would take longer 
than a year to build. The experience of the New York and 
Paris exhibitions had proved that it would make us more, not 
less lethargic, to realise that men and materials were being 
used to build not homes but an exhibition. 34 
Furthermore, he said that London had insufficient hotels to house 
all the visitors to London and his Executive was not in favour 
of building hotels instead of homes for the people. At any other 
time, he concluded, "his council would have supported an exhibition 
but at the moment they thought the project ill-advised,. and 
regretted to say that if a decision were taken to go on with it, 
they would actively oppose it". Cilkes, on behalf of the 
educational authorities, said that his school had suffered 
war-damage and he had been told that he could not even apply to 
rebuild it for another five years. "It was nonsense", he said, "to 
suggest that the situation in 1951, in the educational world at 
least would not be completely disastrous". Other 
representatives, while wishing to see an exhibition in 1951, did 
not wish to see it situated in Hyde Park= they felt that Crystal 
34. "Conference on the Proposed 1951 Exhibition", Journal of the 
RSA, XCV (14 March 1947), p. 232. 
18 
Palace, or better still, the South Bank site, would be a perfectly 
good setting, arguing that it would be better to wipe out its 
unsightliness and create something of new and lasting value, rather 
than destroy something of beauty. Viscount Samuel sent a report of 
the meeting to Sir Stafford on 14 February 1947 and asked for an 
interview with him to discuss the findings. 
35 On 26 February 
1947, Sir Stafford replied to Samuel thanking him for sending the 
report. He said : 
I find this very interesting and I am struck by the 
resemblance between the various opinions expressed and our own 
views some months back, before a detailed assessment of the 
implications of the proposal had been made with expert 
advice. This assessment proved most disappointing, and I fear 
that the Conference had done (and, indeed, could do) little to 
reassure me that the heavy demand upon construction labour 
could be undertaken without serious diversion from more 
immediate necessities. The larger proportion of this labour 
would be required not for construction on the site, but for 
the transport improvements essential to carry the heavy 
traffic anticipated. 
He concluded his letter to Samuel by stating that "there is little 
possibility of the Society's faith in the project outweighing the 
facts which examination has brought to light", adding that if they 
felt it necessary, they could arrange a meeting not with him but 
with Marquand, the Secretary for Overseas Trade. 
36 
The RSA's conference was unable to alter the course on which 
the Government now seemed set. Sir Stafford Cripps reported to the 
Lord President's Committee in March 1947 that he now had to suggest, 
albeit with some reluctance, that the Government "should now frankly 
say that having examined, in detail the estimated cost of an 
35. Ibid., p. 237. 
36. lb id., p. 238. 
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exhibition in labour and material, it could not at present favour a 
large scale project which might seriously conflict with housing and 
with general industrial, transport and public utility 
development. " 
37 
Regardless of this, however, he felt strongly that 1951 should 
be marked by some outstanding event. The question that was now 
preoccupying the officials was what event or series of events would 
be worthy or such an auspicious date. As he explained in his 
memorandum to the Lord President's Committee, Sir Stafford had begun 
to look for viable alternatives, as early as December 1946, when the 
possibility of holding an international Exhibition was slowly 
fading. He had asked for an examination to be made of the 
possibility of holding an outstanding British Industries Fair in new 
permanent buildings on the Osterley Park site, in the hope that this 
would serve as the first step towards developing the site for an 
International Exhibition in 1956, if Britain had to withdraw her 
claim for 1951. However, the estimates he received for this 
seemingly simple request were, he said, formidable. The main 
expenditure, he explained, would be for transport facilities, with 
the total cost of the project amounting to about £36 million and 
involving a labour force of 11,000 in 1948,14,000 in 1949 and 
16,000 in 1950. Facing these facts he was forced once again to 
conclude that : 
this suggestion must also be ruled out and that, in the light 
of the uncertainties as to the position in 1956 and the 
impractability of a second deferment, it would be preferable 
to announce indefinite postponement and to reconsider the 
37. Cab 124/1331, Memo by Sir Stafford Cripps to the Lord 
President's Committee, March 1946. 
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project in two or_three years time when the competing claims 
on our national resources can be more clearly seen. 38 
In spite of this second setback, Sir Stafford still clung to 
the idea that the Centenary of 1851 had to be celebrated. He 
suggested the year could be marked, if it was possible, by the 
opening of a permanent exhibition building situated either on the 
South Bank, Crystal Palace or Alexandra Palace. The new building 
would be equipped with administrative facilities to act as a 
reception centre for overseas commercial visitors, and the British 
Industries Fair would be its first occupant. An area of 35 acres 
would be needed for the project, with construction costs estimated 
at the considerably cheaper sum of E8.5 million. In addition to 
this, he said he was hoping to arrange for the staging of an 
exhibition in conjunction with the Council of Industrial Design, 
which would be housed in the same building, after the British 
Industries Fair, and would display the latest developments in 
British design. This display would possibly be executed along the 
same lines as the recent "Britain Can Make It" Exhibition of 
194639 He added that there might be a cultural exhibition 
combined with these events in 1951, where it would be located was, 
however, still a matter for consideration. Sir Stafford concluded 
his memo by asking his colleagues to agree to the announcement being 
38. mid. 
39. Ibid. "The Britain Can Make It" Exhibition 1946. This 
exhibition was held in the Victoria and Albert Museum and as 
the title implies was designed to show that Britain could 
literally and figuratively make it after the war. Displaying 
6,000 products from 1,300 firms newly switched from warwork, 
none of the goods exhibited were for home consumption .. 9 all 
of them much to the public's disappointment was marked for 
export only. See pp. 508k-51x. for a fuller discussion of this 
exhibition. 
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made, without further delay, that no "first category" International 
Exhibition would be held in London in 1951; and that the possibility 
of such an exhibition being held in London would be considered in a 
few years time. He further asked for permission to say that for the 
occasion, consideration was being given to the construction and 
opening of an exhibition hall in 1951, which would house the British 
Industries Fair, as well as an industrial design exhibition and a 
cultural display. 
On March 28,1947 Sir Stafford made the following statement to 
the House of Commons : 
The possibility of holding an International Exhibition in 
London in 1951 has been the subject of long and careful 
inquiry. I have, as a result, most reluctantly concluded that 
it would be impossible to stage such an exhibition in that 
year, involving large scale demands on labour and materials, 
without impeding the progress of urgent tasks of 
reconstruction .... The Centenary of the Great Exhibition of 
1851 should, however be marked by some national display. 
Methods can undoubtedly be found involving relatively little 
new construction work outside the programme already in the 
course of planning. These might include a cultural festival 
as well as a design display on the lines of the recent 
"Britain Can Make It" Exhibition. 40 
The Labour administration had managed to extricate itself from 
the costly requirements of an International Exhibition but, not from 
the idea of celebrating the Centenary of 1851. Being the shrewd 
group of politicians they undoubtedly were, they realised that they 
had to do something, for the idea of holding an International 
Exhibition had been debated and discussed in Parliament, and the 
public, with the aid of the press had been led to believe that it 
would be held. Furthermore, perhaps they too felt compelled to 
40. UK, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (OOmmons), 5th Series, 
435 (1946-47), 241-242. 
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remember the halcyon days of the Victorian era, for, although they 
were socialists committed to the long awaited social change, they 
were, first and foremost, British and as such, they understood 
instinctively the emotive symbolism of 1851, realising that in some 
way the date had to be acknowledged. The proposals that they now 
put forward would not involve the financial outlay or drain on 
scarce resources that an International Exhibition would have done. 
On the other hand, even though the reduced celebrations were now the 
only option, the nation would be expected to present a display that 
was both excellent in its own right and at the same time, a worthy 
successor to the Great Exhibition, recapturing its spirit while 
emphasising the symbolism that was the essence of 1851. 
23 
THE NATIONAL EXHIBITION IN 1951 
With Sir Stafford's announcement, the proposed project was 
turned over to the Lord President's office, with Morrison acting as 
the minister in charge, as Sir Stafford's sphere of interest did not 
include arranging an exhibition of this nature. The proposals that 
were now being discussed for the centenary, the special British 
Industries Fair, the Design Display and possibly a cultural festival 
had been emerging in the course of departmental discussions held as 
early as December 1946, four months before Sir Stafford's 
announcement. On 15 January 1947 Miss Glasgow, Secretary-General of 
the Arts Council was approached by J. Lidderdale, Secretary of the 
Lord President's office, to find out if the Arts Council would be 
prepared to sponsor a cultural exhibition in 1951, which would be 
held in conjunction with the annual UNESCO Conference, if Britain's 
bid to host the conference was successful. Miss Lidderdale 
explained to Miss Glasgow that much of the work for the exhibition 
would be handled through the COID and, furthermore, she envisaged, 
she said, an exhibition that would be more diffuse in form than the 
usual type of exhibition housed under one roof. 
41 
Mary Glasgow's 
response to this invitation was to state that while the Arts 
Council were very much flattered by the invitation, she felt that it 
was altogether too big a job for her Organisation which had a small 
staff, all of whose energies were devoted to the encouragement of 
music and the arts in the country as a whole, especially in the 
41. Cab 124/1331, Memo by J. Lidderdale to Nicholson, 15 January 
1947. 
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regional areas. She said that she could not see how the arranging 
of a Cultural Exhibition in 1951 could be managed by the Council 
without disturbing its normal course of duties, but that she would 
discuss the matter with the Chairman, Sir Ernest Pooley, and later 
put the matter before the Executive Committee of the Council. 
42 
On 16 January, Mary Glasgow contacted Miss Lidderdale to inform her 
that she had discussed the matter of the Arts council's acting as 
the Government's agent for a Cultural Exhibition with the Chairman, 
and though he was very interested in this proposition, he agreed 
that such a task could not be undertaken by them without enlarging 
the staff of the Council. He was, however, prepared to discuss the 
subject with his Vice Chairman and the Executive Committee. 
43 
Following these exchanges between the lord President's office 
and the Arts Council, an informal meeting was held on 23 January 
1947 in the rooms of Sir John Maud of the Ministry of Education, 
attended by representatives of the Ministry of Education (D. H. 
Leadbetter), the Lord President's Office (M. Nicholson, J. Lidderdale) 
the Board of Trade (D. H. Lyall, A. E. Miles Davies) and Mary Glasgow 
of the Arts Council. D. H. Lyall outlined the ideas that had so far 
been agreed to at the Board of Trade. The British Industries Fair 
and Design Display he said would be separate, it would need, judging 
from its proposed layout, an area of between 20-30 acres, and the 
favoured site for it was Crystal Palace. The representatives then 
turned their attention to discussing the nature of the proposed 
42. Ibid. 
43. Cab 124/1331, Memo by Lidderdale to Nicholson, 16 January 1947. 
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cultural exhibition. The ideas that emerged were that there would 
be an exhibition which would be partly an "exhibition" and partly a 
"Festival", held at different locations. 
44 
The overall cultural 
exhibition would be described as a "Festival" rather than an 
exhibition because this gave the idea more clearly, of a succession 
of events held in different places rather than a static spectacle in 
one large building or in one area. 
45 
Further views were expressed 
as to whether the Festival should be national or international. Sir 
John Maud said that if the event was linked to UNESCO Month in 
London in 1951, there would be no obligation to make it 
international. Nicholson further added that it might, however, be 
desirable to invite selected countries to send perhaps a ballet or 
theatre company to London at this time. The representatives then 
discussed the matter of the exhibition/festival's scope. Sir John 
Maud said that he visualised a Fine Arts exhibition and a festival 
which would include the sciences. However, it was concluded that as 
the plans were not finalised it was difficult to get a clear picture 
of the scope of the exhibition/festival. 
46 
However, by February 1947, a clearer picture emerged of the 
nature of the events being planned for 1951. On 17 February 1947, 
in his report, Nicholson outlined the ideas that had so far been 
agreed upon: the proposed British Industries Fair would be housed in 
a permanent exhibition building; a Design Display would be sponsored 
by the COID; and the Arts Council were to sponsor and arrange a 
cultural festival which would include an exhibition of the Arts and 
44. Cab 124/1331, Note for the record, 27 January 1947. 
45. Cab 124/1332, Arts Council Minutes, 29 January 1947. 
46. Ibid. Note for the record, 27 January 1947. 
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Sciences. This c\iltural festival, Nicholson explained, was favoured 
by the Board of Trade as a means of attracting tourists to London; 
by the Ministry of Education "as an opportunity for using the value 
of the 1851 Centenary to review and stimulate British progress in 
the arts and civilization"; and by the Lord President who perc6. ved 
the event as an opportunity for advertising Britain's contribution 
to modern civilization. 
47 At the Lord President's request, it was 
agreed that an exhibition of the sciences would be included in the 
Cultural Festival; for it was his view that prominence should be 
given to the particularly important role science had and still 
played in Britain's contribution to civilization. 
48 
This belief 
can of course be understood in light of the fact that at the end of 
the war, the country at large was revelling in a celebration of the 
inventiveness of her scientists and technologists, who were being 
regarded not only as being unsurpassed in the world, but also as 
having played a major part in helping the country defeat the might 
of the German war-machine. 
49 
Nicholson continued his explanation of the content of the 
Cultural Festival by stating that it was still not yet determined 
what its scope should be and who would participate in it. However, 
what had been determined, he said, was that it would cover drama, 
music, opera, ballet, painting, sculpture, photography, films, 
books, science and technology, with the main emphasis in these areas 
47. Cab 124/1231, Report by Nicholson on the proposed 1951 
Exhibition, 19 February 1947. Nicholson was an adviser to the 
Lord President; his role in the nascent Festival will be 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
48. Cab 124/1331, Note for the record, 15 February 1947. 
49. Correlli Barnett, The Audit of War, p. 3. 
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being the British contribution to these fields. It might be 
possible, he said, to invite the Dominions and Colonies to make 
selected contributions to the festival. It would, in any event, be 
necessary to set up an official committee made up from 
representatives of the various Government departments, outside 
bodies such as the RSA, and the Royal Academy which would oversee 
the general arrangements for 1951. In addition to this, the 
exhibitions for the year would be organised by the Central Office of 
Information (COI), the organisers of all Government-sponsored 
exhibitions, in conjunction with the Arts Council which would, in 
this instance, be the COI's "client". If it proved acceptable, it 
was further hoped, he said, that it would be possible for the 
Cultural Festival to be organised on a decentralised basis with 
simultaneous shows being staged in Scotland and Wales as well as in 
other suitable places such as Oxford, Cambridge, Stratford-upon-Avon 
and York. 
so 
The idea of decentralising the cultural festival had 
originally been put to Nicholson by the Arts Council, and he 
accepted their interesting suggestion because, as he explained in a 
letter to Mary Glasgow: 
We have had great difficulty with Scotland, and to some extent 
with Wales, over the growing concentration of important things 
in London, and I expect the Government would be very much 
welcome giving prominence to separate Scottish and Welsh 
elements in the proposed festival with the utmost practicable 
devolution of responsibility. The Lord President made a 
strong bid to get the recent "Britain Can Make It" Exhibition 
sent to Glasgow, but it unfortunately proved impracticable on 
grounds of expense, and Scotland had to be left out as 
usual. 51 
50. Cab 123/1331, Report by Nicholson, 19 February 1947. 
51 Ibid. Nicholson to Glasgow, 20 February 1947. 
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on 14 March 1947, Nicholson wrote to Sir John Maud of the 
Ministry of Education to say that the new proposals for 1951 had 
in principle been agreed to by the Lord President's Committee, 
subject to any serious objections being raised. The only objection, 
he said, was raised by the Ministry of Works, which felt that "a 
project requiring £8.5 million on construction work could only be 
carried out at the expense of all kinds of other important projects 
such as housing, new towns, transport and government buildings". 
The idea of a design display and an exhibition of arts and sciences 
had however been approved. Nicholson informed Maud that he had 
spoken to Mary Glasgow and that she had agreed to prepare a report 
on the possible organisation of the arts festival. He also added 
that the Arts Council, although aware that their Charter did not 
include "science", were prepared to organise a science and 
technology exhibition. Nicholson said that he had agreed to this on 
condition that the council consulted the Department of Scientific 
and Industrial Research (DSIR) and other research councils and the 
COI as the group responsible for mounting the exhibitions. 
52 
During this period of planning' a national exhibition, there 
were individuals from Government departments, in particular the 
Treasury, who felt that the proposals for the exhibition were too 
limited in scope. Their main concern was that the topics they 
deemed important, apart from the arts, science and technology, were 
not included in the exhibition programme. The idea of introducing a 
wider spectrum of subject matter into the exhibition was first 
52. Cab 124/1331, Nicholson to Sir John Maud, 14 March 1947. 
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raised in a letter from Mr. Hale of the Treasury, to Max Nicholson 
of the Lord President's Office. He stated plainly that he found it, 
difficult to conceive a display illustrating the British 
contribution to civilization without a Commonwealth and Empire 
theme of some sort, and that even on the United Kingdom side, 
our contribution to civilization (apart from Fine Arts) seems 
inadequately reflected by isolated sections of industrial 
design and scientific and technical accomplishment. The 
suggestion is that our contribution to the field of self 
government, social services, and law and order has been far 
more outstanding than in the field of industrial design, and 
that such things are not outside the scope of modern 
exhibition techniques. 53 
They envisaged an exhibition that would include a comparison of the 
state of working class housing in 1851 to that of 1951,, as well as 
an illustration of the health services. 
54 
The Lord President and his staff rejected these suggestions 
because they felt that their inclusion would be a mistake. 
55 
Morrison acknowledged the desire of various individuals to broaden 
the range of the exhibition, but refused to do so on the grounds 
that the resources available for the exhibition were too limited to 
include visual presentations of this nature. However, to placate 
any ruffled feelings he said that he would allow the organisers of 
the exhibition some latitude in the arranging of the various 
sections. Moreover, he conceded: 
If, for instance, the United Nations Educational Scientific 
and Cultural Organisations were to hold their annual 
conference in London in 1951, then there would be a case for 
including a separate section devoted to education, or, for 
giving emphasis to it in other ways. 56 
53. Cab 124/1332, Hale to Nicholson, June 12 1947. 
54. Cab 132/6. 
55. Max Nicholson, Interview held at 13 Upper Cheyne Row, London, 
20 January 1984. 
56. Cab 124/1332, Draft by Lord President, June 1947. 
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The real reason for the exclusion of these high minded ideas 
lay not with their potential cost, which was a convenient scapegoat 
on Morrison's part, but with the kind of exhibition Morrison and his 
staff, in particular Max Nicholson were beginning to conceptualise. 
The exhibition, they decided, was going to provide unity for the 
nation and, as such, subjects that might prove politically 
contentious or divisive had at all costs to be avoided. 
Furthermore, the exhibition was going to be used as a platform from 
which the public were to be shown the numerous possibilities that 
post-war Britain held for them. In order to do this, the exhibition 
had to be weighted in favour of design and science and technology as 
a means of illustrating some of these opportunities. The view held 
by the Lord President and his staff was that displays on law and 
order and the social services would not only be difficult to 
translate into visual terms but, more importantly, such displays 
could only give a backward looking picture. The accent of this 
exhibition was, in their mind's eye, clearly on Britain's future in 
the post-war era, on what she had to contribute not only to her own 
citizens, but to the world at large. 
57 
Thus the proposed national exhibition would remain a cultural, 
industrial and scientific affair. On 3 April 1947 the Arts (buncil 
presented the report which Nicholson had requested on the Cultural 
Festival, to the Lord President's office. In the Arts Council's 
plan the British Industries Fair and the exhibition of industrial 
design would merely form a "valuable background" for the proposed 
57. Nicholson, Interview, 20 January 1984. 
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Cultural Festival. 
58 The Festival would, the Council said, be 
held over an eight week period between- June and August and would 
include music, drama, opera, ballet and films. It would be housed 
in existing concert halls and theatres and certain buildings not 
normally used for such purposes, such as Hampton Court Palace and 
Greenwich Palace, and it was hoped one or two new concert halls, 
which were being planned, might be ready to use by 1951. In 
addition to these events, the council said there would be relatively 
small, highly-selective, historical displays of painting, sculpture, 
photography, books, industrial design and science and technology, 
which would also probably be held in existing buildings, or, if 
possible, in newly constructed exhibition spaces. If they were to 
be held in existing buildings, the Directors of the National Museums 
(and other required buildings) would be contacted as soon as the 
details were finalised. The Arts Council decided that the festival 
should only illustrate the work of Britain; this, however, did not 
mean, they explained, with specific reference to the arts, that only 
British plays and music could be performed, or only British pictures 
or films could be shown. It would mean they said "that the 
resources of this country alone would be relied upon and no 
official invitations would be issued to foreign countries to send 
representative artists or works of art". 
59 
The report confirmed that the music and drama would not be 
confined to London but would cover as much of the country as 
possible, taking in already established festivals such as those in 
58. Cab 124/1331, Notes on possible organisation of a Festival of 
Arts in 1951,3 April 1947. 
59. Ibid. 
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Edinburgh, Stratford-upon-Avon and Malvern. The report of the Arts 
Council went on to suggest the possible composition of the 
organisation which would' be set up to arrange the Cultural Festival: 
there would be a Cabinet Minister responsible to Parliament at the 
summit; a General Council of the exhibition composed of responsible 
Ministers and others chosen for their personal distinction; below 
this, the Arts Council as programme directors, with one specially 
appointed individual to direct the operation who would be 
responsible to the Council; and below this there would be a 
specialist committee to cover the fields of science and industrial 
design, composed of individuals representing existing organisations 
such as the COID, who would help to organise the specifics of the 
exhibitions. The Festival should, the Council concluded, be under 
the direction of a single body with a single individual responsible 
for it, and the Council recommended themselves most strongly as 
being a suitable body for this kind of operation. In terms of 
financing the festival, the Council did not feel that the outlay 
would be great and even predicted a profit. Most of the performance 
in opera, ballet and drama would be given under the individual 
management of the theatres and concert halls involved, and could be 
arranged as part of a normal programme. The programme would, they 
said, probably be arranged directly by the festival organisation, 
but the receipts for these could be expected to balance, in many 
cases, with the expenditure, and the total net expenditure on a 
cultural festival would, they predicted, be under £250,000. The 
Arts Council concluded their report by stating that to organise such 




The proposals presented by the Arts Council were further 
discussed at a meeting on 16 April 1947 between A. A. Marquand, now 
the Paymaster General and acting on behalf of the Lord President, 
and the members of the RSA, the initial advocates of a celebration 
in 1951. At this meeting four tentative proposals were discussed. 
it was decided that there should be a festival of arts, a film 
festival, an exhibition of industrial design and an exhibition of 
science and technology. Following this decision, the next subject 
discussed at the meeting was the whole role envisaged for the Arts 
Council in the festival. The members of the RSA felt that it was 
impractical to grant the Arts Council the sole responsibility for 
organising the exhibition because the Arts Council's principle 
function as stated in its Charter was to promote and encourage the 
fine arts. Therefore, the members rightly concluded it would be 
difficult for them to arrange an exhibition that would adequately 
illustrate the impact of science and technology on British society. 
Nor could it, for that matter, they concluded, mount an exhibition 
that would show the importance of industrial design. A solution to 
this problem was provided by lord Samuel who suggested that a strong 
central organisation should be created for the life of the 
exhibition, with a Director General of some standing appointed to 
organise and direct it. 
61 
The arguments raised at the RSA meeting 
about the role of the Arts Council in the proposed exhibition had 
60. Ibid. 
61. Works 25/7. 
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been voiced earlier on by other knowledgeable and interested 
parties. As early as February 1947, Hale of the Treasury wrote to 
Nicholson acknowledging receipt of the latter's report on the 
proposals for 1951, 
I note that the Arts Council are cast for the role of staging 
a cultural exhibition, probably including an exhibition of 
arts 'and science'. The last two words rather surprised me as 
the Council's scope under their Royal Charter is "the fine 
arts exclusively". I have made some inquiry, and I understand 
that while they are prepared to cover photography and films, 
which can be held to be "fine arts", they have not so far seen 
their way to go further; nor do I see how they could do so. 
They are certainly quite unequipped to stage for example, an 
exhibition of radar. I suggest that if a science exhibition 
is to be included in the plans for 1951, you will have to get 
some other agency to run it. 62 
The position of the Arts Council was further questioned by the 
Council of Industrial Design. On 24 April 1947, S. C. Leslie, the 
Director of the Council of Industrial Design, wrote to Nicholson 
about the proposed plan of the national exhibition. The Council, he 
said, was quite happy with the proposed layout of the exhibition, 
but wondered whether they could, in view of their experience in 
mounting the "Britain Can Make It" Exhibition, contribute to the 
exhibition display of the other sections which, he said, was closely 
allied to industrial design. However, there were some parts of the 
proposed role of the Arts Council that needed to be clarified: for 
example, he said that the Council did not accept the view that books 
should be displayed as cultural items and not as items of industrial 
design, as would be done in an Arts Council plan. They had already 
been exhibited in the "Britain Can Make It" exhibition and were a 
62. Cab 124/1331, Hale to Nicholson, 20 February 1947. The Arts 
Council were, however, prepared to handle the science 
exhibition with the help of specialised advice by 14 March 
1947. See p. 29. 
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part of the history of industrial design. He further added that, 
"there will be a no man's land between the exhibition of science and 
technology and those sections of the industrial design exhibition 
which will deal with new industrial processes and technical 
developments. 63 
Leslie concluded his letter by drawing Nicholson's attention 
to a proposed press statement which highlighted very clearly the 
fundamental problem. This statement, he said, gave the impression 
that the celebrations for 1951 were to consist of a festival of arts 
with exhibitions of industrial design and science as subsidiary 
appendages of this. He continued: 
It is felt that some care should be taken to put this matter 
in proper perspective, with no suggestion that one aspect is 
subordinated to the others, and especially - in view of the 
country's industrial and commercial problems - that the 
anniversary of 1851 is not to be marked in a way that accords 
anything less than top priority to industrial production. 64 
63. Cab 124/1331, Leslie to Nicholson, 24 April 1947. 
64. Ibid. 
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TOWARDS A FESTIVAL OF BRITAIN 
The results of the meeting at the RSA were presented to the 
Lord President and from them he was able to draw up four detailed 
proposals: 
(1) that there should be a festival of arts promoted by the Arts 
Council. 
(2) a film festival, showing predominantly British films, should 
be sponsored by the British Film Institute. 
(3) an industrial design exhibition, to be run by the Council of 
Industrial Design. 
(4) a separate science and technology exhibition should be 
organised by the COI. 
65 
In November 1947, Morrison presented these proposals to the Lord 
President's Committee. 
66 
Pleading the-case for acceptance of the 
greatly limited proposals, Morrison acknowledged the country's poor 
economic climate and the cuts in the investment programme made 
necessary by the financial crisis in the summer. 
67 
He told his 
colleagues that he realised that all hopes for any permanent 
buildings to house the exhibitions must be abandoned and even 
temporary buildings appeared to be beyond the nation's resources. 
He stressed, however, that he felt that to abandon all attempts to 
celebrate the exhibition would be a mistake. Cancellation of the 
celebrations would, he said, not only cause the country to forego a 
65. Work 25/7. 
66. Cab 124/1252. 
67. The financial and economic climate of the nation will be 
discussed fully in Chapter 4. 
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good deal of foreign exchange but, of greater significance, would 
cause a severe blow to the country's prestige abroad: 
I am sure with ingenuity and careful planning it ought still 
to be possible to house a really worthwhile show. We might in 
fact make a virtue of necessity and evolve a new type of Great 
Exhibition and get away from the mammoth shows such as Paris 
and New York of which people are beginning to tire. 68 
His colleagues, knowing the importance of 1851 and the absolute 
necessity, in spite of adversity, of celebrating this auspicious 
date, accepted his arguments and on 28 November 1947, they approved 
the proposals for celebrating the Centenary of 1851.69 They 
further asked Morrison to set up a committee to exercise general 
supervision over the arrangements for 1951". 
70 
On 5 December 
1947, the lord President announced in the House of Commons that 
although the idea of holding an international exhibition had to be 
abandoned, the Government felt in all wisdom that: 
It would not be right on this account to abandon the 
celebration of the centenary, and we therefore propose to mark 
it by a national display illustrating 'the British 
contribution to civilization, past, present and future; in 
Arts, in Science and Technology and in Industrial Design. ' My 
Right non. friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is, 
therefore, inviting the Arts Council of Great Britain to make 
arrangements in association with other bodies concerned, for a 
Festival of the Arts in 1951. The Festival would not be 
confined to London, and provision will be made to link up with 
it existing ventures in Edinburgh and elsewhere, and to 
encourage new ones. Wales, for example, must play its part, 
The Festival will include events in Music and Drama, Opera and 
Ballet, together with exhibitions of painting, sculpture and 
photography. Separate consideration will be given in due 
course to arrangements covering architecture and town planning 
in its design aspects; books, and the showing of notable 
British films, including documentaries. Besides the Festival, 
there will be two major national exhibitions. My Right Hon. 
friend, the President of the Board of Trade, is inviting the 
Council of Industrial Design to sponsor a first-rate design 
68. Cab 124/1332, Memo by Lord President to lord President's 
Committee, November 1947. 
69. Work 25/7. 
70. Cab 124/1252. 
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display which will include consumer goods, civil transport, 
certain classes of capital goods and some handicraft 
production, and some displays showing the historical 
development of some industries. I am arranging for an 
exhibition of British achievement in science and technology to 
be organised by the Central Office of Information on behalf of 
the Research Councils and other scientific bodies. Both the 
Festival and the Exhibitions will be held in existing 
buildings. Provision will be made for co-ordination between 
these projects. They will cover, at a national level, the 
field of the 1851 Exhibition and will, I believe, mark its 
Centenary as worthily as our resources will allow. 71 
The opposition and the nation appeared to be well pleased with 
the Government's decision, not a murmur of disapproval with the 
proposed celebrations was heard inside or outside of the House. A 
title was even given to this new exhibition - Morrison suggested to 
Clement Attlee, the Prime Minister, who concurred wholeheartedly 
that the exhibition should henceforth be known as "The Festival of 
Britain 19510. 
71. Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Series, 445 
(1947-8), pp. 691-695. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SETTING UP OF THE FESTIVAL ORGANISATION 
THE FORMATION OF THE FESTIVAL OFFICE 
Morrison, having publicly committed the Government to hold the 
Festival, instructed his staff to formulate plans and ideas 
pertinent to the execution of the project. He was emotionally 
involved in the scheme and knew the precise ambience he wanted to 
create for this particular event. In his position, he was acutely 
cognisant of the difficulties endured by the people during the war 
and in the post-war period. In his thinking, the people, after so 
much stress, deserved a 'lift'. His primary concern therefore, was 
that the final product should be populist, popular and 
successful. 
' 
The criteria having been set, the Minister left the 
business of detail to his staff. In his vision of events there 
would be people dancing and enjoying themselves. The Great 
Exhibition Centenary Celebration was a good excuse, it would serve 
as the more serious element in an attempt to cheer the people up. 
After the euphoria of a Labour victory in 1945, there followed 
a strong desire on the part of the Government to live up to the 
expectations of the people. Morrison, in accepting responsibility 
for the Festival of Britain realised that his personal standing, as 
Minister in charge was at stake. Whatever decisions were made, had 
in the finality to show the Festival as a success. 
To ensure the fulfillment he needed, he entrusted the day to 
day responsibility and management of the project to the hands of his 
1. Nicholson, Interview, 20 January 1948. 
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Under-Secretary, Max Nicholson, who was a temporary Civil Servant 
and was one of his most brilliant advisers. The fact that Nicholson 
was not a part of the normal Civil Service structure was important 
to Morrison who disliked and mistrusted the civil service and had 
earlier refused to have a civil servant in charge of the project. 
2 
Career Civil Servants give the impression, especially at 
higher levels, of being a formidable phalanx, guarding against 
intrusion from outside. With the Labour victory of 1945, they might 
have felt the necessity to be vigilant regarding any departures from 
the norm. Having suspicions on both sides, it was important from 
the outset that maximum co-operation and esprit de corps should be 
established between career Civil Servants and those seconded to the 
Service by reason of specialist qualifications or qualities of a 
type needed in ventures of this kind. Team work was essential from 
the outset. In December 1947, the Great Exhibition Centenary 
Committee was set up by Morrison: the Official Committee, as it 
became known, was chaired by Nicholson and included representatives 
of the Ministries of Works, Town and Country Planning, Education 
and Health, as well as of. the Foreign Office, the Treasury, the 
Board of Trade, the Scottish Office and the Office of the Lord Privy 
Seal. Officially, the function of this Committee was to 'exercise 
general supervision over the arrangements for celebrating the 
Centenary of the 1851 Exhibition, with the help and guidance of the 
Lord President's Council: 
3 
Unofficially, Nicholson, as chairman, 
2. Ibid. 
3. Work 25/7. For more information on the members of this 
committee see Annex 1. 
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interpreted the Committee's role as that of preventing any 
disasters, financial or otherwise, which might embarrass the 
Government. Furthermore, it would ensure that the Festival 
Organisation, which was being created to manage the Festival, was 
free to get on with the task, taking note of the various ministries 
involved but maintaining an independent stance of its own, 
4 
Meetings of the Official Committee began soon after its 
inception in December 1947 and by February 1948, the Committee made 
the following recommendations on the possible structure of the 
organisation which would manage the Festival. They proposed that a 
supervisory body should be appointed to act in an honorary and 
advisory capacity, which would be known as the Festival Council. It 
would be composed of high level representatives of the main 
interests concerned with the Festival, as well as members of the 
Government, and the Opposition. In addition to this, they advised 
that subordinate to the Festival council there should be an 
Executive Committee to organise the specialised exhibitions of the 
Festival, which would include representatives from five constituent 
bodies, with a Director-General in charge. These bodies would be: 
the Arts Council, arranging the cultural festival; the Council of 
Industrial Design, arranging the industrial design display; The 
British Film Institute, organising the film festival; the newly 
created Science and Technology Council, chaired by an industrialist, 
Sir Alan Barlow would manage the science exhibition. Added to these 
was the newly-formed Architecture and Town Planning Council, chaired 
by Howard V. Lobb. 
4. Nicholson, Interview, 20 January 1948. 
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The decision was taken that architecture should be given some 
prominence in the Festival, in view of its importance to Britain as 
a post-war country involved in the necessities of reconstruction, 
building and town planning. The proposals for the Architecture 
Exhibition were developed by the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning with the assistance of the Royal Institute of British 
Architects. Its main theme, they appropriately decided, was to be, 
'Reconstruction and Redevelopment. 0 
5 
In addition to these bodies, 
one more group was added: the National Book League was asked to 
arrange the book exhibition in conjunction with the Arts Council and 
the COID. Anne Moore, the Festival Officer responsible for the 
League, was to liaise with the Executive and the Festival 
Organisation but, unlike the other constituent bodies' 
representatives, she did not sit on the Executive. 
6 
The Executive 
Committee would be responsible to the Festival Council for the 
organisation of the Festival and for co-ordinating the work of the 
constituent bodies. The Festival Council would also function in 
part, as a mediator between the Executive, the Official Committee 
and the Lord President. 
7 
5. Work 25/7, See Annexes lA-F for list of members of these 
constituent bodies. 
6. Cab 124/1334, Executive Committee Minutes, 4 March 1948. See 
pp. 34-36 for the problems between the Arts Council and the 
COID on the exhibition of books. Further refer to Annex 1F 
for the list of members of the National Book League. 
7. Work 25/7. 
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THE SELECTION OF THE FESTIVAL 
ORCTSATION'S OFFICERS 
The Official Committee had two priorities: to find a suitable 
Chairman for the Festival Council, and to recruit talented members 
to complete the team. The more urgent of the two was, however, to 
engage the most appropriate chairman. Included amongst those 
considered for this position were: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke; 
Lord Brabazon of Tara; , Lord Courthope; Admiral of the Fleet Lord 
Cunningham of Hyndhope; Earl De La Warr; the Duke of Devonshire; 
General Lord Ismay; Lord Leathers; Lord Halifax; Lord Rothschild; 
Lord Walkden; Lord Weir; and Lord Mountbatten. 
8 
All of the men 
considered for this job seemed to share a similar social background 
and at least four of them had held positions of resonsibility during 
the Second World War. The inclusion of military men in this Civic 
undertaking was quite natural, for, like politicians, the military 
were perceived as national figures who were known and admired by a 
public still . rejoicing over 
the country's victory in war. 
Consequently these men became identified alongside the great 
politicians, led by Churchill, who more than any other, brought the 
identity of the soldier and the politician to a high level of public 
regard at that period in history. The inclusion of military men as 
eligible candidates for running the Festival, did not stop with the 
proposed appointment of the Chairman of the Festival Council, It 
was, rather the beginning of a military strain that would run 
throughout the Festival Organisation. Most of the men appointed to 
8. Cab 124/1214, Nicholson to the lord President, 25 February 
1948. 
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the Executive Committee, as well as the architects and designers 
eventually selected to design the Festival exhibitions and 
structures, had served in the forces during the war. The training 
they had received from their military experience stood them in good 
stead during the hectic months of planning, organisation and action 
between 1948 and culminating with the opening of the exhibition in 
1951. As Bevis Hillier and Mary Banham explain in" their book, "A 
Tonic to the Nation", the war had given them training, 
in both long-term planning and the art of making ad hoc 
decisions; had taught them how imperative was clear 
communication throughout the organisation; to know their 
exact rank and to do what they were told. Instant decision, 
instant obedience. 9 
Initially the most promising candidate on the list appeared to 
be Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke. His appeal lay not only in his 
undoubted social status but, as Max Nicholson explained: 
He had proved himself a first-rate Chairman, able to keep the 
peace in all circumstances, without involving himself in too 
much detail ..... he is also very unassuming and an easy man 
to get on with and can be relied on not to create 
difficulties "10 
Of the other Lords mentioned, it was said of Lord De La Warr and 
General Lord Ismay that they "seemed most promising although neither 
are in the same class as Lord Alanbrooke". 
11. 
The Official 
Committee thought that it was highly unlikely that Lord Mountbatten 
would commit himself to the Chairmanship because he was very 
involved with the details of Indian Independence and the 
partitioning of that Country. 
9. Mary Banham and Bevis Hillier, 'A Tonic to the Nation, p. 14. 




On 10 March 1948, the Lord President appointed General Lord 
Ismay as Chairman of the Festival Council. Ismay was invited to 
see the Prime Minister and the Lord President; a meeting, he 
explained in his memoirs, that he attended with great trepidation 
for fear of being asked to undertake some overseas 
appointment. 
12 
He said that Attlee quickly dispelled his 
anxieties by explaining the Festival of Britain project and asking 
him to undertake the Chairmanship of the Festival Council. Of this 
request, Ismay said: 
It seemed a very unsuitable assignment for one who was a 
complete ignoramus about the arts; but I was so relieved at 
not being asked to go abroad again, that I accepted at 
once. l3 
As the project evolved it became clear that Ismay as he himself 
mentioned was not endowed with either remarkable insight or great 
powers of creative brilliance. He was highly dependent, therefore 
on the guidance from better informed men, with whom he was 
surrounded, to provide him with all the relevant information upon 
which he could then act. Ismay was not going to bring a wealth of 
ideas or vision to the project, but what he would be able to 
contribute was reliability, trustworthiness and the leadership 
qualities of a high-ranking solder. 
14 
12, General Lord Ismay, The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay", 
p. 448. Ismay had been involved in the negotiations of Indian 
Independence and the settlement of the partition issue, and as 
such, he had been out of Britain for some time. 
13. Ibid., p. 448 
14. Sir Huw Wheldon, Interview held at 120 Richmond Hill, 
Richmond. 29 January 1983. 
46 
Ismay's appointment to a position, which while being 
administrative required some creative ability, might at first have 
appeared as foolhardiness on the part of the Government. It was, in 
fact, a tactical manoeuvre by the Lord President and Nicholson. 
Churchill, still smarting from the Conservative's defeat in 1945, 
was a stern critic of the policies of the Labour Government and had 
singled out the Festival for some of his most vituperative attacks 
which fortunately, although they had come to the attention of 
Morrison and his staff, were so far being made in private. 
15 
In 
view of Churchill's undeniable reputation and stature, they were 
afraid that if he proceeded to make such criticisms in public, the 
project would be destroyed before it had even been given a chance to 
prove its worth. Morrison and his staff decided that in order to 
stimulate the idea of the Festival in the minds of the people, it 
must be given a chance to develop without the barbed comments of 
Winston Churchill. The appointment of Ismay who had not only been 
Churchill's wartime Chief of Staff but a man with whom Churchill 
seemed to have a special relationship, might it was thought provide 
some check on his attacks on the Festival. 
16 
This appointment 
did not, however, stop Churchill and the Conservative Party from 
finding another outlet for their mounting criticism of the 
Festival. Through Lord Beaverbrook's newspapers, The Daily 
Express and The Evening Standard , criticism bordering at times on 
15. Banham and Hillier, p. 29- 




In a measure, Ismay's appointment did, 
however, stop the criticism from the one man who not only Morrison, 
but to a large extent the nation regarded as a powerful and 
persuasive orator. His ability to blend language, style and content 
into a forceful speech might sap the enthusiasm and will to see the 
Festival through. The other members appointed to the Festival 
Council by the Lord President were: representing the diverse world 
of theatre, Noel Coward, who was later to resign due to pressures of 
work, and John Geilgud; music was represented by Sir Malcolm 
Sargent; representing the world of art were Sir Kenneth Clark, the 
Earl of Crawford and Balcarres, and the Chairman of the Arts 
Council, Sir Ernest Pooley; representing science was Sir Robert 
Robinson; Design, Dr R. S. Edwards, Chairman of the COID; 
Architecture, Sir Patrick Abercrombie and H. V. Lobb; Literature, 
T. S. Eliot and Sir A. P. Herbert; the Church was represented by the 
Very Reverend A. C. Don; and the political parties were variously 
represented by R. A. Butler (Conservative), Walter Elliot 
(Conservative), Margaret Herbison (Labour), Lady Megan Lloyd George 
(Liberal), Lord Clydesmuir (Conservative), Thomas Johnston (Labour), 
Jean Mann (Labour), Sir Roland Nugent (Unionist), Lord Wilmot 
(Labour)and Lord Latham (Labour). 
18 The Official Committee had 
now to turn its attention to finding the right team to create and 
manage the Festival. 
17, From 1949 to 1950 the conservative newspapers the Daily Mail, 
the Daily Express and the Evening Standard, published highly 
critical and provocative articles. See Annex 1G. 
18. Work 25/3, The Story of the Festival of Britain 1951. For 
the full list of the forty members who made up the Council, 
see Annex 1H. 
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By January 1948, the Arts Council was still resisting the 
Offical Committee's proposal that an Executive Committee should be 
formed to manage the exhibitions. On 8 January 1948, Mary Glasgow 
sent a letter to E. Hale of the Treasury who was assisting Nicholson 
in drawing up a list of nominees for the post of Director-General of 
the proposed Executive Committee. The letter stated: 
It is the view of the Executive (of the Arts Council) that the 
nomination of a Chief Executive Officer of the top council to 
take the chair at meetings of the organising body, should, if 
possible be postponed. They do not, at the moment, feel 
convinced of the need for such a high-powered officer as is 
suggested and, while they appreciate the purpose for which he 
would be required as the plans for the festivities take shape, 
they would like to suggest that the appointment should be made 
nearer the time, perhaps a year hence, when some of the 
preparatory work has been done. 19 
This however, was neither the view of the Official Committee nor 
that of the COID who had objected strenuously to the initial role 
the Arts Council was to play in the proposed national exhibition. 
The COID not only accepted the Offical Committee's proposal for an 
Executive Committee, but was forthcoming with suggestions for 
possible nominees. on- 12 January 1948, the Director of the COID, 
Gordon Russell wrote to Max Nicholson on this matter: 
My Council are of the opinion that by far the most important 
matter which is likely to affect them at this stage is the 
appointment of the Chairman of the small Executive Committee. 
The Council feels most strongly that he should be an 
administrator rather than one who has a considerable knowledge 
of either the arts or industrial design and would like to 
suggest the possibility of filling the post with someone of 
the calibre of Lord Ismay, Sir Cecil Weir or General Slim. 20 
By 19 January 1948, the Arts Council, perhaps sensing defeat and 
domination by the COID, changed its mind and let it be known that 
19. Cab 124/1214, Glasgow to Hale, 8 January 1948. 
20. Ibid. Russell to Nicholson, 12 January 1948. 
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they now accepted the need for a Director-General and that their 
preference lay, unlike the COID's stipulations, with someone who 
possessed a real understanding and knowledge of arts and 
sciences. 
21 
As in the case of the search for the Lord President of the 
Festival Council, there were many nominees for the post of 
Director-General. They were: Lord Ismay, recommended by COID; 
Gerald Barry, nominated by the Ministry of Education and by Mary 
Glasgow; Sir Guy Locock and Captain J. S. Graham, both nominated by 
the Board of Trade; J. Eaton Griffith and H. V. Rhodes, both 
nominated by the Treasury; Sir Cecil Weir, nominated by the 
Scottish Office and the COID; Sir Cyril Radcliffe, nominated by the 
COI; Sir Miles Thomas and Mr Hynd, both nominated by the Ministry 
of Town and Country Planning; and General Slim, nominated by the 
CO ID. 
Nicholson and the Lord President after conferring selected 
Gerald Barry, a forty-five year old Managing Director of the liberal 
newspaper, The News Chronicle-, who-was appointed Director-General 
of the Executive Committee on 30 March 1948.22 He was appointed 
to this position for a number of reasons: Nicholson and Morrison 
felt he ought to be appointed because he was one of the first 
persons'to suggest celebrating the Centenary of 1851; moreover, he 
was well-known to Morrison and was also a personal friend of 
Nicholson, who had worked with Barry as Assistant Editor on The 
Weekend Review', a newspaper which Barry had founded; perhaps most 
21. Cab 124/1214, Nicholson to Padmore, 19 January 1948. 
22. See Annex II further information on the nominees. 
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important of all, he was chosen because he was, as Nicholson said, 
"a great impressario". Both Morrison and Nicholson felt that if the 
Festival project was to succeed at all, it had to be stimulating and 
Barry was, they believed, he man who could provide the necessary 
impetus. 23 Barry was well-liked by his Executive Committee 
colleagues whom he selected after his appointment, with Nicholson's 
approval. He was perceived by them as a rather boyish character 
with an innate sense of fun, lighthearted verging on the 
lightweight. 
24 
Barry intended to make 'fun' the by-word of the 
Festival - Huw Wheldon, a member of the Executive Committee, 
described him as preferring fireworks to ballet. 
25 The Festival 
Barry envisaged would most definitely appeal to ordinary people. 
From the beginning, Nicholson recognised that Barry had a 
rather cavalier attitude towards life and work, and he realised that 
he was taking certain risks by pushing for his appointment. 
Nicholson feared that Barry might be bored by the administrative 
work that had to be done if the Festival was to succeed. In fact it 
was, he said later, rather a revelation to him 'how well Barry 
stayed the course, because he was not terribly good at doing a desk 
job or handling matters concerned with financial management. 
26 
To protect the Government and the Festival from any embarrassing 
mishap resulting from Barry's ebullient nature, Nicholson decided to 
appoint to the Executive, two more solid figures to 'keep an eye' on 
Barry and to ensure that his conduct of matters connected with the 
Festival administration was beyond reproach. Bernard Sendall was 
23, Nicholson, Interview, 20 January 1984. 
24. Wheldon Interview, 29 January 1983. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Nicholson Interview, 20 January 1984. 
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thus appointed to the Executive Committee as the Controller of the 
Festival. Sendall was a rather dull though, trustworthy, civil 
servant, who had served in the Admiralty, the Treasury and the COI. 
As the planning of the Festival progressed, Sendall's presence 
proved to be not only a necessity, but a most fortunate and 
expedient inclusion. He became the organisational heart of the 
Festival Headquarters, the man to be relied upon by both sides. He 
spent two years shielding Barry, who found it tedious both to hold 
meetings regularly and punctually. Another worrying factor was his 
inability to present coherent and rational financial plans and 
budgets -a factor which would become vitally important when the 
Festival Office would be given its Vote in 1949.27 
The other person appointed by Nicholson to a position of 
responsibility was G. A. Campbell, as the Director of Finance and 
Establishments. Nicholson knew that Campbell was, like Sendall, a 
solid and sound civil servant. James Gardner, designer of the 
Battersea Pleasure Gardens, described Campbell as 'very much a Scot 
with fierce eyebrows and aggressive nose'. His cautiousness with 
the financial arrangements for the Festival earned him the nickname 
of 'Old Moneybags' by the creative section of the committee who were 
not themselves civil servants. 
28 
The other members of the Executive Committee selected by Barry 
and Nicholson were representatives of the five constituent councils 
of Art, Science, Architecture, Industrial Design, and the British 
27. In April 1949, the Festival Office was made a separate 
Government department, for the life of the project. As such 
it had its own vote and therefore became accountable to 
Parliament for the money spent on the project. 
28. Banham and Hillier, p. 120. 
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Film Institute. These men were selected not only for their 
competence, but in the main, they seemed to have a compatability 
with Barry. Huw Wheldon represented the Arts Council while Ian Cox, 
the Director of Science and Technology Council, was responsible for 
all the science exhibitions in the Festival. He was described as 
being humourless and rather missionary like in his approach to the 
Festival. Cox did not appear to typify the norm on the committee. 
All of the members had a certain dedication, but Ian Cox pursued his 
task with overwhelming zeal. His paramount desire, not only for the 
Science Exhibition but for all the Festival exhibitions, was that 
they would manage to educate and celebrate simultaneously. 
29 
cox's missionary zeal and seriousness was clearly highlighted in a 
letter from Barry to Cox concerning the latter's handling of the 
theme of the Festival of Britain. Barry said: 
My main criticism - if that is the word - is rather a 
fundamental one. I recognise the difficulty well enough but I 
have a fear lest the whole approach may be too serious, too 
scholastic. We must remember that while we are out to tell a 
consecutive story, which is in itself a serious and, indeed, 
an 'educative' one, we are also, and primarily out to 
entertain simple people who will go to the exhibition in the 
expectation of enjoying themselves, and who will only imbibe 
such message or moral as we have to offer if they do so, so to 
speak, by accident and unawares. People simply will not go to 
an exhibition to learn a lesson, however perfectly it may be 
told. Offered a choice even between the Express and Mirror 
they choose the Mirror in the ratio of ten to one; I am 
therefore convinced that we must avoid being too serious and 
too historical, even possibly at some sacrifice of continuity 
(in any case the limitations of space will force us to be 
ruthlessly selective). I may have got the wrong impression, 
for I don't pretend to have fully digested this long and 
exceedingly thoughtful document, but I rather got the 
impression that it places somewhat undue emphasis on the past 
at the expense of the future. 30 
29. Sir Paul Wright, Interview held at 3 Ormonde Gate, London, 5 
January 1983. 
30. Work 25/21, Barry to Cox, 26 April 1949. 
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In addition to devising the theme for the Science Exhibition, 
Cox devised the theme for the Festival as a whole based on the 
abstract ideas discussed by the Executive Committee. Hugh Casson 
was appointed Director of the Council for Architecture, Town 
Planning and Building Research. Be was given the job because, he 
explained, As an impecunious architect I'd moonlighted, doing 
journalism: I used to write 'what to do with that cupboard under 
the stairs' .... and I wrote for Gerald Barry in the 'News 
chronicle' on the future of architecture and all that sort of 
stuff : 
31 
Gordon Russell, the Director of the COID chose to 
represent the interests of industrial design himself, and Denis 
Forman of the British Film Institute was selected to represent the 
Institute as the Director with a seat on the Executive. Apart from 
the constituent representatives to the Executive, the other members 
included: Paul Wright who, having previously been the Director of 
Public Relations at the National Coal Board, was appointed the 
Director of Publicity. Cecil Cooke of the COI Exhibitions Division 
was appointed Director of Exhibitions, and Leonard Crainford, the 
former General Manager of the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre, was 
recommended by the Arts Council. In view of his experience in 
managing arts festivals, and his early associations with the Council 
for the Encouragement of Music and Arts (CEMA - the forerunner to 
the Arts Council), he was appointed as Secretary to the Executive 
Committee. 
The men chosen by Barry to form the Executive Committee, as 
31, Banham and Hillier, p. 15. 
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has been mentioned earlier, were for the most part known to him, 
largely as friends and personal acquaintances. The Executive 
Committee thus ended up resembling a cross between an old boy's 
network and a private club. Barry's selection methods have been 
defended by his ex-colleagues, like Hugh Casson, who acknowledged 
that the Executive Committee was inbred, but explained that this was 
because the Committee had a very short time in which to produce the 
Festival, and therefore it was vital, he said, that all Committee 
members spoke the same language for there was no room for different 
objectives, all objectives and opinions had to be clear and 
unanimous from the outset. 
32 
Having successfully appointed the basic elements of a central 
organisation for the Festival, the Official Committee concluded its 
business in this area after creating three regional councils. The 
Arts Council's initial idea that the cultural festival should not be 
based solely in London but taken to other parts of the country, had 
impressed Nicholson and the Lord President who announced this 
intention in his statement to the House of Commons on 5 December 
1947.33 Both men wished to avoid the criticism that once again 
London was getting the lion's share of events and, furthermore, they 
wanted the Festival to be a nationwide event. To this end, in 
February and March 1948, the Official Committee developed proposals 
to create three regional councils, for Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. On 20 May 1948, The Secretary of State for Scotland, the 
32. Sir Hugh Casson, Interview held at 60 Elgin Crescent, 
London, 29 November 1982. See Annex 1J for the members of 
The Executive Committee. 
33. See pp. 38-39. 
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Right Honourable Arthur Woodburn, announced the formation of the 
Scottish Committee: Joseph Westwood, Secretary of State for 
Scotland, was appointed as Chairman but, unfortunately, soon after 
the Committee's first meeting on 18 June 1948, he died and was 
replaced by the Right Honourable Thomas Johnston, Secretary of State 
for Scotland (1941-45). The Festival Committee for Wales was also 
appointed in May 1948 and was chaired by Sir Wynn Wheldon, father of 
Huw Wheldon, the Arts Council's representative to the Executive 
Committee. The Government of Northern Ireland appointed the 
Northern Ireland Festival Committee in November 1948, under the 
Chairmanship of the Right Honourable Sir Roland Nugent. 
34 
The 
purpose of these Committees was, with the help of the Festival 
Organisation, to ensure that the regional festivals developed the 
ethos of the Festival theme in their respective cities, thereby 
ensuring that those who could not travel to London would at least 
experience the essence of the Festival message, and also some of its 
activities. 
35 
Of all the committees appointed, however, the most important 
was undoubtedly the Executive 
Presentation Panel which was 
Presentation Panel was created 
Committee on 20 May 1948. It was 
for the Director-General to set 
panel which would be responsible 
Committee and its offshoot, the 
created by Gerald Barry. The 
at a meeting of the Executive 
decided that it would be necessary 
up a 'creative' or presentation 
to the Executive. The function of 
34, Cab 124/1252. 
35. Work 25/3. A list of names of the persons who formed these 
regional committees is given in Annex 1K. 
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this panel would be to translate the theme of the Integrated 
Exhibition as well as for all the exhibitions that had been agreed 
to so far. In addition, it would be responsible for overseeing the 
design and display treatment of all the Festival exhibitions and 
events throughout the country. Within this new framework, the role 
of the COID was reduced in scale. Originally, the COID was to be 
solely responsible for the mounting of a separate industrial 
exhibition, and because of their wide experience they would help 
organise the design and mounting of the Science and Technology and 
the Architectural Exhibitions. In this new plan, to which the COID 
agreed only after a great deal of hesitation, because it would mean 
giving up the considerable executive responsibility initially given 
to them, they would now be just a part of a team. They would only 
be responsible for making an approach to industry to elicit 
participation in the necessary Festival exhibitions, for choosing 
all industrial exhibits to be displayed and for selecting all the 
'furniture' for all the exhibitions. Further the COI, the 
Government's exhibitions mounters would be in charge of arranging 
the work for the exhibitions to be undertaken by the appropriate 
builders, technicians and designers. 
36 
Both the Executive Committee and the Presentation Panel, were 
ultimately responsible for shaping and visualising the theme of the 
Festival: 'Britain's contribution to Civilisation past, present and 
future* in the Arts, Science and Technology, and Industrial Design. 
The Presentation Panel included: Gerald Barry, Chairman; Misha 
Black, of the COI Exhibition Division who was one of the finest and 
36. Cab 124/1335, Executive Committee Minutes, 20 May 1948. 
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most experienced exhibition designers in Europe; Ian Cox, the 
Director of the Science and Technology Council and originator of the 
festival theme; Anthony Hippisley Coxe of the COID, who was a 
former features editor on the News Chronicle; Mark Hartland Thomas, 
also of the COID, James Holland of the COI; Ralph Tubbs? an 
architect who had advised the News Chronicle on architecture and 
therefore, like Hippisley Coxe, knew Barry personally; James 
Gardner, another brilliant wartime exhibitions designer, who had 
been Chief Designer on the successful "Britain Can Make It" 
exhibition of 1946; and Peter Kneebone of the COI, who was appointed 
Secretary of the Panel. 
37 
The importance of the Presentation Panel cannot be 
over-emphasised. In conjunction with the COID, it would be 
responsible for the composition, design and content of all the 
Festival exhibitions, as well as for the visual aspect of all the 
festival projects. Ultimately these two bodies would create and 
approve the 'Look' that would become. known as the Festival Style. 
All the members of the Executive and the Presentation Panel knew 
each other well, some having worked together for Barry on the News 
Chronicle, others having worked closely together designing 
exhibitions or creating camouflage during the war years under the 
auspices of the Ministries of War and Information and the COI. 
Others had formed associations through membership of the Modern 
Architectural Research Society (MARS), a group formed in the 
Thirties which was committed to spreading the ideas of modern 
37. United Kingdom, Central Office of Information, CL 593 - 
October 1948 to May 1949. 
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architecture, not only to those already familiar with forms of 
architecture, but to the public at large. As a result of these 
varied early associations, they all seemingly spoke the same 
intellectual and creative language which enabled them to present an 
uncommon uniformity of ideas in a short space of time. 
The members of the Executive committee were in some ways 
similar to 'the men who surrounded Herbert Morrison: for the most 
part, they were intelligent, middle-class intellectuals with 
left-wing sympathies. 
38 
They have been described by Michael 
Fryan, in his study of the Festival, as: 
the do-gooders, ' readers of the News Chronicle, The Guardian 
and The Observer, the signers of petitions:. the backbone of 
the BBC. In short they were herbivores or gentle ruminants, 
who look out from their natural station in life with their 
eyes full of sorrow for less fortunate creatures, guilty of 
their advantages though not usually ceasing to eat the 
grass . 
39 
Perhaps this criticism might seem somewhat harsh but these men, 
steeped in paternalistic philosophy were determined not only to 
protect and care for the ordinary man, but they were also going to 
make his drab existence more worthwhile. It was this philosophy 
that they would infuse into the Festival project as' it took shape, 
it would become apparent that their aim would be not only to allow 
the people to celebrate, releasing themselves from their lethargy, 
but to present them with an alternative novel secular ideology. In 
short, their aim was to open opportunities to people towards a new 
concept of themselves, their nation and a future shaped by the 
achievements the Festival demonstrated. 
For" the members of the Festival Organisation, work officially 
38. Casson, Interview, 29 Novemer 1982. 
39. Michael Fryan, 'Festival', The Age of Austerity, pp. 319-320. 
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began on 30 March 1948, appropriately in the headquarters of the 
Royal Society of 'Arts, in the very rooms where the 1851 Exhibition 
was planned and executed. (The Festival Organisation would later 
move its operations to its own offices in Savoy Court)* No 
inauguration, however, could be complete without an official opening 
ceremony and this took place on 31 May 1948 at the RSA in the 
presence of its President, Her Royal Highness the Princess 
Elizabeth. At the opening, all the expectations reflected in the 
speeches made by the Princess, the Lord President, General Ismay, 
and Gerald Barry, showed that the Festival, though modest in 
conception, was not only rapidly growing in stature but was being 
perceived as the channel through which varied aspirations could be 
achieved. It was going to be used as a vehicle through which 
Britain, though physically exhausted by the effort of winning the 
war, and coupled with rumblings from her overseas territories, would 
move towards a persona infused with a new sense of power. To 
understand this need more fully, it is necessary to examine the 
nature of British power during the preceding century. The wars 
during Queen Victoria's reign were more localised. Weaponry by 1939 
was more sophisticated. The horror of war was brought into the 
homes of millions. The scope of disarray widened, the causes tended 
to linger on, into other mini-wars. The world had changed in every 
way understood by what was then regarded as-'civilised man'. 
Added to this the emergence of nationalistic philoýphies in 
non-western nations threatened a way of life and thought, 
instigating disquiet and insecurity into an hitherto well-ordered 
view of a nation in command. 
In 1939 it was still possible for the British to think in 
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terms of Empire: India was placed in the war by Britain without her 
consent, as the "keystone of imperial defence". In 1941, The Times 
quoted Lord Lloyd as saying that: 'the moral and material resources 
of the British Empire are virtually inexhaustible'. In 1942 in 
Egypt the Abdin Palace in Cairo was surrounded with armoured cars by 
the British Ambassador who delivered an ultimatum to King 
Farouk. 
40 
By 1945, the facade of invincible might appeared to 
have suffered serious structural damage. In India, as the 
Constituent Assembly arranged by the British Cabinet Mission met, 
the Raj was fast sinking under the weight of communal rioting, 
tramcar burning, and acid throwing through the streets of Burma, 
Bombay, Bengal and Bihar. In Egypt, the negotiations for the 
renewal of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty were deadlocked and there 
were anti-British riots in Alexandria and Cairo. Added to these 
issues was the baffling and humiliating problem of Palestine and a 
home for, the displaced Jewish refugee population. For many months 
British soldiers, civil servants and policemen, striving only to 
keep the peace and reconcile the irreconcilable, had been shot at, 
blown up, kidnapped - and in one notorious case, flogged - by the 
highly efficient terrorists of the Stern Gang and Irgun. 
41 
Everywhere the British looked that year (1945), 'The Pax Britannica, 
which in the unconscious of many Britons was still almost a part of 
the order of nature, was breaking up under one's eyes. 'Everywhere 
there was a sliding loss of control'. 
42 
Against this background of unrest and rebellion with a 
40. Hopkins, The New Look, p. 59. 
41. Ibid., p. 59. 
42. Ibid., p. 59. 
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f. 
Government teetering between imperialism and Democratic Socialism, 
unsure as to which ideology was better suited to the present needs 
of Britain the nation was becoming infected by a sense of a lack 
of direction and purpose. On the whole, therefore a general decline 
in self-confidence was creeping into the fabric of society. Wearied 
by a demanding war, troubled by the changing world, the people 
needed to be resuscitated. It seemed a good idea to do something to 
lift the spirit of the nation and to rekindle that 'unconquerable 
mind' of past years. It was necessary to show to tired people 
something beyond the drabness of their present - why not then remind 
them of the enormity of their past achievement in the hope that this 
might be a stimulus to their present and future? Thus, between 1948 
and 1949 the Festival planners grew to realize that the country's 
dilemma demanded a spectacle that would give a new vision as well as 
a tangible demonstration of well-being which would raise the morale 
of the nation. 
It was against this background that the British people needed 
to secure a place for their identity, and in the face of the grim 
realities of austerity-ridden, post-war Britain, it was hoped that 
the Festival would encourage and enliven the public, and divert 
their attention from the oppressive realities of shortages and 
economic problems to the long-term possibility of optimism in the 
future. In short, the Festival was to be, as Barry aptly put it, 
'a tonic to the nation'. Moreover, it was hoped that the Festival 
could be used as a_ means of re-evaluation, . redirecting 
and 
re-establishing Britain's now seemingly tenuous position in the 
Western world, by displaying with pride, her achievements of the 
past and present and, much more importantly, by signposting her 
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future potentialities. These sentiments were clearly expressed at 
the inauguration by Princess Elizabeth who said that the Festival, 
will be designed to display to our own people and to visitors 
from all over the world what a wealth of ideas and 
achievements Great Britain has produced in the realm of art 
and science. 43 
She went on to emphasise the virtue in troubled times of dwelling on 
the arts of peace and stressed, moreover, that Britain had provided 
continuity and permanence through her contributions to the store of 
human happiness and knowledge. Furthermore, she added, 'we have 
certainly not forfeited our opportunities of leadership in the world 
of ideas'. Princess Elizabeth encouraged the men of the Festival 
Organisation to show a breadth of vision and courage, and to ensure 
that '1951' would stress sharply Britain's responsibility to the 
future; 'then the 'Festival of Britain 1951, may prove to be not 
simply an end in itself but a beginning of many good things'. 
44 
In the Lord President's speech he began by placing the 
responsibility for the project firmly on the shoulders of the 
Festival Organisation. He said: 
The Government looks to the Council to decide, within the 
framework (British contribution to civilisation, past, present 
and future) the shape the Festival shall take. How far, for 
instance, is it to look backward and how far forward. It will 
want, I am sure, to look back to 1851 and dwell on the 
progress made since then. But I hope it will look forward 
also to the further advances in the arts of peace which are 
just beginning to develop and which ought to be encouraged. 45 
The Lord President continued by explaining that the Festival was 
going to be a national, nationwide enterprise. This intention could 
already be seen by the nature of the Festival council which, he 




said, was not only representative of the varied national interests 
concerned with the Festival but also with members of Parliament from 
all parties. 
The Lord President went on to state that while the Council was 
doing its best to create the Festival, the Government would also be 
doing its best 'to find funds for the Festival from national 
resources'. They were prepared to do this despite the limitations 
on money, labour and materials because, he said, their decision to 
mark the Centenary of 1851 was quite simply an act of faith: 
of faith in the ability of this country to grapple with the 
immense economic difficulties with which it is faced; of 
faith that by 1951, we shall have mastered these difficulties 
and shall be able to present to the world a smiling face of 
honest pride in a job well done. If this comes true, the 
Festival will be a wonderful means of displaying our 
achievements to ourselves and to the world. 46 
The Lord President added, that it was his belief that if properly 
handled the Festival would not only by its excellence permanently 
raise the regard in which British artists, scientists, craftsmen and 
technicians were held, but it would stimulate dormant skills and 
talents, thereby, leaving behind at its close, a legacy for the 
nation. Of this view, he said: 
I hope that, by encouraging from the outset the highest 
standards of industrial design and by stimulating further 
initiative in the fields of the sciences and the arts, the 
Festival itself will contribute to the mastery of the 
country's economic difficulties, and will besides, leave 
behind it a rich legacy to the future by establishing the 
outstanding value of British contribution in these fields. 47 
Fortunately, this view was also shared by Lord Ismay and 




Organisation. Lord Ismay opened his remarks by thanking the Lord 
President for finding the time amidst this 'manifold preoccupations' 
to come to the launching. This, he said, confirmed his belief that 
Morrison had a special place in his heart for the Festival and, 
moreover, was going to be its staunch supporter and friend. 
Morrison really had very little choice in the matter for as the 
Minister in charge of the Festival, it had, he believed, to be a 
success. Thus, he willingly gave the project his full commitment 
and support. Speaking of the role of the Festival Council, Ismay 
said: 
Our Festival Council will not itself be directly concerned 
with trade and industry, but rather with those intangible 
things that reveal and express the innermost heart and spirit 
of a nation. Twice in living memory we have not hesitated to 
take our place in the van in the fight for freedom. Twice, 
with God's help, we have emerged victorious. Now is our 
opportunity, as it is our duty, to take up our lives and move 
forward again in the van - this time in the van of progress in 
the arts, the sciences and the humanities. 48 
Lord Ismay continued his speech by remarking upon the Lord 
President's statement that the resources for the Festival would be 
limited. This he said, did not depress the organisation in the 
least, for after all, is it not a challenge to all concerned with 
the arrangements, and to all our artists, scientists, designers and 
craftsmen to prove that skill, ingenuity and quality are far more 
compelling than size, ostentatious splendour of quality'. But he 
warned, 'At the same time, I feel sure that neither His Majesty's 
Government nor the British people would wish us to run the risk of 
'spoiling the ship for a ha'p'orth of tar'". He concluded his 
48. Ibid. 
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remarks by stating that the Festival Council were resolved to do 
their utmost to ensure that 1951 would be a memorable year in the 
island's story, a time for enjoyment celebrated in the British 
tradition and at its close a distinctive mark would be left by it on 
the nation's life for all time. 
49 
Gerald Barry, with his gift for phrase-making, was last to 
speak on behalf of the Executive Committee - the creators of the 
Festival. He stressed the difficulty of capturing and putting on 
show something as elusive as British tradition, a challenge that his 
committee would nevertheless respond to. As Barry perceived it, it 
would not be enough to think of 1951 in terms of fun for the masses, 
or for that matter as a show. 1951 must, he said: 
be much more than a year of bigger and better exhibitions, or 
more and merrier festivals. It ought, as General Lord Ismay 
so rightly said just now, to leave some mark on our 
history. 50 
Furthermore, Barry had concrete ideas as to how this could be 
achieved: 
By the standards we set, by the wealth of talent we disclose, 
by the recognition which the whole idea of the Festival will 
give to the central importance of the arts and sciences in the 
national life, by emphasising their indispensability in the 
future if we are to maintain and develop our leadership in 
quality ..... by all these things the Festival should, as I 
see it, aim to produce tangible and lasting results. Among 
other things, it should succeed in encouraging more of the 
right sort of recruits into the Arts and Sciences in the 
future; in permanently higher standards, and eventually in 
establishing British supremacy in culture and the humanities. 
It should also be possible, by judicious commissioning of 
music and possibly of other works of art, to bequeath to the 
future a modest addition to our heritage. We should also make 




leave permanent contributions behind. In short we should not 
regard 1951 as an end, but as a beginning. It should be not 
only a year in which we as a team complete our labours, but 
also a year which is a starting point. 51 
Thus, having publicly outlined the varied high hopes and 
aspirations held for the Festival, the Festival Organisation 
settled down to the serious task of devising a theme suited to the 
image of the Festival which had begun to achieve far greater 




THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE THEME AND AIMS OF 
THE FESTIVAL OF BRITAIN 1951 
In the first week of May 1948, the Executive Committee spent 
the first of many weekends at Barry's home in West Sussex. Barry 
had issued the invitations so that the members of the Executive 
could become better acquainted with one another and 'establish a 
strong team spirit and become united in a common enthusiasm". 
Barry, describing these meetings, said: 
Weather and company were in their best form. In the daytime 
we worked on the terrace or paced the lawn in pairs like the 
Walrus and the Carpenter, trying to marshal the oddly-assorted 
shoes and ships and sealing-wax at our command into some sort 
of order and coherence. Below us rolled away in succeeding 
folds of green and gold a landscape of English parkland 
inherited from an age of men who had such faith in the future 
of their country, and so robust a sense of responsibility to 
their successors, that they planted not for themselves but for 
their great-grandchildren. Here was our incentive. This 
successful weekend was followed by others of a similar kind. 
The team spirit was born. 52 
The Festival of Britain therefore was shaped not only in committee 
rooms and around tables which Barry and his colleagues found 
inhibiting, but, "on hilltops, in gardens, around log-fires where 
half a dozen people could foregather and talk'. In these romantic 
settings the Committee members 'breathed, thought, imagined, willed, 
inhaled and exuded - Festival'. 
53 
From these meetings, the theme that would become the Festival 
of Britain was beginning to emerge and take form, and the 
Executive's natural tendency towards tutoring and paternalism 
52. Sir Gerald Barry, "Three Cantor Lectures on the Festival of 
Britain 19510, Journal of the Royal Society of Arts c (22 
August 1952), p. 675. 
53. Ibid. p. 675. 
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would become increasingly evident. These emergent themes possessed 
a vision of what the Executive committee believed Britain in its 
post-war years could be. The new Britain they perceived would not 
base its concept of greatness on conquest and power (largely, in 
fact, because even in this early period, such an idea was rapidly 
becoming unrealistic) but on culture and the humanities. If this 
new foundation for greatness was accepted by the British public 
through the Festival, the Executive Committee believed that the 
nation would avail itself of this opportunity and reassert its 
supposed right to lead the world, but this time, in the realm of 
culture and ideas*54 
As they saw it, the first step towards achieving their goals 
was to eliminate the fallacy that the best work of the nation had 
already been done. They wanted to 'stimulate the natural forces 
within the British people, showing them to be as worthy as the stuff 
from which their past was made and by pointing out new horizons to 
them. ' The Executive acknowledged that in order to do this, some 
recapitulation of past achievements would be necessary, but this 
would not be to show that the country's greatest assets lay in the 
past, nor to pander to the deadly sin of nostalgia, but because: 
the achievements of those days were again the same forces in 
the British character bursting through barriers such as 
ignorance, distances, squalor, want, disease and cruelty, 
which at the time seemed just as opaque as the barriers of the 
present day. 55 
54. COI, CL593, October 1948-May 1949: This idea of Britain 
leading the way in culture and the humanities or in the arts 
and sciences was confirmed by Nicholson in a letter to Gerald 
Barry. He said, "It (the Festival) is expected to give a 
great impetus to the Arts and Sciences on which our leadership 
in the world will more increasingly depend". Cab 124/1334, 
Nicholson to Barry, 15 April 1948. 
55. Ibid. 
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They perceived that their main task was to give the people 
direction; they had to be aroused from the slumber of depression. 
The Festival was going to be an expression of the people's physical, 
mental and spiritual efforts, made, not by the Executive calling 
upon the people to repeat the glorious achievements of the past but 
by making the old fire we know to be burning in the people blaze up 
again'. Furthermore, they were going to make the people glad to 
feel the heat of this fire, and as a result, eager to go forward. 
56 
Having developed these largely intangible concepts, the 
Executive was faced with the arduous task of translating them into 
reality. This, they decided, could be achieved by trying to define 
the British outlook and tradition, which they perceived to be: love 
of country; love of freedom; love of nature; tolerance and fair 
play; pride in craftsmanship; and humanity. These characteristics, 
though abstractions, were they said, without a shadow of doubt 
recognizable British traits. 
57 In order to-begin to translate 
these highly subjective observations into objective reality, they 
decided to envisage themselves as salesmen planning a campaign. 
They asked themselves four basic questions: What exactly were they 
trying to sell? To whom were they going to sell it? When were they 
going to sell it?, and how were they going to sell it? What they 
were going to sell was, of course, the most important question of 
all. 
To find an answer to this most perplexing problem, they began 




knew, first and foremost to commemorate the Centenary of the Great 
Exhibition of 1851, and to illustrate a century of progress made 
since then. Beyond this patently obvious excuse for a celebration, 
the Festival was to be made an occasion for putting Britain on show 
and presenting her unique and outstanding contribution to 
civilisation, past, present and future. This aspect of showing off 
a Britain, despite being battle-scarred, seemingly uncertain and 
insecure about a future in a world in a state of flux, was extremely 
important. It was hoped that the exhibition would alter the way 
Britain was being perceived in the `world, especially by the 
burgeoning United States which was seen, on the one hand, as 
treating Britain with her network of Imperial holdings, as an 
economic rival but, on the other hand, dismissing her as an 
anachronism with little or no future. Moreover, the Executive 
hoped that by putting Britain 'on show', the people would not only 
begin to take pride in their heritage but also in themselves and 
their communities, thereby at least beginning to help themselves, 
not necessarily in major ways, but in small ways, for example by 
building the things their communities needed: such as bus shelters, 
civic centres and concert halls. In short an attempt was being 
initiated to inculcate the concept of self help into the minds of 
the people. This concept would be bolstered with the aid of local 
authorities and councils, as well as various voluntary associatons 
which would demonstrate with the people's consent, that they could 
carry out tasks that Central Government was too preoccupied to 
concern itself with. 
Taking all the aforementioned objectives into account, the 
theme that emerged was the Executive decided, to be found by looking 
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at "Britain's gift to the civilised world". The exhibition, it was 
decided would show 'the immensely important contribution Britain had 
made to the betterment of the human race. In short, the underlying 
theme would be, "one hundred years of British leadership and 
achievement". Sensing that this kind of theme might be open to 
misinterpretation, they warned that it must not be obvious, or it 
would spoil the effect, for there could be no hint of bombast. The 
appeal of the theme had to be subtle, 'so subtle that it will have a 
subconscious effect on even the most sceptical of minds". 
58 
Burdened with a variety of working titles such as, One 
Hundred Years", 'The Amazing Century", 'Salute Britannia', and 
"Britain Serves', the exhibition was going to be designed to pay 
tribute to "British skill, invention, culture, craftmanship, 
technical efficiency, and the sturdiness of the British people which 
in the last century carried them through two world wars'. It was 
initially thought that each major section would be designed to start 
with a flashback to 1851, relating the present with the past which 
would be shown: 
not as a dull page from the history books, but burning with 
human interest, not things, but people; employing every 
possible dramatic use of exhibition technique. 59 
In addition to this, there would be sections devoted to displaying 
'the Britain of the future". 
The exhibits would be arranged by subject matter, with the aim 
of showing them within the context of everyday use. For example, 
there would be a section on transport and travel which would show 
58. Cab 124/1334, Cooke to Barry, 19 April 1948 
59. Ibid. 
72 
aeroplanes, ships, trains, motorcars, barges, bicycles and also 
travel goods and travel wear. There would be a homes section 
showing the exterior and interior of the home. This section would 
contain examples of good and bad design, as well as old and new 
household appliances. On display there would be examples of 
furniture, fabrics, carpets, wallpapers, china, glass, cutlery, 
table linen, pictures and kitchenware. A health section was 
envisaged that would show the vast improvements in British health 
and hygiene since 1851, with displays illustrating the development 
of some of the many advances and discoveries made during the period, 
including, penicillin, radiography, blood transfusions, x-rays, 
sanitation, health centres and clinics. Among other topics to be 






THE SEARCH FOR SITES TO HOUSE 
THE FESTIVAL EXHIBITION 
LOOKING AT EXISTING STRUCTURES AND THE MOVE TO AN OPEN SITE 
The abstract ideas that had emerged at the Executive 
Committee's weekend conference at Barry's home led to important 
structural changes in the Festival project. After the conference, 
at a meeting of the Executive on 20 May 1948, the new structure that 
was unfolding was fully discussed. This had also been discussed in 
April at meetings of the Official and Executive Committees and it 
was confirmed that the best way to translate the theme of the 
British contribution to civilization in the arts and sciences would 
be by staging a Combined Exhibition which would display industrial 
design and some aspects of science and of architecture. In addition 
to this, there would be a separate Exhibition of Science and 
Technology, an Exhibition of Architecture, Town Planning and 
Building Research, as well as a Travelling Exhibition. 
' 
The Committee then turned their attention to discussing the 
space required for the Combined Exhibition and the possible sites 
for housing it. It had already been agreed at the weekend 
conference that the Combined Exhibition would need a minimum of 
550,000 square feet to allow ample room for circulation, but they 
were not certain what the material needs of this exhibition would 
be. The Executive Committee began reviewing all the buildings in 
London which they thought might be suitable for the Combined 
Exhibition and also for the other Festival exhibitions. This was 
done because the Executive was mindful of the fact that when the 
Government agreed to some sort of national display, they did so 
1. Cab 124/1335, Executive Committee Minutes, 20 May 1948. See 
also pp. 143-7 on the section dealing with decentralisation. 
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believing that the nation could 'host something that would, in Sir 
Stafford Cripps words, involve relatively little new construction 
work outside the programme already in the course of planning'. 
2 
On taking charge of the proposed celebrations, the Lord President 
reiterated the Government's policy towards construction by stating 
that 'no new construction work for the purposes of a national 
display can be undertaken in 1951', and he emphasised that 'the 
Festival and its exhibitions would be housed in existing 
buildings'. 
3 Thus, it appeared that the vogue for extravagance, 
rather than quality and imagination, which had been so much in 
evidence in the moneyed exhibitions of New York 1939 and Paris 1937, 
would not be possible or acceptable in Britain in 1951. - 
The Government's decision to house the exhibition in its 
existing buildings was not dictated by frugality or indifference but 
with the euphoria of victory in war and 'democratic socialism' 
slowly fading, their decision was governed by the grim realities of 
post-war life in Britain which was not only presenting the Labour 
Government with unexpected setbacks, but was a shock for the people 
who expected greater rewards for their efforts. Filled with the 
best possible-intentions of creating a just and equitable society, 
the Government was being frustrated'by external factors beyond their 
grasp and control. Between' 1947-1950, the country was buffeted 
about by traumatic downward trends and illusory upward swings. The 
inclement weather of early 1947 virtually brought production in the 
2. See p. 22, Cripps' statement to the House of Commons, 28 March 
1947. 
3. See pp. 38-, 9, Morrison's statement to the House of Commons, 5 
December 1947. 
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coal industry to a halt, effectively plunging the country into a 
state of imobility and semi-darkness. Consequently, there were cuts 
in the electricity supply which. led to enormous temporary 
unemployment: the Austin Motor Company, for example, shut down 
production due to the lack of coal and 14,000 people lost their 
jobs. A further two million men and women were eventually added to 
the ranks of the unemployed. The situation was also aggravated by 
poor industrial relations - for example, an unofficial strike by 
lorry drivers put the meat ration in jeopardy. 
4 
For a large part of the nation this state of affairs created a: 
strange, half-life that was to become part of the 
collective experience of post-imperial Britain ... cold 
breakfasts by candlelight blacked out streets (lamps, at 
first half on, were finally wholly extinguished), 
motionless escalators at the underground. At the office 
typists muffled in overcoats and rugs tried to operate 
machines with cold, numb fingers. In the newspapers, Home 
Page editresses explained the art of cooking by hay box "as 
grandma used to do". 5 
As each frozen day succeeded another, food not only became scarce 
but what was available carried a costly tag. Two financial crises 
in 1946-7 and 1949 exposed the nation's problems in a way that had 
not been anticipated and by the spring of 1947, both the foreign and 
domestic press began to write of "a city under siege, of an end of 
the phoney peace". 
6 
The Foreign Correspondent of the France Soir 
wrote, "do you want to see how a besieged city looks, then-take a 
walk through central London today". 
7 
For the British people 
another war was beginning and this time it would be fought solely on 
4. Hopkins, The New Look, p 74. 
5. Ibid., p. 75. 
6. Robert Hewison, In Anger, p. 13. 
7. Hopkins, p. 75. 
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the home front. Thus, by 1948, when plans for the Festival were 
fully under way, the arguments for holding such an event, in light 
of the country's faltering economic position, seemed untenable. In 
the midst of planning a celebration of British achievement and way 
of life, the Government was fighting with Balance of Payments, acute 
national shortages and inclement weather. So desperate was the 
situation that: 
as the first of the sahibs and soldiers returned from 
Nehru's India, they found a Britain whose clocks were 
plastered over with strips of brown paper, whose fires were 
out, whose streets were dark, whose railway services were 
sketchy and uncertain. There was, for some, the sense of a 
once great nation running down. 8 
It was against this harrowing background that, in order to ensure a 
fair share for all of the few remaining available resources, 
rationing was continued and extended (in the most basic areas such 
as tobacco, clothes, petrol and simple foodstuffs). Furthermore, 
taxes were raised and there were many cut backs and shortages to 
contend with, the worst of which was that of housing. 
9 
Substantial numbers of families lived in prefabs; 
flat-roofed boxes made of asbestos sheeting while rosebay 
willowherb flowered in purple patches across untouched 
bombsites. 10 
In this climate, it was impossible for the Government to allow 
the Festival to assume epic proportions. The members of the 
Executive and the Festival Organisation, as a whole, were like 
everyone else living in the grip of austerity and depression and they 
6. Ibid., p. 76" 
9. Robert Aewison, p. 13. During the war years, very few houses 
were built in any case, but this was further exacerbated in 
areas that had suffered bomb-damage - building materials were 
scarce and housing could not be replaced quickly enough to cope 
with the numbers of homeless people. 
10. Peter Lewis, The 50's, p 11. 
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therefore realised that their aspirations for the Festival would 
have to continue within the limits set out by the Government. 
The Executive Committee were meanwhile being helped by the 
Official Committee and the Ministry of Works in the task of 
reviewing existing buildings for the exhibitions. 
11 
Having looked 
at the available buildings, they decided that those best suited to 
their purpose were Earls Court and Olympia, each of which provided 
an area of 500,000 square feet. They were, however, informed by 
Nicholson that both these halls were booked from 30 April to 11 May 
1951 by the Board of Trade for the annual British Industries Fair. 
Of the two halls, Olympia with displays booked for early autumn, he 
said, was much more heavily booked in 1951 than Earls Court which, 
on the other hand, appeared to have a free period from the end of 
May until the middle of September. There would therefore be less 
of a conflict if the Festival Organisation could obtain Earls Court 
rather than Olympia for the Festival exhibitions. On receiving this 
information, Barry proceeded to commission a report by Cecil Cooke, 
the Director of Exhibitions, on the amount of time the Festival 
Organisation would require to mount their exhibitions at either 
Earls Court or Olympia. In his report, Cooke stated categorically 
that the Festival Organisation would need a minimum period of at 
least three months to arrange a suitable exhibition at either of the 
two sites. The 'Brito. in Can Make It' Exhibition of 1946 which was 
11. The Ministry of Works was involved in the search for existing 
buildings in which to house the Festival's exhibitions because 
it was the department responsible for the maintenance of 
national museums and gallery buildings as well as places like 
Hampton Court Palace. They were also to be responsible for any 
works which needed to be done in order to make the buildings 
chosen suitable for the 1951 exhibitions. 
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held at the Victoria and Albert Museum took nearly three months to 
install, and it covered only one-fifth of the size of the Festival 
of Britain's requirements (i. e. 100,000 square feet compared to 
Festival of Britain's estimated requirement of 500,000 square 
feet). Further, the small COI exhibitions of 10,000 square feet 
normally took two months to install. He argued, therefore, that in 
view of the proposed scope, scale and type of displays the Executive 
wished to mount, they would need at least six months to accomplish 
this. He warned that this estimate was made on the assumption that 
the COI, as the Government's exhibition planners and mounters, could 
be assured from the very outset that all the necessary materials, 
labour and transport would be made readily available. Moreover, the 
COI would want all the materials to be pre-fabricated and stored 
ready for quick erection. Having-mounted the exhibition, Cooke said 
it would take the COI approximately six weeks to dismantle it, 
12 
On receiving this information, Barry wrote to Nicholson saying 
that on the basis of the report and on information he had received 
from Cecil Cooke and the COID, he was forced to come to the 
conclusion that: 
These minimum estimates of three months for mounting are 
extremely optimistic. If the Festival is to have to make 
use of existing (by now, almost traditional) exhibition 
buildings, it must certainly set out to use them in a quite 
unusual and striking way for 1951, otherwise the Festival 
could not succeed, on the exhibition side, in living up to 
the high standards we are setting. It would be fatal for 
the public to feel that, after all the fanfares, there were 
to be just another couple of routine exhibitions at Olympia 
and Earls Court. 
Barry said of this poor state of affairs : 
I am strongly of the opinion that an exhibition of 
exhibitions worthy of the standard we intend to set 
12. Cab 124/1334, Barry to Nicholson, 22 April 1948. 
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ourselves for 1951 and all of the enterprise and labour 
they will entail should remain open for a minimum period of 
four months. It is a normal experience that exhibitions 
have to extend their period of opening in response to 
demand. Thus allowing (a maximum of) three months for 
mounting, six weeks for dismounting, a minimum period of 
show of four months - the Festival will require occupation 
of Earls Court and/or Olympia for a minimum period of eight 
months and two weeks. 
Working from a position of tactical strength Barry, through 
Nicholson, issued the Government an ultimatum. He said: 
We are thus faced with this proposition: that either the 
Government must be asked to take drastic and immediate 
action to persuade the parties concerned in existing 
contracts for Earls Court and Olympia to change their dates 
or to find alternative accommodation, or the intention to 
use Earls Court and Olympia for the Festival purposes in 
1951 must be abandoned. 13 
The 'parties' who were blocking the Festival Organisation's use of 
these halls were primarily the Board of Trade, the BIF Council of 
Exhibitors and the Birmingham Council of Management of the BIF. The 
BIF, an important event in normal circumstances was, in the 
desperate economic situation of 1948, deemed extremely important by 
the Government, the Board of Trade, the Council of Exhibitors and of 
Management-. The Government, anxious to balance the nation's 
payments, saw export as its chief means of achieving this goal. The 
BIF by promoting export trade would bring in the much-needed foreign 
currency, and all parties were naturally concerned that nothing, not 
even the Centenary of 1851, should reduce its effectiveness. The 
Executive Committee, realising that Britain's export trade was of 
paramount importance to the beleaguered Government and nation came 
to the conclusion that care had to be taken not to antagonise 
Industry, and that the BIF had thus to be seen as both related to 
13. Ibid. 
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and complementary to the Festival and that cancellation in 1951 was, 
therefore, completely out of the question. 
14 
This view was 
communicated to Nicholson by Barry who went on to argue that in view 
of this attitude, as well as that of the Government's and the Board 
of Trade's: 
urgent consideration be given to the finding of alternative 
sites or to the prospects of erecting temporary structures 
to house the Festival Exhibition 1951.15 
14. Cab 124/1334, Executive Committee Minutes, 15 April 1948. 
15, ibid. Barry to Nicholson, 22 April 1948. 
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THE MOVE TO AN OPEN SITE 
From as early as 20 May 1948, the Executive confirmed, at a 
meeting, that whilst looking at existing structures they had also 
been reviewing and visiting sites in open spaces in central London. 
Even at this stage they were of the opinion that the Combined 
Exhibition should be situated on any one of these open sites. In 
addition to this, they suggested that a funfair be situated below 
Hungerford Bridge on the South Bank, which was due for 
redevelopment. The funfair would, they thought, be run 
independently of the Festival Organisation but would have to conform 
to their standards. They asked miss Lidderdale, Secretary to the 
Official Committee, to submit their views on the need for an open 
site to the Lord President for his comments, because they were aware 
that the idea of using an open site in central London for Festival 
purposes would raise difficulties. 
16 
The Executive Committee's next move was to publicly unveil the 
new ideas for the Centenary celebrations. At the first meeting of 
the Festival Council on 31 May 1948, Barry explained that on 
reflection, the Executive felt that if they were to put "The British 
Contribution to Civilization' on display to the nation and the 
world, it could be accomplished more attractively and compellingly 
"by means of a large exhibition covering all the relevant features of 
our national life rather than by dividing it up somewhat artificially 
16. Cab 124/1335, Executive Committee Minutes, 20 May 1948. 
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into related compartments`. The Executive had therefore decided: 
to organise a combined (integrated) exhibition covering all 
those subjects which we are called upon to cover, and this 
should offer opportunities not only for presenting a truer 
and more comprehensive picture but also a more interesting 
and dynamic show than was likely to be achieved by the 
original plan. 17 
Barry went on to explain that there would be further separate 
exhibitions on science and technology and architecture. He 
concluded by saying that he could not yet give any definite 
information as to where these three exhibitions would be held. 
However, the Executive had already advised the Government that 
to house the Combined Exhibition, it would be necessary either to 
build in central London on a site yet to be chosen, one large 
temporary building or a number of smaller ones to equal the total 
size required. Added to this, the Executive had asked for the use 
of Earls Court to house the Science and Technology Exhibition. 
Negotiations had begun with the Board of Trade to persuade them to 
relinquish their claim to Earls Court in the summer of 1951 and use 
only Olympia for their annual British Industries Fair, which 
normally occupied both venues. 
The Architecture exhibition had its own problems: it had not 
yet been decided how large this exhibitio 
be visualised. Barry said that it might 
of Earls Court or alternatively, it 
completely different pattern from the 
housed elsewhere either inside or outside 
n would be or how it should 
possibly be housed in part 
might be arranged on a 
other exhibitions and be 
London. 
18 
17, Work 25/44,31 May 1948. See pp. 70-73, Consolidation of the 
Theme and Aims of the Festival of Britain. 
18. Work, 25/7 
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This latest idea about where and how the Combined Exhibition 
and the other - exhibitions - should be housed had been discussed 
earlier on 25 May 1948 at a meeting of the Official Committee. 
Bernard Sendall of the Executive Committee, outlined the Executive's 
plans for the Festival, stating that they were in favour of using an 
open park site on which specially-designed and constructed 
structures would be placed to house the Combined Exhibition. The 
estimate of 550,000 square feet was, he explained, based partly on 
an original estimate made by the COID and partly on the view held by 
the Executive that as the central display for 1951, the combined 
Exhibition ought to be the larger and should, therefore, be larger 
than the 470,000 square feet which the Science and Technology 
Exhibition would occupy if it were to use Earls Court. Cecil Cooke 
of the COI and also a member of the Executive Committee, further 
added that a decision on whether the temporary buildings could be 
constructed, was required almost immediately as the Executive had 
become convinced that it would not be possible to present the 
Combined Exhibition in Dutch barns or standard shedding* 
19 
Following these statements, Proctor of the Ministry of Works 
rightly said that the scheme contemplated by the Executive was a 
great deal more ambitious than the original plan and, in his 
opinion, steps should be taken immediately to present the scheme to 
the Investment Programmes Committee (IPC) in as much detail as 
possible. The Committee was, he said, presently drawing up-a four 
year investment programme and would be paying specific attention to 
1949, when he assumed Festival construction would begin. He further 
19. Cab 124/1335, Official Committe Minutes, 25 May 1948. 
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suggested that a Working Party should be set up to examine the 
possibilities of alternative temporary structures. The Chairman of 
the Official Committee, Max Nicholson, wholly concurred with this 
view and invited the Ministry of Works to set up a Working Party, to 
be composed of representatives from the Ministries of Town and 
Country Planning, and of Works, and also the COI, which would 
examine what types of temporary structures it would be possible to 
use for both the Festival's Combined Exhibition, and its 
Architecture Exhibition. The Working Party, he added, would have to 
bear in mind which materials were in the shortest supply and to 
assess the re-use value on any of the materials subsequently used. 
In addition it would also have to report back to the Official 
Committee as soon as possible so that they could prepare a report 
based on this information for submission to the IPC. 
20 
The Executive Committee meanwhile continued their 
investigations for a suitable site to house the Combined Exhibition, 
and at a meeting of the Executive on 24 June 1948, the members 
discussed a memorandum by the COI which examined the types of 
schemes the Executive could use for housing the Combined Exhibition 
in temporary buildings on an open site. The schemes presented in 
this memorandum were based upon the early estimates drawn up by the 
Ministry of Works' Working Party. The COI presented three possible 
schemes: the first, Plan A- envisaged structures composed entirely 
of standard shedding with one hundred per cent re-use value; the 
second, plan B- called for a group of buildings made up mainly from 
standard shedding with some structures being specially-designed for 
20. Ibid. 
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the exhibition and which would have little re-use value; the third, 
Plan C- presented the Executive with the option of erecting a 
community of buildings that would be architecturally designed and 
specifically constructed to house the combined exhibition in 1951, 
the re-use value here, like Plan B, would be minimal. 
21 
The Executive Committee rejected Plan A on the grounds that it 
was too depressing and unworthy of their enterprise. The choice, 
they concluded, lay between Plans B and C. Barry explained to his 
colleagues that if 'a scheme based on Plan B could be evolved which 
was up to Festival standards and which would do credit to Great 
Britain in the eyes of the world, it should, in his opinion, be 
adopted'. If this was not possible, then the Executive, he said, 
should not hesitate to endorse Plan Cl, but Plan C could not in 
itself be accepted because although it was by far the most 
preferable, it would be hard to defend such a choice in view of the 
country's economic difficulties. After weighing and examining all 
the limitations of Plan B, the Executive concluded that it would be 
reasonable to assume that the Combined Exhibition could be worthily 
housed in a group of buildings, sixty percent, (it must be noted 
lessened by six per cent of the original COI quotation), to be 
composed of standard structures of probably limited purposes, while 
forty per cent would be specially-designed for the Festival. This 
decision, and the reasons for not adopting Plan C were, they said, 
to be presented to the Government whose permission they needed if 
they were to erect temporary structures on an open site. 
22 
21. Cab 24/1335, Executive Committee Minutes, 24 June 1948 and Cab 
124/1335, Report by the Official Committee, 17 July 1948. 
22. Cab 124/1335, Executive Committee Minutes, 24 June 1948. 
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on 9 July 1948, Barry sent a memorandum to the Festival 
Council stating that after careful consideration and an exhaustive 
search, the Executive Committee could now recommend to the Festival 
Council whose endorsement they were seeking, that the Combined 
Exhibition, which would occupy a total area of 550,000 square feet, 
be situated at Battersea Park. Battersea Park was chosen, he said, 
after a variety of sites had been examined, because of its 
attractive setting with its continuous frontage along the River 
Thames. Explaining how the exhibition would be housed, he said: 
Having regard to the known shortages of material and 
labour, and the fact that the Government intimated that no 
special buildings would be possible for 1951, they think it 
right to recommend a less ambitious alternative. 
Accordingly, the recommendation is that 40 per cent of the 
buildings for the combined exhibition and the science 
exhibition together shall be designed for the purpose; and 
that 60 per cent shall be composed of 'standard structure' 
of various types suitable for re-use. Of this 60 per cent, 
it is recommended that a proportion (yet to be specified)' 
should consist of types specifically designed for the 
Festival but also having re-use value. 23 
Before the Festival Council could either reject or endorse the 
recommendations of the Executive Committee, however, the official 
Committee held a meeting on 13 July 1948 to discuss their attitude 
towards the Executive's proposals. In general, they were not 
necessarily against the Executive's plans: the proposals, Nicholson 
said, did not strictly run counter to the Minister's conditional 
agreement to celebrating the Centenary, as they would not 'call for 
23. Work 25/44, Festival Council Papers, 9 July 1948. The Science 
Exhibition was to be reduced in size and housed with the 
Combined Exhibition in Battersea Park. However, in order to 
make this story of the housing of all the Festival exhibitions 
clearer, I will discuss all the details of the Science 
Exhibition and the search for its site further on in this 
chapter. 
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permanent new building or make major demands upon manpower and 
material. 
24 In further discussion it was quite correctly pointed 
out that the scheme being put forward was on a very much smaller 
scale than the International Exhibition which had initially been 
seriously considered. 
An exhibition of this category would have required some 5 
million square feet of exhibition space, with building, including 
some permanent structures, costing £21 million and the necessary 
traffic developments for the Osterley Park scheme, costing £50 
million; the Executive's proposals, the members concluded, "were of 
an entirely different order"* 
25 
Furthermore, there were no 
alternatives to housing the Combined Exhibition in Battersea Park; 
the avenues of using Earls Court and Olympia had been fully explored 
and had to be rejected. Thus the Official Committee endorsed the 
recommendation from the Executive Committee that the Combined 
Exhibition and the Science and Technology Exhibition should be 
situated in Battersea Park. 
The Official Committee's reasonableness was, unfortunately, not 
infectious. On 12 July 1948, a day before the meeting of the 
Official Committee, the IPC, to whom the Official Committee sent a 
report on the resources the Festival Organisation would need for 
their consideration, met and gave their opinion on the proposals. 
Under the chairmanship of W. Strath of the Central Economic Planning 
Staff of the Treasury, the representatives of the Board of Trade, the 
24. In March 1947, at a meeting of the Lord President's Committee, 
this was the condition which the Ministers made before agreeing 
to the celebration of the Centenary. 
25. cab 123/1335, Official Committee Minutes, 13 July 1948. 
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Ministries of Supply and Works and the Treasury, denounced and 
rejected the Executive Committee's proposals. 
26 
They did so on 
the grounds that the lord President, in his statement of 5 December 
1947 to the House of - Commons, had clearly stated, "it is now clear 
that under the revised investment programme no new construction for 
such purposes (celebrating the Centenary of 1851) can be undertaken 
for 19510. It was their belief that the country's economic and 
investment prospects had not improved and it was difficult to see 
how any resources could be made available for construction of this 
kind, regardless of whether the structures for 1951 were of a 
temporary, semi-permanent or permanent nature. 
27 
They proposed to 
report to the Government that in view of the shortage of steel and 
of labour in the London area for essential building programmes, they 
recommended that no materials or labour should be spared for 
temporary structures of any kind for the Festival exhibitions. 
28 
The attitude of the IPC was reported to the Official Committee 
members by Nicholson at a meeting on the following day, 13 July. 
The Committee decided that in view of this attitude, which as was 
shown earlier was diametrically opposed to their own, a report 
showing exactly what the Festival Organisation was asking for in 
terms of labour and materials for their temporary buildings should 
be written by them and presented to the Lord President for his 
consideration. On 17 July 1948, Nicholson presented this report to 
the Lord President. In it he set down clearly how the Executive 
26, The members of this Committee (the IPC) who were looking at the 
Executive's proposals from an investment angle are listed in 
Annex 2. 
27. Cab 124/1335, IPC Minutes, 12 July 1948. 
28. Ibid. Official Committee Minutes, 13 July 1948. 
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Committee had reached the decision that it would be necessary to 
house both the Combined and the Science and Technology Exhibitions 
in temporary buildings on an open site. The Official Committee, he 
said, endorsed the Executive Committee's view that Battersea Park 
would make the best site for their major exhibitions. Knowing how 
sensitive the Government was to the idea of using parklands for 
Festival purposes, Nicholson drew the Lord President's attention to 
the fact that the public had been denied access to the park for the 
last seven years due to military allotments and occupation. In the 
Official Committee's view, another three or four years of partial 
closure would not make such a great difference. The report then 
proceeded to outline the plan the Executive had adopted for housing 
the exhibition - sixty per cent standard shedding, forty per cent 
specially designed structures. Speaking on behalf of the Official 
Committee, Nicholson said: 
we consider, if these exhibitions are to be staged on an 
open site and they are to be worthily housed, that this 
scheme is as reasonable and economical as could be hoped 
for and, in our view, it is unlikely that any acceptable 
economies could be made in it which would materially effect 
the problem of finding resources. We understand that the 
Investment Programmes Committee see great difficulty in 
finding the steel and building labour which would be 
required mainly in 1950. 
The Committee concluded this aspect of their report by stating: 
if a special British Industries Fair . 
(and other industrial 
exhibitions which will contribute to export) are to be held 
in 1951, they will effectively shut out from Earls Court 
and Olympia the major exhibitions to be staged by the 
Festival of Britain and therefore if both the BIF and Trade 
Exhibitions and the Festival of Britain are to take place, 
there is no real alternative to housing the main Festival 
Exhibitions in temporary buildings in a public open space, 
as proposed by the Festival Organisation. It is clearly for 
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Ministers to decide whether such a scheme can be 
accepted. 29 
After despatching the Official Committee's report to the Lord 
President, Nicholson turned his attention to convincing the IPC of 
the rightness and necessity of the Executive Committee's plans. He 
was not altogether convinced or, for that matter, impressed by the 
logic of the IPC's arguments, as he pointed out to Sir Edwin 
Plowden, Chairman of the Committee, in a memorandum on 21 July 1948: 
the present Chancellor (Sir Stafford Cripps, who took over 
from Hugh Dalton from 13 November 1947) who originally 
propounded this idea when he was President of the Board of 
Trade. When the thing was put into my hands, I made every 
effort to reach a compromise which would have meant either 
holding the BIF very early in the year, or staggering it in 
one building, but although the Board of Trade for some time 
thought this would be workable, when it came to getting out 
the detailed scheme and consulting their Advisory council 
they had to reject it. Apart from the concert hall, the 
claims on materials are for a Combined Exhibition and for 
Exhibitions of Science and Technology, Architecture, Town 
Planning and Building research. 30 
29. Cab 124/1335, Report by the Official Committee, 17 July 1948. 
See Annex 2A. 
30. Ibid. Nicholson to Plowden, 21 July 1948. The Concert Hall 
scheme mentioned refers to the plans that were being discussed 
at this time and endorsed by the Executive that a Concert Hall 
should be built for the Festival events in 1951, either on the 
South Bank as part of its redevelopment programme or on the 
Queens Hall Site. These will be discussed further on in 
this chapter as they bear direct relevance to how this whole 
matter of housing the Festival exhibitions was resolved. 
The Architecture Exhibition; by 21 July 1948 the Architecture 
Council had finally managed to organise some plans of what this 
exhibition would entail. At a meeting of the Festival Council 
on 21 July 1948, the Director General of the Executive 
presented a memo which stated that the Architectural Council 
now wished to present an exhibition that would entail 
developing a 'site of a suitable size adjoining the main 
exhibition area as a cross-section of a residential 
neighbourhood containing houses, flats, shops, nursery schools, 
open spaces etc., the whole area complete with roads, 
landscaping and services being handed back to the local 
authority for normal occupation at the end of the exhibition. 
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The IPC, he said, "appears to be unable to point out any specific 
repercussions on other really vital national interests which would 
result from acceptance of this scheme". He continued by adding that 
the Festival's exhibitions, far from being frivolous and 
inessential, would have an immense indirect effect in putting over a 
wide range of British exports, in which design, technology and 
living conditions are involved. Furthermore he said that the 
Festival would also be able to stimulate the much needed 
modernisation of design, technology and other processes that would 
be vital to the future of British industry if it was to retain any 
kind of competitive edge in the world markets. The Festival, like 
the BIF, he argued, would be able to produce a substantial flow of 
hard currency into the country as a result of the large number of 
foreign visitors expected to come to Britain for the Festival. 
Nicholson was convinced that the Festival would provide the British 
people with a morale booster which he thought might be badly needed 
when Marshall Aid came to an end. He reminded Sir Edwin that "it 
was the Ministers who had agreed without asking any questions to a 
big national festival and what it was to cover". The Government 
was, he emphasized, heavily committed to the Festival, having not 
only announced that it was to take place, but also having gone as 
far as setting up a Festival Organisation. 
31 
While waiting for a reply from Sir Edwin, Nicholson turned his 
attention back to the Lord President who, he was quick to realise, 
was in a difficult position. As the Minister in charge of the 
Festival he was responsible for its eventual success or failure. But 
31. Ibid. 
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its potential success depended not on the Executive Committee's 
plans, but on Morrison's ability to get other ministers enthusiastic 
about the Festival. This was vital, for without a great degree of 
commitment from them the Festival could not get off the ground. In 
this task of raising Ministers' consciousness it was Nicholson's job 
to provide Morrison with all the convincing arguments that would 
sway them. Nicholson told Morrison to explain to the President of 
the Board of Trade, Harold Wilson (who took over from Sir Stafford 
Cripps from 29 September 1947), that: 
It (i. e. the Festival) will put the spotlight on British 
science, technology and design etc. in a way which will be 
worth, in some ways more than the BIF at a time when the 
seller's market is probably over and it will incidentally 
bring in enough extra hard currency and tourists to earn 
its keep. Also the stimulus to productivity and more 
intelligent use of materials through better design and 
improved practice will give a big economic dividend which 
the President should support. No-one is complaining that 
the BIF now wants to absorb all existing exhibition 
buildings for 1951, but if the President takes this line, 
it is up to him to support an alternative which will enable 
the decision to hold a worthwhile 1951 Festival to be 
carried out. 32 
These points should, Nicholson said, impress the President and, more 
importantly, they were issues that he should find sound enough to 
support. Nicholson instructed Morrison to tell the Minister of 
Works that: 
while it was hoped that existing buildings could be used, 
the claims of the BIF make this impossible and the only 
Ministerial decision was that there should be no permanent 
buildings or major claims on resources. The previous 
Osterley Park International Exhibition scheme involved over 
five times the exhibition area (5 million square feet) and 
well over ten times the expenditure. As the Government has 
decided that a worthwhile exhibition is to be put on and as 
the Board of Trade needs the existing exhibition buildings, 
the Government is morally committed to something of this 
32. Cab 124/1335, Nicholson to Morrison, 21 July 1948. 
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order and could not draw back without far stronger grounds 
of repercussions on other important national interests than 
have been suggested. 
The Minister of Works was, Nicholson wrote, to stress this last 
point to his officials and not allow them to take too rigid a line. 
Lastly, Nicholson instructed Morrison to tell the Economic Secretary 
of the Treasury that: 
while the gross cost in material of the exhibition and the 
concert hall schemes taken together may come up to some 
9,000 tons, the net cost should not exceed about 4,000 and, 
if the LCC use their ingenuity in fitting in labour, the 
effect of putting back other construction in the London 
area should not be great, particularly as the main load on 
labour does not occur until 1950 when the housing position 
should be less difficult. 33 
Nicholson had already started to devise an alternative scheme 
should the Lord President find it impossible to get support from 
these Ministers: this new plan allowed for the Combined Exhibition 
to be held in Battersea Park, but limited it to a smaller scale than 
the"Executive Committee had originally envisaged. The space for the 
temporary structures would be reduced from the original 900,000 to 
750,000 square feet. The costs would be lowered and the structures 
would only occupy the existing open areas in the northern half of 
the park. Thus, the park would not have to be closed because the 
entire southern half of the park would be left open and free for 
continuous public use. 
34 
The revised plan was sent to Morrison, although Nicholson 
warned him that it was: 
still open to objections from the investment resources 
angle, but it would be considerably more economical and to 
that extent less unpalatable than the original scheme. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Ibid. Nicholson to Morrison, 22 July 1948. 
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Sir Edwin Plowden was, Nicholson said, in favour of this revised 
scheme, but felt it his duty to point out to Nicholson that some 
parts of the Treasury and the IPC still did not agree with the 
investing of scarce resources even on a scaled-down Battersea Park 
project. Nicholson asked Morrison to put the revised scheme to the 
Ministers, finding out their views before be made a decision. 
Nicholson told Morrison that he hoped: 
that the Ministers will give a clear indication whether or 
not they are prepared to recommend to the Cabinet use of 
resources on this scale for 1951 and if not, how else they 
think that a worthwhile show could be organised. 35 
However, despite all of Nicholson's and Morrison's 
manoeuverings behind the scenes, the Executive Committee's plans to 
use Battersea Park received yet another unexpected setback. On 21 
July 1948, the Festival Council met to discuss the Executive's 
recommendations which had been presented to them on 9 July. Several 
Council members were of the opinion that there would be strong 
public opposition to the use of Battersea Park and of the diversion 
of funds and building labour into the exhibitions which could be 
used for other more essential purposes, such as the reconstruction 
of houses and schools. Moreover, the Council members were also 
concerned that the Festival Organisation should avoid taking any 
action that might arouse public hostility and opposition to the 
Festival projects as a whole. The Council members felt that the 
Festival exhibitions should be housed in existing buildings or 
permanent buildings which had already been planned for completion by 
1951. If the Executive still insisted on using an open site, the 
35. Ibid. 
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Council suggested that inquiries should be made into the 
possibility of adapting the South Bank redevelopment plan, so as to 
accommodate the exhibitions there. Perhaps, they said, it would be 
possible to arrest the building of the proposed Government offices 
on the site so that the exhibitions could be housed in the shell, 
with the building being completed at the end of the exhibition* 
36 
Thus, contrary to all expectations, the Council, while taking 
seriously its honorary and advisory role, had decided it would seem 
not to appear as an automatic rubber stamp for the Executive's 
schemes. This attitude and their views were communicated to the 
Lord President on 22 July 1948, in a letter from Leonard Elmhirst, a 
member of- the Council, which stated, The Council of your '51 
Exhibition came to life yesterday and promptly jammed a spanner in 
the works of the Executive Committee". The reason for this was that 
they could not see: 
how in a world of drastic economy they are going to justify 
to their various constituencies any expenditure at all on a 
Festival, whether of money, labour or materials, at a time 
when so many young married couples are living with their 
in-laws and when industry is short of steel. They feel 
they must have an imperative reason that they can place 
before the public in this country and the world at large. 
Naturally, in view of this attitude, the Council considered the 
Executive Committee's proposals indefensible and further, they were 
worried that the use of Battersea Park would mean depriving a large 
section of the south London population of the use of the park for 
two years, with no guarantee that the park would recover its 
present beauty and charm for some time to come'. Elmhirst said that 
there was also a natural scepticism amongst the Council about the 
36. Work 25/7, Festival Council Minutes, 21 July 1948. 
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chances of recouping even a proportion of the £2.5 million suggested 
for outlay, or of salvaging very much of the expenditure on labour 
and materials for the buildings. Finally the Council were doubtful 
as to what would be shown in the proposed buildings and also that 
any exhibition which required a greater walking distance than was 
available to the public at the Victoria and Albert Museum for the 
'Britain Can Make It' Exhibition, was probably unwise. 
37 
This last objection of the Council's, as to what would fill the 
buildings, was indeed ironic for it was obvious they lacked the 
creative imagination of the Executive Committee. Moreover, when the 
combined Exhibition was finally opened to the public on the South 
Bank, there were 22 pavilions which housed over 10,000 exhibits. In 
view of their objections, however, the Council members wished, 
Elmhirst said: 
to explore the possibility of using the opportunity offered 
by the Exhibition to make both a temporary and permanent 
contribution to the rehabilitation of the South Bank of the 
river. Some people felt that the opportunity for holding 
the World's Fair in New York was used, not to destroy 
temporarily an existing park amenity but to turn an old 
dump into a permanent asset to the city and to provide on 
it some permanent buildings of use to the Exhibition and to 
the public afterwards. You, as an old Chairman of the LCC, 
will realise how strongly this idea of using the 1951 
occasion to convert the semi-demolished slums into a 
permanent public asset would appeal not only to Londoners 
and English people generally but to the whole world, that 
wonders whether or not we are going to lose or use an 
opportunity we have not had since the great fire of London 
in the 17th Century. 
Elmhirst concluded his letter by saying that: 
if it were possible to add to the site shown to us, of the 
LCC proposals, which was limited by the map, I have a 
feeling that there would be very little difficulty in 
selling to the Council the idea of combining Council plans 
with LCC improvement. Whatever was shown in the exhibition 
37. Cab 124/1336, Elmhirst to Morrison, 22 July 1948. 
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buildings, the idea of such combination is eminently 
saleable to the public both here and abroad. 38 
The Government had thus found a surprising ally in helping them 
arrive at their decision as to whether or not the Festival 
exhibitions should be housed in Battersea Park. On 24 July 1948, 
the Government gave the Festival Organisation its answer, which was 
delivered to them in a letter from Nicholson to Barry. They had 
decided not to permit the use of Battersea Park on the grounds that 
they: 
considered that the provision of temporary 
housing the combined and science exhibition 
Park could not be justified in view of 
extreme shortage of steel and labour, and 
public objections which must be expected to 
most or all of the park. 
structures for 
is in Battersea 
the continuing 
of the strong 
the closing of 
The Government concluded that in view of their ban on the 
construction of temporary structures, the Executive Committee would 
be well advised to look at the museums and institutes in South 
Kensington to accommodate their exhibitions. 
39 
38. Ibid. 
39, Work 25/44, Report by Barry to the Festival Council, 27 July 1948. 
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RE-EXAMINING EXISTING STRUCTURES 
On receiving the Government's answer, the Executive Committee 
made a preliminary examination of the Government's latest proposal 
and visited all the buildings in the area. They rapidly came to the 
conclusion that the five museums (the Victoria and Albert, the 
Natural History, the Science and Geology Museums, and the Imperial 
Institute, which combined gave a total floor area of approximately 
804,000 square feet and a ground floor area of 448,000 square feet) 
were unsuited to their purpose. More importantly, the Directors of 
these museums were unanimous in the opinion that to clear the 
required space in order to mount the Festival's exhibitions for 
1951, would have the most disruptive effect on their plans for 
post-war recovery and development. 
40 
They were very concerned 
that the burden and the magnitude of total clearance and subsequent 
storage of pieces, apart from being an absurd idea, would be a long 
and extremely costly task with its own peculiar and complex 
problems. They explained to the Executive that it would take four 
years, from November 1949 to October 1953 to dismantle, mount the 
1951 exhibitions and to reinstate the museums. To move their 
exhibits to and from storage facilities would cost approximately 
40, The holding of the Festival Exhibitions in museums would have 
caused a serious interruption in a number of building 
programmes including: The Science Museum was due to start 
construction of a central block in 1950; the construction of a 
boilerhouse for all museums; the completion of the 
Entomological Block in the Natural History museum was due to 
begin in 1949/50; and the new herbarium at the Natural History 
museum was due to begin in 1951. In addition to this, there 
were also other minor works to be attended to. Cab 124/1295, 
Lidderdale to Nicholson, 27 July 1948. 
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£2,428,000 in London, where storage space was quite readily 
available, and in the regional areas it would cost approximately 
£2,991,000, as storage space was scarcer. Alternatively, they said 
that they could perhaps meet the Festival Organisation's needs half 
way by partially clearing their houses: thus the Victoria and 
Albert, Natural History, Geological and Science Museums and the 
Imperial Institute combined, could offer the Festival Organisation 
95,000 square feet, at a cost (in terms of clearance and storage) of 
£50,000 in London and of £62,000 in the regional areas. 
41 
On 27 July 1948, the Executive Committee presented their 
preliminary findings on the museums to the Festival Council. This 
report concluded that from an architectural point of view, these 
buildings were not suited to modern display techniques. It would, 
they said, be virtually impossible to set up a thematic exhibition 
in any of them and they had, after all, discarded the idea of 
mounting separate disconnected exhibitions. Furthermore, these 
41. Work 25/44, Memo by Executive Council to Festival council, 18 
September 1948. The Directors of the Victoria & Albert, 
Science, and Geological Museums were asked to a meeting in the 
rooms of Sir John Maud at the Ministry of Education on 27 July 
1948. Also present at the meeting were officials from the 
Ministry of Works, including Mr. Proctor, and the Ministry of 
Education, as well as Miss Lidderdale of the Official 
Committee. At the meeting it was decided that the Ministry of 
Works should collect information from the Directors of the 
Museums concerned as well as from the Imperial Institute which 
would explain the implications of using these structures for 
the Festival in terms of cost, interruption to research and 
building programmes and the like. The Directors would have to 
work out both the cost of total and partial clearance of their 
museum for the Festival exhibitions. The Directors report was 
to be pushed through with utmost speed and presented before the 
end of August to the Lord President. The Executive Committee, 
as can be seen from the note, received this detailed 
information in September. Cab 124/1295, Lidderdale to 
Nicholson, 27 July 1948. 
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buildings between them, provided recreation and education for 
approximately 2,890,000 people in the course of a year. It seemed 
ludicrous, as well as undesirable, that in a year when Britain was 
to be on show that these amenities with their highly historical and 
artistic exhibits were to be made inaccessible. To do this, they 
argued, would surely cause a public outcry far greater than any 
protest over the closing of a park. It was highly dubious, they 
thought, to provide one new show by taking away four good ones. 
Entering into the spirit of enterprise and initiative and taking 
their task very seriously, the Executive concluded that a 
'make-shift show housed in unsuitable, obsolete or dull surroundings 
may make a poor and even depressing effect upon the visitor': 
It may give him quite an inadequate idea of our progress 
and our inventiveness, and send him away with an impression 
the opposite of that intended to convey - namely, of the 
virility and the resilience of the nation, its powers of 
recovery and its place in the vanguard of progress. This 
would create hidden liabilities. Better no exhibition at 
all than one unworthy of an event which by 1951 will have 
been advertised across the world for three years. 42 
On 28 July 1948, the Festival Council met to discuss the Executive's 
report. They fully concurred with the views expressed and decided 
to inform the Government that the Combined Science and Technology 
Exhibitions should not be accommodated in the South Kensington 
Museums. Rather, these museums should be encouraged to complete 
their own reconstruction and development programmes in time for 
1951, when they could present exhibitions of their own which would 
be worthy of the occasion. 
43 
42. Work 25/44, Report by the Director General to the Festival 
Council, 27 July 1948. 
43. Ibid. Festival Council Minutes, 28 July 1948. 
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The Festival Organisation was not going to be diverted from its 
mission of giving the world and the British people a brilliant show, 
nor was the Government, it appeared, prepared to abandon its 
pragmatic course. Both parties stood poised with neither side 
willing to compromise or retreat. Some kind of solution to this 
impasse had to be found. The London County Council, the Lord 
President's former office intervened presenting an answer, indeed 
making an offer that neither party could legitimately refuse. 
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THE SOUTH BANK SITE 
As early as 20 May 1948, the Executive Committee were pressing 
the Official Committee to endorse the building of a permanent or 
temporary concert hall in London in time for 1951. The Arts Council 
was extremely anxious because the Albert Hall was the only concert 
hall in London, and they were firmly convinced that the cultural 
aspects of the Festival of Britain could not be worthily celebrated 
in 1951 without the provision of a new concert hall, be it temporary 
or permanent. They asked the Executive to support this view and 
present it to the Official Committee and, on 25 May 1948, the 
Official Committee discussed the Executive's latest recommendation. 
The committee recognised the need for a new concert hall in London 
and agreed, in the course of discussion of possible sites which 
included the Queen's Hall site and Regent's Park, that the most 
likely setting for the new hall would be on the South Bank site 
which was due for redevelopment although, in the immediate climate, 
any commencement seemed remote. The Committee concluded by agreeing 
that every effort should be made to provide London with another 
concert hall by 1951, which they thought would probably have to be a 
temporary one, as it seemed unlikely that a permanent one could be 
built in time; the most suitable site for it would be on the South 
Bank. 
44 On 2 June 1948, the Executive received word from the 
Official Committee that they endorsed the Executive's view that 
London needed another concert hall and they were now inviting the 
Executive to sponsor the building of a temporary concert hall in 
44. Cab 124/1335, Official Committee Minutes, 25 May 1948. 
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London by 1951 as part of their programme of temporary construction 
for the Festival exhibitions. 
Thus, the Executive Committee were now responsible not only for 
the Festival Exhibitions, but also for the construction of a concert 
hall. As the sponsors of this major venture, they were approached 
on 22 June 1948 by the LCC, the owners of the South Bank site. 
Howard Roberts, Clerk to the LCC came to talk to the Executive 
Committee members about the possibility of using the site in 1951. 
He explained to them that the LCC were planning to redevelop the 
South Bank between County Hall and Waterloo Bridge and this would, 
he said, form the first phase of their reconstruction scheme in that 
area. It had been decided to build new Government Offices and a 
cultural centre on the South Bank which would be financed and owned 
by them. The cultural centre would consist of two concert halls 
(one large, the other small), a restaurant, and a national theatre, 
the construction of which would not begin before 1952 but until 
then, however, the LCC were going to beautify the site by laying it 
out as a garden which would be ready for 1951. The LCC, Roberts 
said, were of the opinion that in view of the Government's decision 
to mark the Centenary of 1851, they wanted to bring forward their 
redevelopment plans for the South Bank and in particular, they 
wanted to have part of the cultural centre ready for 1951. They 
were convinced, Roberts said, that if they were given priority for 
labour and materials they could complete the larger concert hall in 
104 
time for 1951.45 The completion of at least one of the concert 
halls was considered very important by both the Executive Committee 
and the Arts Council, who felt that the proposed cultural Festival 
could not be worthily celebrated without a new concert hall. The 
LCC for their part, were anxious to see the concert hall built on 
the South Bank because it would help to transform this area, which 
had no previously-known associations with music and the performing 
arts. This would be the beginning of a new cultural centre. 
Tempering the Executive Committee's enthusiasm, Nicholson, who was 
present at the meeting at which this whole subject' was discussed, 
reminded the Executive that the issue was not so much whether the 
South Bank concert hall or the Queen's Hall concert hall should be 
built, but which one (if any) should be given priority for materials 
and labour, should these be available. He was inclined to think 
that if the LCC could build the embankment between County Hall and 
Waterloo Bridge, as well as erect a permanent concert hall in time 
for 1951, their scheme might 'well appear more attractive than the 
Queen's Hall scheme. But, he said, the' issue, was one for the 
Minister to decide, with full knowledge of the implications of each 
proposed scheme in terms of material and labour. He added that they 
had, however, already decided that the redevelopment scheme for the 
County Hall to Waterloo Bridge section of the South Bank should 
45, Cab 124/1335, Executive Committee Minutes, 22 June 1948. Also 
discussed at this meeting was the plan to build a new concert 
hall on the site of the old Queen's Hall and the St. George's 
Hall sites. This proposal came from Messrs. Chappell. Their 
hall would seat 4,000 and be financed entirely by them. The 
musical world as well as the Arts Council were strongly in 
favour of this scheme as the area (unlike the South Bank) was 
not only more accessible but had a long and well-known 
association with music. 
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proceed and, if further resources were available, one concert hall 
scheme would be chosen to go ahead. Seeing that the final decision 
would rest not with them but with the Government, the Executive 
decided to present an objective statement outlining the amount of 
labour and materials that both schemes would require. 
46 
The IPC met on 12 July 1948, when they discussed not only the 
Executive's Battersea Park proposals, as mentioned earlier, but also 
the proposed concert hall schemes. They decided that the South Bank 
was much too elaborate to be practical for 1951, but agreed that if 
further examination of the Queen's Hall scheme established that the 
new, concert, hall could be completed there by 1951, the proposal 
would be accepted and they would make a, recommendation that the 
necessary resources should be made available. 
47 
As far as the 
Festival Organisation was concerned, the ideal solution to the 
concert hall was, as Nicholson pointed out in the Official 
Committee's report to the Lord President, that both schemes should 
be implemented. The Official, Committee, he said, strongly 
recommended that one of, the, schemes should go forward, but felt that 
they were not in a position to recommend one scheme above the 
other. 
48 
The earliest indication that the Festival Organisation 
recognised the potential of the South Bank site came at a meeting of 
the Festival council on 21 July 1948, where Council members 
expressed doubts as to the wisdom of using Battersea Park for the 
46. ibid, see Annexes 2B and 2C for the breakdown of resources 
needed. for the construction of the South Bank and the Queen's 
Hall concert hail schemes. 
47. Cab 124/1334, IPC Minutes, 12 July 1948. 
48. Ibid. Report of the Official Committee, 17 July 1948. 
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Combined and Science and Technology Exhibitions and asked the 
Executive to look into the possibility of adapting the South Bank 
redevelopment scheme proposed by the LCC, so that the exhibitions 
could be housed on this site. They concluded by agreeing amongst 
themselves that the Executive should make a serious attempt to 
secure a modification of the LCC's redevelopment plans that would 
facilitate the inclusion of the Combined and Science and Technology 
Exhibitions on the South Bank site. 
49 
By the 24 July 1948, when the Government rejected the 
Executive's Battersea Park proposals, the Executive left with no 
suitable place to house their exhibitions, began to seriously 
consider the merit in the council's proposal. On 27 July, Barry 
sent a memorandum to the Festival Council, informing them that the 
Government had decided to give priority to the LCC's concert hall 
and to permit the redevelopment of the South Bank 'so far as 
resources allow: 
50 
A jubilant Executive chose to interpret the 
Government's decision as the permission they needed to begin work on 
the South Bank, even though the decision referred specifically to 
the LCC's plans, not to the Executive's. In spite of this small 
technicality, the Executive not only began to develop blueprints for 
housing the exhibitions in tented structures on this site, because 
of the lack of materials, but they also asked the LCC to inform them 
how much clearance and development the South Bank scheme would 
entail. The LCC answered the Executive's request with their 
49. Refer to p. 97 for the Festival Council's attitude towards 
using the South Bank for the Exhibitions. 
50. Work 25/44, Report by the Executive Committee on the South Bank 
site, 27 July 1948. 
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characteristic energy and optimism because, after all, if the 
exhibition was situated on the South Bank it could only further 
enhance the area's reputation culturally. They said that the site, 
which comprised of the 'wedge bounded by County Hall, the River, 
Waterloo Bridge and York Road', could be completely cleared of all 
existing tenancies and buildings, which as landlords the LCC owned; 
the area could be levelled by June 1949. The clearance, they 
explained, would include the filling in of basements, leaving a 
level surface, with the exception of the area on which the concert 
hall was to be built which would be excavated to basement level by 
June 1949.51 
on 28 July 1948, the Council met to discuss the Executive's 
report on the South Bank site. The report served to confirm their 
belief that the South Bank was eminently suitable for the Festival 
exhibitions. The Executive was invited to examine the most 
appropriate ways in which this area could be used as a Festival 
centre for 'either 'the combined and science exhibitions or for any 
other exhibitions that were being contemplated. 
52 
The Government had,, however, yet to make a decision on the 
Festival Organisation's use of the South Bank and by August 1948, 
the Lord President was writing to the Ministers whose departments 
were closely concerned with the Festival about the Executive's 
latest plans. On 21 August 1948, he wrote to Aneurin Bevan, the 
Minister of Health, to say that the Executive had worked out a scheme 
51. Ibid. From July to October 1948, the Executive developed the 
idea of using tentage as an answer to the Government's ban on 
the construction of temporary structures because of the 
shortage of materials. See Annex 2D. 
52. Work 25/44, Festival Council Minutes, 28 July 1948. 
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which would make provision for a Combined Exhibition in attractive 
and gaily-coloured tented structures of sufficient durability, 
occupying 350,000 square feet to be situated on the South Bank 
site. Morrison concluded by stating that he believed this new 
scheme had considerable attractions and was, for the most part, free 
from the objections raised by the Battersea Park scheme*53 
Having examined all other plausible alternatives, on 2 
September 1948 the Executive formally agreed to use the South Bank 
as the site for both the Combined and the Science and Technology 
Exhibitions, to be housed in tented structures. They were supported 
in their view by the Council who passed the same resolution at a 
meeting on 23 September 1948. However, their problems with this 
site were. not yet at an end: Government offices, financed and owned 
by the Ministry of Works, were to be constructed on an integral part 
of the site which the Festival Office needed, for without it, the 
site would be insufficient for their purposes. The Festival 
Organisation decided to press the Ministry of Works to make their 
portion of the site available for the exhibitions, and to give an 
undertaking not to begin any work on the site before or during 1951, 
which would compromise its use for Festival purposes. In addition, 
they asked that the Ministry to re-examine their estimates for 
53. Cab 124/1336, Morrison to Bevan, 21 August 1948. 
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preparing and clearing their part of the site. 
54 On 17 
September, the Executive Committee learned, in a letter from Miss 
Lidderdale, that the Ministry of Works would not be able to make 
available the Riverside portion of the site on which the Government 
Offices were to be placed, for the use of the Festival exhibitions. 
The South Bank site, the Executive persisted, would be insufficient 
without the use of this area and therefore they decided that the 
only course of action open to them was to put the whole matter 
before the Lord President for him to resolve. 
55 On 9 October 
1948, the Executive Committee received the Government's answers, not 
only in terms of their use of the South Bank, but also regarding the 
Ministry of Works claim on the site. The Government agreed to the 
use of the site for the 1951 exhibitions and stated that a 
compromise had been reached with the Ministry of Works, who would be 
allowed to sink steel piling around the perimeter of the site, was a 
token of their claims' to the area. In return, the Ministry had 
agreed to have the site ready for the Festival Organisation's use by 
the middle of 1950.56 
54, Work 25/44, Festival Council Minutes, 28 July' 1948. The 
Ministry of works had reported to the Executive that their 
portion of the South Bank site would only be advanced as far as 
foundation level by the summer of 1951 (this was based on the 
assumption that the site would have been cleared by June 
1949). Furthermore, the Ministry said that although no work 
for the Government buildings would have begun by 1951, there 
was a great possibility that work might begin that year. Thus 
the Festival skyline, instead of being alive and gay with 
British architectural ingenuity and wonders, would it appeared, 
be nothing more than a mass of cranes, girders and 
scaffolding. Work 25/44, Report by the Executive of the South 
Bank, 27 July 1948. 
55. Work 25/7. 
56. Cab 124/1336, Executive Committee Minutes, 12 October 1948. 
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Thus, it would seem that with the acquisition of a site the 
Festival was beginning to take shape and the planning and 
development could, from now on, assume some semblance of reality. 
The Executive Committee, guided by Nicholson and aided by the LCC, 
had won the first round of their fight to have a show worthy of 
their vision of the nation. 
The Festival project was saved not by Government commitment, 
but by the timely intervention of the LCC whose desire to contribute 
to the Festival was-motivated for their part by unabashed 
self -interest. It was to their benefit, in the dawning era of the 
growing responsibility of Local Government and the development 
schemes for the betterment of' their communities to be seen to be 
actively doing something for Londoners, especially Morrison's 
beloved South Londoners who would after all benefit directly from 
the beautification of their once ugly surroundings. A location had 
been found for the Combined Exhibition but, as had been shown, 
however, the Executive had decided to hold separate exhibitions of 
science and architecture which still required suitable locations. 
In addition to this, the adoption of the idea of decentralization 
meant that carriers had to be found for the travelling exhibition. 
Above all, the Executive continued with their idea of staging a 
funfair as part of the Festival events, and this also needed a site. 
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THE HOUSING OF THE THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY EXHIBITION 
From 20 May 1948, the Executive Committee decided that there 
would be a combined Exhibition and separate exhibitions of Science 
and Technology and Architecture. It had at first been thought that 
the Combined Exhibition and the Science and Technology Exhibition 
could be housed at Earls Court and if necessary Olympia. In this 
connection the Executive Council asked the Science Council to 
present estimates regarding the, space their exhibition would 
require. The Science Council informed the Executive that their 
exhibition would need approximately 400-500,000 square feet, and 
further, because of-the delicate nature of the models and exhibits, 
a permanent structure was essential. On the basis of this request, 
the Executive decided that the Science Exhibition should be housed 
in Earls Court. However, when the Executive examined the 
possibility of using Earls Court and Olympia, they encountered some 
difficulties, over conflicting dates with the Board of Trade, and 
reluctance on their part to relinquish either of the halls for these 
Exhibitions. 
57 
While the Executive was convinced that the Combined Exhibition 
would be better suited to an open site, they felt that the claim 
should still be pressed for the science Exhibition to be housed at 
Earls Court. To this end Max Nicholson (who thought that Earls 
Court and Olympia should be put at the disposal of the Festival 
Organisation for their major static exhibitions) with the permission 
of the Executive Committee, proposed to ask the Lord President to 
57. See pp. 78-81. 
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write to the Minister of Works requesting 
concerned that the Festival Organisation i 
requiring these buildings in 1951, and 
getting the private parties to postpone 
would be greatly appreciated. 
58 
However, even if all the private 
that he notify all parties 
would in all probability be 
that his co-operation in 
or cancel their projects 
companies had agreed to 
postpone their engagements, the Board of Trade had yet to be asked 
if it would be willing to use only Olympia for its exhibition. The 
Board of Trade was asked to bring the BIF forward to the beginning 
of 1951 by the Official Committee, or to examine the possibility of 
confining the fair to either of the two buildings by staggering the 
BIF in sections over twice its normal period, in order to release 
both venues in time for the Festival exhibitions to open on 1 May 
1951.59 After considering these proposals, the Board of Trade 
informed the Official Committee that they could not comply with 
either request. They said that the BIF required approximately one 
month to mount and one week to dismantle their exhibition displays 
and, if the dates were staggered it would mean that there would be a 
gap of five weeks between the first and second BIF show= they 
further emphasised that as most buyers were interested in a range of 
exhibits, it would be virtually impossible to make two self-contained 
58. Cab 124/1334, Official Committee Minutes, 11 March 1951. 
59. Cab 124/1335, Memo by Lidderdale to Executive Committee, 25 
June 1948. 
Although the Executive had chosen Earls Court in preference to 
Olympia, both buildings offered the same amount of space and 




60 This was a disadvantage that was unacceptable especially 
as 1951 was likely to be a buyers market and, if a great number of 
buyers came to the BIF, export levels would probably be increased - 
a vital necessity to financially-troubled Britain. They insisted on 
retaining the use of both buildings, arguing that no other suitable 
sites were available and stressing that any attempts either to 
confine the exhibition to one hall, thereby reducing its total size, 
or to stagger the dates would be strongly resisted not only by 
themselves but by industry as a whole. 
61 
As the Government had 
initially urged, the Board of Trade intended to host an expanded BIF 
in 1951 lasting a period of three weeks instead of the usual annual 
fortnight. 
62 
Not wishing to appear intransigent, however, the Board of Trade 
proposed a compromise: they were prepared to consider putting 
forward the opening date of the Earls Court section of the BIF to 1 
April 1951, thus enabling the hall to be cleared and available for 
possession by the Festival authorities on 30 April 1951. They 
proposed to take possession of Earls Court on 1 March 1951 but to 
make the hall available to the Festival authorities three months 
prior to this date to begin preliminary work on the Science 
exhibition. They added, however, that all work done by the Festival 
60. In 1951 there were 1700 exhibitors at Earls Court and Olympia 
and there were also further sections of the BIF held at Castle 
Bromwich in Birmingham. For further information on the BIF see 
Annex 2E. 
61. Cab 124/1335, Memo by Lidderdale to the Executive Committee, 25 
June 1948. 
62. Although the Board of Trade intended to extend the BIF from two 
to three weeks in 1951 this did not happen and I have been 
unable to find any information regarding this change of mind. 
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authorities in this period would have to be restricted to the roof 
and wall- area, thereby not impinging in any substantial extent on 
the floor area. , 
With great reluctance, they were further prepared 
to reduce their total floor area by some 10 per cent, to allow a 
certain amount of constructional work by the Festival 
authorities. The Festival Organisation would have a further two 
months after the BIF ended in which to install the science exhibits 
and open on 1 July 1951.63 
These options were presented to the Executive who considered 
them at a meeting on 29 June 1948. Ian Cox, the Director of Science 
said that although he had only had time to consult one member of the 
Science Council, and as such the new proposal had not gone before 
the whole Council, it was his belief that the Council members would 
find the proposal objectionable, especially because the Science 
Exhibition would have to open later than the other Festival 
exhibitions, that is 1 July 1951 instead of 1 May. He said that 
'science-offered one of the most spectacular and important parts of 
the Festival exhibitions and as the Festival was bound to be judged 
on its first few weeks of life, the absence of this part at that 
stage would be disastrous'. Whatever was given as the official 
explanation of this, the public would, he said, be inclined to judge 
this later opening as a result of inefficiency. To solve the whole 
problem, he proposed that the Science exhibition should be housed in 
a specially constructed building, with re-use value, thereby enabling 
it to open on time with the other exhibitions. Barry concurred with 
63. Cab 124/1335, Memo by Lidderdale to the Executive Committee, 25 
June 1948. 
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with Ian Cox's view that the Science Exhibition was likely to be one 
of the most important and exciting "stories" of the Festival and 
therefore, its opening date could not be postponed nor its period of 
show curtailed. Furthermore he said, "was it not altogether too 
optimistic to assume that installation could be accomplished when 
the COI had hitherto reckoned that four months was the minimum time 
required- .... would it not be wiser to discard the purely notional 
figure of 500,000 square feet, which had been given by the Science 
Council for planning purposes, reduce it to 250,000 square feet, and 
include this size in the Combined Exhibition at Battersea Park with 
the Architecture Exhibition being housed elsewhere". 
64 
The 
Executive agreed with Barry's view and decided to'reject the Board 
of *Trade's offer, preferring to house the Science Exhibition with 
the Combined Exhibition in temporary structures in Battersea 
Park. 
65 
The Executive's decisions were warmly accepted when presented 
to the Council of Science and Technology who affirmed that: 
in a display of the British contribution to civilization, 
science had at least as much to offer as any other field of 
activity - possibly more than any other. It was essential, 
therefore, that the exhibition of science should open at 
the same time as the main Festival begins (1 May). The 
Festival would be judged, both by the press and the 
overseas and home public, on its first few weeks and it was 
unthinkable that our scientific contributions should not be 
put on show at this time. Further, whatever information 
was put out, a late opening for the science exhibition 
would be construed as a result of muddle and inefficiency. 
They concluded that if the exhibition could not open on 1 May, the 
offer of Earls Court had to be rejected and any new site to be 
64. Cab 124/1335, Executive Committee Minutes, 29 June 1948. 
65. Ibid. 
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considered for the exhibition would have to be as close as possible 
to the main Festival exhibitions if not a part of them, as was being 
proposed. 
66 
The Battersea Park proposal was shown earlier, was rejected by 
the Festival Council and more significantly by the Government. The 
latter was motivated by the desire to have the public enjoy 
unhindered use of the park; more pertinent to this decision, was the 
fact that the Government was acutely aware of the constraints 
imposed upon its ability to acquiesce to ideas that demanded large 
expenditure from scant resources. 
67 
The Executive finding the museums and institutes of South 
Kensington unsuited to their required purpose abandoned this idea 
and turned its attention to the South Bank site as a suitable venue 
from which to mount the Combined and Science and Technology 
exhibitions. In September 1948, the Government had given the LCC 
permission to redevelop the site so far as the country's resources 
would allow, and the Council had recommended that the Executive 
should try to seek a modification of the LCC's plans so that the 
exhibitions could be housed on this site. They were successful in 
this quest for, as no other alternative housing for the exhibitions 
could be found, the Government had no other alternative but to allow 
the Festival Organisation to use the South Bank. 
68 
66. Cab 124/1295, Report by the Director of Science to the Science 
and Technology Council, 8 October 1948. 
67. See pp. 84-7 for a discussion of the Battersea Park proposals. 
68. See pp. 106-9 for a discussion on the Festival Organisation's 
use of the South Bank site. 
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Having located a site for the Combined Exhibition, the themes 
that the Executive Committee had been discussing regarding the South 
Bank site were being developed in their minds. The site was small, 
only 28 acres, offering approximately 420,000 square feet of space - 
the initial estimates for the Science Exhibition alone were for an 
area of 400-500,000 square feet. As the plans for the Combined 
Exhibition developed, the Science Council felt that since in 
addition to science, other subject-matter was to be accommodated 
within the small area of the site, the display possibilities for the 
scientific contribution would become considerably lessened, and the 
exhibition would not be able to do justice to the Lord President's 
demand that it should demonstrate the extremely wide field of 
British scientific contribution. 
69 The council decided, 
therefore, that there was a need for additional space for the 
display of certain aspects and achievements which might otherwise 
impair the balance of the Combined Exhibition which was being 
envisaged. The Council passed a resolution to this effect which 
stated that: 
while the opportunity for displaying many of the 
achievements of British science in the Combined Exhibition 
is welcomed, an additional Science Exhibition is required 
for the display of those more fundamental aspects which 
might either spoil the balance of the Combined Exhibition, 
or be excluded on the grounds of space. 70 
Thus, on the basis of this resolution, a further re-examination 
began of all the available accommodation in central London that was 
69. Cab 124/1295, Report of Director of Science to Science Council, 
8 October 1948. 
70. Ibid. Science Council Minutes, 13 October 1948. 
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either adjoining or accessible to the South Bank site. 
Investigations were again made into the practicability of museum 
space in the South Kensington area being allocated for Festival 
purposes. The Science museum offered an area of 35,000 square feet 
on four floors of its western block which needed redecorating and 
reglazing. The Museum's Director was of the opinion, however, that 
the expenditure necessary to provide special temporary facilities in 
this block would be uneconomical and against the permanent interests 
of the Science Museum. The Geological Museum was prepared to offer 
5,000 square feet for the mounting of a special exhibition which 
would illustrate the place of Britain in the development of 
geological science, but only on condition that it was run by the 
Museum's staff -a condition that the Festival Organisation would 
not have agreed to. The Director of the Geological Museum was, 
reluctant, however, even to offer this small amount of space because 
he felt that the use of the museum for Festival exhibitions would 
greatly interfere with its normal work. The Imperial Institute 
would only offer an area of 16,000 square feet on the condition that 
any display mounted had a Commonwealth theme. 
It became apparent from these offers that the only suitable 
place to house the Science exhibition was the Science Museum which 
was duly inspected by Ian Cox, the Director of Science, and Cecil 
Cooke, the Director of Exhibitions. They found the Science Museum's 
offer to be satisfactory for the purpose of mounting the Science 
Exhibition, provided that certain modifications were made to the 
proposed exhibition space which would allow separate entry to the 
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1951 Science Exhibition from outside the building. 
71 
The Science Council were, however, uncertain as to whether the 
space in the Science Museum should be accepted. On 9 October, 
Nicholson sent a memo to the Lord President stating that the 
Chairman of the Science Council, Sir Alan Barlow, and the Director 
of Science, Ian Cox, wanted his guidance on what he expected of the 
Science exhibition, as this had originally been his idea. Nicholson 
said: 
I have always understood that you wanted it to be a big and 
worthwhile show and the suggestion that it should be 
squeezed into 35,000 square feet or about a quarter the 
size of the "Britain Can Make It" and about one-twelfth the 
size of the Earls Court, does not look at all like meeting 
your views, if I have understood them rightly. 
No exhibition of much less than 400,000 square feet could 
possibly be looked on as a first-rate show or as giving 
room to accommodate the great variety of achievements of 
British science. To get anything like the area in South 
Kensington would absorb the whole of the Science and 
Geological Museums plus the Imperial Institute and a bit 
more in other buildings. It is very doubtful if this is 
practical even though the Exhibition would be presenting 
the same subjects which the Museums affected exist to 
display. 
The alternatives to accepting the Science Museum's offer, Nicholson 
said, were either to house the Science Exhibition in tented 
structures in some suitable open site such as Battersea Park or 
Crystal Palace, or to place the Science exhibition in the exhibition 
halls at Wembley. However, before examining these alternatives, he 
said that the Science Council wished to know the type of exhibition 
the Lord President envisaged. 
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71. Cab 124/1295, Report of the Director of Science to the Science 
Council, 8 October 1948. 
72. Cab 124/1295, Memo by Nicholson to the Lord President, 9 
October 1948. 
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On 10 October, the Lord President replied to Nicholson's 
questions stating that it was important to learn what the Science 
Council proposed to do with any space they did acquire. The 400,000 
square feet which Nicholson mentioned as a worthy size for the 
Exhibition was, Morrison said, over three times the size of the 
"Britain Can Make It' exhibition which he felt was not only needless 
but he also asked whether the crowds would go to Crystal Palace. He 
suggested that the space offered by the Science Museum should be 
accepted. 
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At a meeting of the Science Council on 13 October 1948, the 
Council members recommended the following: that the offer made by 
the Science Museum should be accepted; that the Science Exhibition 
should be distinct from the normal displays in the Science Museum; 
and that the exhibition should be arranged and managed by the 
Festival Organisation. On 7 December 1948, Ian Cox sent a memo to 
the science Council which stated that the Science Museum were 
building a new 'centre section' in the museum. The Lord President 
had written to the Minister of Works to ask if this construction, 
which was part of the priority programme recommended by the Standing 
Commissions on Museums and Galleries, could be started and available 
in some form to house the Science Exhibition in 1951. The response 
to this request was very positive. The Ministry of Works would try 
to complete the basement and ground floors of the new building and 
hand them over early in 1951; a temporary roof would be installed on 
73, Ibid. Morrison's reply is written on this document and is dated 
10 October 1948. 
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the central wall in order to provide a more adequate and worthy 
setting for the Exhibition of Science and Technology. This new 
'centre section' would provide approximately 100,000 square feet of 
covered space with considerably more impressive approaches (than the 
original area offered) and would also border the western block which 
the science Council had already been offered and would still be 
using* 
74 
In addition to the western block's 35,000 square feet which 
they had already accepted, the Science Council were pleased with 
this extension of space for their Science Exhibition; science would 
now not only be represented on the South Bank in the Combined 
Exhibition, but in addition it would have a combined area of 135,000 
square feet of space in the Science Museum in which to outline and 
highlight the British Contribution to Civilization in Science and 
Technology in a display that the Director of Science promised "to be 
one of the most spectacular and important parts of the Festival 
exhibitions. " 
75 
74. Cab 124/1295, Memo by the Director of Science to the Science 
Council, 7 December 1948. 
75. See p. 115 for Ian Cox's remarks on the Science Exhibition. 
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THE ARCHITECTURE TOWN PLANNING AND BUILDING RESEARCH CENTRE 
In July, 1948, the Architecture Council began the task of 
designing its exhibition by drawing up two possible types of 
display. Their initial idea was to house a conventional type of 
exhibition consisting of photographs, drawings, plans and elevations 
to be displayed on screens. This would not have done justice to the 
vitality and promise of post-war British architecture, however, and 
the Architecture Council therefore devised another plan which was 
presented to the Executive on 21 July 1948. This more ambitious 
scheme called for the development of a site of a suitable size 
adjoining the main exhibition area, to display the advances in 
architecture, town planning and building in a newly developed 
cross-section of a residential neighbourhood containing houses, 
flats, shops, nursery schools and open spaces: the whole area would 
be completed with roads, landscaping and services and would be 
handed back to the relevant local authority at the end of the 
exhibition, for normal occupation. 
76 
This plan was adopted by the 
Architecture 'council as a scheme which they felt would not only 
clearly display good architecture, but would also be a guaranteed 
success. 
77 
The Executive Committee agreed with this plan as did 
the Festival Council and the Government. The members of the 
Architecture Council then turned their attention to the finding of a 
suitable site. They examined sites in Clapham High Street, 
Hurlingham No. 2 Pologround, Roehampton, Woodberry Down 
76, Work 25/44, Memo by the Director General to the Festival 
Council, 21 July 1948. 
77. Work 25/45, Executive Committee Minutes, 20 July 1948. 
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Redevelopment Area in. Stoke Newington, Battersea-Patmore Street 
area, Camberwell-Kingswood Drive, Westminster-Pimlico area, 
Grosvenor Road, and the Stepney-Ocean Street area. All of these 
sites were eventually rejected because there were doubts as to 
whether their respective layout were still in a fluid enough state 
to permit the amendments desired by the Architectural Council* 
78 
Apart from these sites, two other areas were given serious 
consideration by the Architecture Council: the Poplar neighbourhood 
"Unit Nine", at the junction of East India Dock Road and Burdett 
Road suggested by the LCC; and Unit ten of the same neighbourhood 
from East India Dock Road to Brunswick Road, also suggested by the 
LCC and the Ministry of Town and Country Planning. Apart from the 
fact that it had very strong support from the LCC because, like the 
South Bank, it was in urgent need of reconstruction for which the 
LCC was responsible, the advantage of using the former site (Unit 
Nine) was that apart from it being the first area scheduled for 
comprehensive planning under the 1944 Town and Country Planning Act, 
it also provided sufficient amount of land which would afford a 
varied and interesting group of buildings, both residential and 
commercial; furthermore, the plans already drawn up for this site 
were fluid enough to be adjusted to the special requirements of the 
exhibition. The site offered the chance of associating the 'Live' 
Architecture Exhibition with the cause of construction, particularly 
in the badly-bombed areas. A feature that ought not to be 
overlooked. 
78, Work 25/44, Report by the Director of Architecture on the site 
for the Live Architecture Exhibition, 7 September 1948. 
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The factors favouring the use of the second site, "Unit Ten' 
were that it was the area near the eastern end declaratory area that 
the LCC intended to develop first and, as such, ample land on the 
site had already been cleared and the LCC intended to complete any 
necessary demolitions within the first stage of development. 
Further, use of this site would have the advantage, like 'Unit 
Nine', of forming part of a larger area to be developed in the near 
future and of having the full support of the LCC's Planning 
Department who were hoping to erect community buildings, health 
centres, churches,, schools and flats. 
These sites were exactly what. the members of the Architectural 
Council were looking for and they recommended, without reserve, 
that the neighbourhood 'Units Nine and Ten' be selected as the site 
for the 'Live' Architectural Exhibition. 
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On 18 September 1948, 
the Executive Committee endorsed the findings of the Architecture 
Council and recommended that the 'Live' Architecture Exhibition 
should be sited in the Stepney-Poplar area within the neighbourhood 
"Units Nine and Ten'. On 5 October, the Executive was informed that 
the Festival Council approved the choice of site within this 
neighbourhood for the Architecture Exhibition. 
80 
At a Festival Council meeting on 14 December 1948, however, the 
members had a further recommendation from the Architecture Council 
and the Executive which asked that the Council should endorse the 
use of only 'Unit Nine' in the Stepney-Poplar area, which offered 124 
acres, for the 'Live' Architecture Exhibition. They further asked 
79. Ibid. 
80, Work 25/44, Executive Committee Minutes, 18 September 1948. 
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asked that the LCC should be requested to make this unit available 
for the Architecture Exhibition. 
81 The Council endorsed this new 
proposal and on 14 December 1948, Barry sent a letter to Howard 
Roberts, Clerk to the LCC, explaining what the 'Live' Architecture 
Exhibition would consist of a cross-section of residential 
neighbourhood buildings, partially completed buildings 
containing show flats or similar exhibition units which would 
demonstrate- building techniques, as well as buildings actually in 
the course of erection, using modern methods of construction and 
building machinery. This full scale demonstration would therefore, 
he said, not only show the advantages of town planning but also the 
great advances which had been made in building science. He stated 
that he had been directed by the Festival Council to inform them 
that of the two sites they had suggested "Unit Nine' should be 
chosen as the most suitable area for the exhibition and a sizeable 
portion of the site needed to be made available as soon as possible 
for development of the 'Live' Architectural Exhibition. He 
concluded his letter by stating that no formal conditions were 
attached to this request, but it was being put forward on the 
understanding that there would be 'full and effective consultation 
between the LCC and the Festival Organisation on the planning and on 
all visual aspects of the portion of the site which would be on 
display in 1951; 
82 
81. Ibid. Memo by Secretary of Executive Committee to the Festival 
Council, 12 January 1949. 
82. Work 25/44, Barry to Roberts, 14 December, 1948. 
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In reply to this request, Howard Roberts, Clerk to the LCC, 
said that provided all additional out-of-pocket expenditure incurred 
by the LCC by reason of the exhibition was reimbursed, the LCC would 
willingly co-operate with the Festival authorities in the 
arrangements for the exhibition. 
83 
Thus, the 'Live' Architecture Exhibition had not only found a 
site, but because of its very nature, it would not, unlike the other 
proposed events for 1951, be any financial burden upon the 
Government, as the work for the exhibition was going to be performed 
by the LCC under their normal building programme. Under this 
agreement, the Festival authorities would co-operate with the LCC 
but retain the right to have the final word in matters of layout, 
design, types of construction, building techniques and choice of 
84 
architect. 
83. Ibid. Roberts to Barry, 8 January 1948. It is interesting to 
note that the LCC made this condition in writing before 
consenting to the Festival Organisation's plans, thus making it 
impossible for the Organisation to claim, as it would do with 
the South Bank site, that the issue of out-of-pocket 
expenditure on the LCC's part was not mentioned when the LCC 
agreed initially to lend them the site; see p. 215. 
84. Work 24/47, Official Committee Minutes, 13 January 1949. 
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THE PLEASURE GARDENS 
The idea of a Festival Pleasure Garden was first initiated on 
14 May 1948 by Cecil Cooke, the Director of Exhibitions, at one of 
the weekend conferences at Barry's home. 
85 
At the following 
meeting of the Executive, Barry raised Cooke's proposal and 
suggested that perhaps a funfair could be situated on the South Bank 
of the River Thames, below County Hall. This funfair, he further 
suggested, could be run independently of the Festival Organisation 
provided it conformed to the Festival's views on layout. The 
Executive accepted Barry's suggestion, but concentrated its energies 
on solving the more important problem of finding a site for the main 
Festival exhibitions, asking Miss Lidderdale of the Official 
Committee, who was present at the meeting to find out about the 
possibility of using this site for the funfair and Pleasure 
Gardens. 
86 on 2 June 1948, she reported to the Executive that 
their idea for the funfair had been taken up by the Official 
Committee who had asked the Ministry of Works to examine the sites 
below Hungerford Bridge for the proposed funfair. The Ministry of 
Works, after their examination, said that the area below the 
Hungerford Bridge would be undergoing construction work which would 
have started by 1951. In response to this, the Executive asked miss 
Lidderdale to submit, at the earliest possible opportunity, a report 
with a map showing the other areas on the South Bank that might be 
available for Festival purposes which at this early stage included 
85, Cab 124/1335, Executive Committee Minutes, 20 May 1948. 
86. Cab 124/1252, Notes on the early development of the Festival 
Gardens project. 14 May 1948 - 25 November 1949. 
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the proposed funfair and concert hall. 
87 
Miss Lidderdale's report on the site was presented to the 
Executive at a meeting on 22 June 1948. Her report was limited to 
the areas between County Hall and Southwark Bridge, (County Hall and 
Waterloo Bridge and the River Thames and Belvedere Road). The 
buildings around County Hall, Waterloo Bridge, the River Thames and 
Belvedere Road had either been totally destroyed or seriously 
damaged beyond repair by the bombing during the war. However, on 
some parts of the site, the damage to existing buildings was not as 
serious and repairs were still considered to be a feasible 
possibility. A funfair, the report suggested, might be situated on 
the western side of the site below Waterloo Bridge and with the 
damaged area on the other side of the upper ground, an area of nine 
acres could be provided. 
88 
As the ideas for the funfair rapidly 
developed, it seemed, however, that the nine acres provided by the 
South Bank would be insufficient. Furthermore, as they would find 
out on 29 June 1948 from Miss Lidderdale, the Ministry of Works did 
not consider that it would be practicable to put a funfair on their 
site of the river below County Hall. It would be expensive and 
uneconomical to clear the area and fill in existing basements to 
provide a temporary surface for the funfair, which would then have 
to be cleared away before they could begin constructing the 
foundations for their Government offices. Using this part of the 
site might cause delays which the Executive were unwilling to 
87. Cab 124/1335, Executive Committee Minutes, 2 June 1948. 




89 At this meeting, the Executive decided that a funfair 
of traditional type was not exactly what they had in mind, if 
anything the word funfair was misleading; rather they began to 
envisage a pleasure garden along the lines of the 'Tivoli' Gardens 
incopenhagen. Set in the centre of Copenhagen, the Tivoli Gardens 
were considered at the time of the planning of the Festival of 
Britain, one of the finest amusement parks in the world. With an 
admission price of sixpence and an abundance of fine amusements, 
such as the usual funfair entertainments, restaurants, open-air 
cafes, the people of Denmark, from Royalty downwards enjoyed daily 
(until almost midnight) the amenities of this well laid out park. 
When he visited Denmark in 1950, Morrison was shown around the Park 
and was so excited by the Gardens that he declared: 'Swaff tell 
Londoners they are too stuffy. They should have something like this 
in Hyde Park'. What impressed Morrison most, the article in The 
People said, was the cheapness, of which he said: "Why, for a few 
shillings the workers can have a glorious time till nearly 
midnight. Your people have learned to enjoy themselves in the 
open. That's what London wants. ' 
90 
The LCC's Architecture 
Department, with their sights firmly fixed on 1951, suggested to the 
Executive Committee that they seek Government approval for a small 
permanent funfair to be planned along the lines of 'Tivoli' on the 
north-east corner of Hyde Park. Miss Lidderdale accepted that the 
members would not only be tempted by this new suggestion, but would 
actually want to investigate the possibility of using the area and 
89. Ibid. Executive Committee Minutes, 29 June 1948. 
90. The People, 20 August 1950. 
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she warned, therefore, that all proposals discussed and considered 
would of. course be subject to Ministerial approval. 
91 
Not wishing 
to abandon the idea of an amusement park, the Executive Committee 
began to examine alternative sites. Any site subsequently chosen 
would have to be within easy access to the South Bank, thereby 
enabling visitors from the South Bank to visit and relax in the 
Gardens. Hyde Park,, Regents Park, Ranelagh and Hurlingham were 
given consideration, but the only area that was considered 
appropriate was Battersea Park. This site was considered suitable, 
as the Presentation Panel, explained, because it was linked with the 
South Bank site and it had ample space and inherent characteristics 
which lent themselves admirably to the project. 
92 
The Executive 
presented their proposals to the Festival Council on 22 December 
1948, having initially explained to them that they believed, due to 
the serious aspects, of the exhibitions being mounted in London, 
provision had to be made for rest and relaxation during the Festival 
period. They said that "something more imaginative and civilized 
than a mere conglomeration of giant racers, dodgems and sideshows 
can be devised - something on the lines of the famous Tivoli Gardens 
in Copenhagen where, to the usual features of funfair are added 
popular concerts and other entertainments, as well as open-air cafes 
and restaurants : 
93 The Festival Council saw the merit of the 
Executive's reasoning and agreed completely to the establishment of 
an amusement park along the lines of the Tivoli Gardens and also that 
91. Cab 124.1335, Executive Committee Minutes, 22 June 1948. 
92. Work 25/45, Executive Committee Minutes, 7 December 1948. 
93. Work 25/44, Memo by the Director General to the Festival 
Council, 16 August 1948. 
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it should be housed in Battersea Park but, if Battersea Park was not 
available, then the Executive should press the the use of either 
Hyde Park or Regents Park. No further consideration should be 
given, they said, to Hurlingham or Ranelagh. 
94 
On 1 February 1948, Barry reported to the Executive that the 
LCC (within whose management the park fell) was highly interested in 
the project and was prepared to offer 37 acres of the park 
rent-free. Sensing that the Government might not be willing to 
permit expenditure on this non-educational Festival project, the 
Executive, in consultation with the LCC and the National Amusement 
Council (which represented the Showmen's Association) drew up a plan 
which would make the proposed project viable without having to 
resort to public funds. The first assumption of the plan was that 
the proposed gardens could not be made self-supporting in a single 
year, but could clear all expenses in five years and might possibly 
make a small profit. To this end, the LCC, appreciating the 
important amenity the proposed gardens would provide, made it known 
to the Festival Organisation of their intention to provide them with 
the site for five or seven years, thereby making the Gardens 
permanent or semi-permanent and helping to offset the overhead costs 
and avoid loss. Whether or not they intended that the site should 
be provided rent free for this extended period was not made clear. 
The Festival Organisation were told informally that the Government 
would be prepared to give consideration to a project on this basis. 
The plan continued that in order to clear expenses there would have 
94. Ibid. Festival Council Minutes, 22 December 1948. 
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to be an admissions charge of one shilling, or one shilling and 
sixpence, and with a probable attendance of 50,000 on weekdays and 
75,000 on Saturdays, Sundays and Bank Holidays in 1951, and allowing 
for a natural drop in these figures in 1952 and 53, the initial 
outlay could be recovered and profits at the end of the year would 
be in the region of £320,000, this would increase to £600,000 if the 
necessary legislation was passed permitting pleasure and amusement 
centres to open on Sundays. 
95 
The early provisional estimate of 
the cost of the construction of the gardens was put at £1 million by 
the designers. The Executive felt that if on examination this 
scheme proved to be financially sound a Government-sponsored company 
should be set up to oversee the construction of the Gardens, with 
the authority to borrow from the Treasury and the LCC. The LCC 
further informed the Executive that it was prepared to consider 
making a loan to the Company of either 20 per cent of the total 
cost, or £200,000, whichever was the lesser amount. 
96 
Before 
further investigations were made, however, the Executive decided 
that it was necessary for the Festival Organisation and the LCC to 
seek, in principle, the approval for this scheme from the Government 
and in this respect, reports on this matter from both Barry and 
Howard Roberts of the LCC were sent to the Lord President's 
office* 
97 
95. Work 25/44, Memo to the Director General to the Executive 
Committee, 1 February 1949. 
96. Ibid. The designer's estimates of £1 million was later lowered 
to £750,000 because the Working Party considered the initial 
estimate too high. 
97. Work 25/44, Memo by the Director-General to the Festival 
Council. 1 February 1949. 
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On receiving these reports the Lord President, on 3 February 
1948, gave Max Nicholson instructions to form a Working Party to 
investigate the feasibility of using Battersea Park for the Pleasure 
Gardens. The Working Party was made up of representatives from the 
LCC, the Ministries of Works and Transport, the Metropolitan Police, 
the London Transport Executive and the Railway Executive. At a 
meeting on 11 February 1949, the Working Party's initial examination 
of the Festival Organisation's proposals led them to the conclusion 
that there were some areas that had not yet been fully 
investigated. The Working Party therefore asked the Festival 
Organisation to attend to these points and this led to a revised 
scheme being presented in consultation with the LCC and the NAC. 
From this revised scheme the Working Party was able to draw its 
own conclusions and present them to the Lord President in its report 
on 2 April 1949. They stated that they understood the Festival 
Organisation's desire to provide Pleasure Gardens for the 
entertainment and relaxation of the visitors to complement the 
highly educational South Bank exhibitions, and they also endorsed 
the Festival Organisation's view that the Gardens should be located 
in Battersea Park. There were, however, some problems which they 
felt would have to be sorted out if the park was to be used. 
To begin with, there was the problem of financing the scheme: 
the report stated that the proposals had been worked out on the 
assumption that the Government would not consent to any scheme which 
could not pay for itself over a period of time. The Festival 
Organisation had therefore given a great deal of thought to the 
matter of financing the scheme and had come to the conclusion that 
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the Gardens could best be administered by a Public Corporation 
financed from the Exchequer. The Board of this Corporation should 
include experts from the NAC and from their own organisation. The 
Report further stated, however, that the Treasury considered it 
inappropriate for such a project to be financed from public funds, 
but would not object if all the departments concerned supported the 
proposal that the company should borrow from private interests. If 
however, the company had to take this course, there would be 
considerable difficulties and disadvantages in raising outside 
capital: for example, in the event of the company resorting to 
borrowing from private interests, the LCC might not be prepared to 
take any share in the financing of the project and could well 
decline to make over any part of a public park to a concern which 
would be paying interest to private stockholders. In addition, it 
was pointed out that the Government could well be exposed to. 
critisism when Parliamentary powers were sought and the stockholders 
would need to demonstrate great self-restraint in accepting the 
spending of their money on features desirable to the Festival but 
with perhaps little, if any, financial return. The introduction of 
private capital could, furthermore, cause delay at the planning and 
preparation stages of the Gardens. The report warned that if the 
Government were to insist upon the option of private financing, the 
Festival Council could reasonably argue against this by stating that 
had the main Festival exhibition not been forced onto the cramped 
South Bank site, there would never have been any question of 
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discrimination between its financing and that of the Festival 
Gardens. 
98 
Apart from the question of finance, there were also traffic and 
transport problems. The site was in a rather inaccessible part of 
London which was not at all well-served by the existing transport 
systems. Sloane Square Tube Station would require reconstruction as 
well as limited works on the underground station at South Kensington 
and the railway stations at Battersea Park and Queens Road. In 
addition to these necessary repairs a further ninety buses, over and 
above the one hundred extra buses required to serve the exhibitions 
on the South Bank, would be necessary to provide adequate links with 
the nearest tube stations at Sloane Square and South Kensington, and 
also the South Bank, which would further be linked to the site by 
water bus. Furthermore, it would be necessary to carry out 
roadworks on the approaches to the site to prevent serious traffic 
congestion; there was also the problem of finding sufficient 
parking spaces for at least 2,000 cars. The police would only 
approve the Gardens scheme if a satisfactory solution to the problem 
of parking was found. Despite these difficulties, which the Working 
Party stated were not insurmountable, they recommended that a 
Company, limited by guarantee, should be established to develop and 
operate the scheme, to be financed from either public or private 
funds but which would be precluded from distributing any profits for 
private advantage. 
99 
98. Work 25/44, Report of the Working Party on the Festival 
Pleasure Gardens, 2 April 1949. 
99. Ibid. See Annexes 2F and 2G for the finance and administration 
of the Pleasure Gardens and the cost of the transport and 
traffic work. 
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At a meeting of the Festival Council on 22 June 1949, Barry 
outlined the position of the proposed Pleasure Gardens. The scheme 
had, he said, originally been envisaged to occupy a 37 acre site in 
Battersea Park. A meeting had been held under the Chairmanship of 
the LCC, with representatives of the LCC, the Festival Organisation 
and the Battersea and Chelsea Borough Councils. The scheme did not 
meet with the approval of the two local authorities and was referred 
back to the Festival Organisation for further examination. As a 
result, a further meeting was held this time under the Chairmanship 
of the Lord President' and an alternative proposal was advanced: 
less ambitious than the original proposal, this new scheme called 
for a smaller capital outlay and worked on the assumption that the 
Gardens would be opened for only six months, seven days per week, 
during the Festival period. The modified scheme, Barry told the 
Council, had met with the approval of the local authorities 
concerned = it had been accepted by Battersea Borough Council and 
was likely to be accepted by Chelsea Borough Council. The Lord 
President and the Chancellor of the Exchequer now proposed to 
recommend the modified scheme to the Cabinet for approval, with the 
proviso that the Gardens should be managed by a specially appointed 
company. The Council discussed Barry's remarks fully and concluded 
that the Festival Gardens were essential as a natural concomitant of 
the South Bank and were essential to their plans for the Festival in 
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London in 1951.100 
On 20 July 1949, Barry sent a note to the Festival Council 
informing them that the Government had approved the siting of the 
Pleasure Gardens in Battersea Park for six months, and that the form 
which the company should take was still under consideration. The 
Treasury had expressed the opinion that a private company, limited 
by shares, would be the most suitable and following this advice, 
Barry proposed that a company with the title, Festival Gardens 
Limited, with a share capital of £100 should be formed. The 
Council, he said, should appoint the Board of Directors consisting 
of a member from the Festival Council as Chairman, five members of 
the Festival Office staff and one or two representatives of the LCC 
and NAC. Be added that the Council might also wish to consider the 
nomination of one or two of its own members or an independent person. 
Barry ended his proposal by putting forward the names of the nominees 
from the Festival Office: they were Bernard Sendall, the Controller; 
Cecil Cooke, the Director of Exhibitions; George Campbell, the 
100. Work 25/44, Council Minutes, 22 June 1949. The provisional 
estimated cost for the six months scheme was £770,000, £120,000 
more expensive than the 5-7 year scheme at £750,000. This 
figure was made up as follows: Capital Expenditure - £500,000 
(this included £30,000 for the cost of pier); Running Costs - 
£150,000; Interest - £20,000; Clearance and Reinstatement of 
the park - £100,000. The estimate revenue was put at £670,000 
with a loss of £100,000 (£70,000 if the cost of the pier was 
not charged to the Company). The revenue figure was calculated 
on the basis of an admission charge of one shilling for adults 
and sixpence for children, with attendance figures out at 
30,000 persons daily Monday to Friday; 70,000 on Saturdays and 
Bank Holidays; and 60,000 on 
, 
Sundays. These charges would 
produce revenue of £300,000 and the remainder of the revenue 
was to come from concessions which was expected to provide a 
profit of around one shilling per head - including children. 
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the Director of Finance and Establishments; Leonard Crainford, 
Secretary to the Executive; and himself. 
101 
The Government were 
in full agreement that the appointment of the company's Board of 
Directors should be made by the Festival Council, as it wished at 
all costs to dissociate itself publicly from bearing any 
102 
responsibility to the company. 
At a meeting on 20 July 1949, the Council discussed Barry's 
note and decided that to have five representatives from the 
Executive was much too high and out of proportion to the number of 
staff to be recommended from other sources. Instead, they felt that 
the Board should be represented by only two members of the Festival 
Council as well as the Director General of the Executive. They 
further agreed that invitations to sit on the Board of the company 
should be sent to the following persons: Sir Henry French and Lord 
101. Work 25/44, Note by Director General to the Festival Council, 
20 July 1949. 
102. The Government's desire not to be involved with the Festival 
Gardens Company was exposed in two letters on the subject: 
The first, dated 16 July, 1949 (five days before Barry made his 
proposals for the company) was from O'Donovan of the Treasury 
to Nicholson: it stated: "Actually, I think it was you who 
suggested that the Chancellor's wish to dissociate the 
Government from too close responsibility could be met by 
getting the Council to nominate all the official 
representatives". Cab 124/1302, O'Donovan to Nicholson, 16 
July 1949. 
The second letter, dated 18 July 1949 was from Nicholson to 
Ismay. It said: I confirm that it is the Government's wish 
that the Board of Directors should be appointed by the Festival 
Council, and in this connection I suggest it would be best not 
to use such terms as 'an official majority' (see 3rd paragraph) 
or 'four official representatives' (see 5th paragraph), as this 
might create an impression that these representatives were 
really Government representatives which is what we wish to 
avoid. Cab 124/1302, Nicholson to Ismay, 18 July 1949. 
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Latham, both of the Festival Council; Lord Aberconway, President of 
the Royal Horticultural Society and member of the RSA council; Sir 
Charles Cochran, theatre manager and producer; and one or two LCC 
and NAC representatives. 
103 
On 4 October -1949, Barry sent a memorandum to the Festival 
Council stating that a company to be known as the Festival Gardens 
Limited had been approved and set up (it would be incorporated on 16 
November 1949). The company would be able to borrow £770,000 (the 
cost of the gardens), £200,000 of which was being lent by the LCC 
and the rest by the Festival Office. The members of the Board were: 
Sir Henry French, Chairman; Lord Aberconway (who would later resign 
for private. reasons and was replaced by Sir Giles Loder, an expert 
in Horticulture); Sir Charles Cochran (also to resign, on medical 
grounds, and replaced by Sir Arthur Elvin who was involved in the 
entertainment world); D. H. Daines, Chairman of the Finance Committee 
of the LCC; Sir Howard Roberts, Clerk of the LCC; G. J. Hill, Vice 
Chairman of the Showmen's Guild, H. L. Joseph of the NAC; Gerald 
Barry, Director General of the Festival Office; Cecil Cooke, 
Director of Exhibitions; Bernard Sendall, Controller of the Festival 
Office; and Leonard Crainford who was appointed Secretary to the 
Board. Barry concluded his memorandum by adding that it was 
possible that one or two more directors might be added and also that 
the LCC was understood to be prepared to put up forty per cent of 
any loss, provided it did not exceed £40,000.104 
103. Work 25/44, Festival Council Minutes, 20 July 1949. 
104. Ibid. Memo by the Director General to the Festival Council, 4 
October 1949. See Annex 2H for the comprehensive list of the 
members of the Board of the Festival Gardens Limited. 
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FESTIVAL EXHIBITIONS OUTSIDE LONDON 
The Idea of Regional Decentralisation 
From the inception of the Festival of Britain project, there 
was a desire on the part of the Lord President that the Festival 
exhibitions and events should be spread across the nation and not 
confined solely to London. 
105 To this end, the Festival 
Organisation developed the idea of mounting Travelling Exhibitions 
which would visit specific towns and cities throughout the country. 
In addition to this, three Regional Councils were created to 
organise local exhibitions, with the help of the Festival 
Organisation, in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales which would 
106 
reflect the national theme and aspirations for 1951. 
At a meeting of the Official Committee on 11 March 1948, the 
matter of how best to spread the Festival experience throughout the 
country was discussed. The first point to be clarified, Nicholson 
insisted, was the fundamental issue that the Executive should be 
guided by the Official Committee on the matter of decentralisation 
and that any final plan should, furthermore, have the approval of 
the Official Committee as well as the Government since the choosing 
of centres for Festival exhibitions, outside London, would be bound 
to disappoint many local interests. While agreeing with Nicholson's 
view, some members felt rather apprehensive about the idea of making 
the decision in London on which towns were to be designated as part 
of the National Festival, before full consultation was made with 
105, See p. 28 for the early ideas on decentralisation. 
106. See pp. 55-6 for a discussion on the creation of these councils. 
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local authorities who might be interested in taking part in the 
regional festivities. Nicholson, although agreeing with this point, 
stated that while he recognised the need for proper consultation 
with local interests, care would have to be taken to avoid becoming 
heavily involved with too many authorities before a decision was 
made on the places to be included as part of the -Regional 
festivities. The discussion on decentralisation was concluded with 
the Committee agreeing that the Executive should be sent a 
preliminary list of towns in England, Scotland and Wales which might 
be designated as Festival exhibition centres, and it would be up to 
them to compile a final list indicating both the venue and the type 
of event planned, which would be decided in consultation with local 
interests. 
107 
On 16 March 1948, the members of the Executive discussed the 
proposal from the Official Committee, and as Barry did not take up 
his appointment as Chairman until 30 March 1948, Nicholson took the 
position of Acting Chairman. He reiterated the Government's 
decision that the Festival should be decentralised, adding that the 
drawing up of plans would not be an easy task as any decisions on 
the choice of towns to participate in the festivities would be bound 
to disappoint those not chosen. Furthermore, he emphasised that 
when their plans were formulated, the Executive would have to submit 
them to the Official Committee and that in this connection they 
would have to bear two considerations in mind: There were some 
places which had a very good case for inclusion in the Festival as 
"designated centres" by virtue of established local activities, an 
3 
107. Cab 124/134, Official Committee Minutes, 11 March 1948. 
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example of which was Edinburgh which was, after the success of its 
International Arts Festival staged in the summer of 1947, planning 
to hold an International Arts Festival on an annual basis. In 
another category other towns might be included because it would be 
convenient to stage a particular exhibition there; for example 
Birmingham could be used to stage a Rail and Road Transport Design 
Exhibition, as it was understood that there would be no buildings 
available in London to accommodate an exhibition of locomotives. 
The preliminary list forwarded by the Official Committee was at best 
a guide which the Executive could, he said, amend and develop, but 
in doing this it would, he cautioned, be important for the Executive 
to maintain a proper balance between national and local projects to 
ensure that national projects were able to obtain the labour and 
materials necessary to mount theme108 
By 5 April 1948, the Executive was beginning to conceive of a 
method by which decentralisation could be achieved. In a memorandum 
to his Committee, Barry outlined his proposals for a Travelling 
Exhibition: it would compromise a selection of representative 
exhibits from the Combined Exhibition, the Science and Technology 
Exhibition and the Architecture Exhibition. It would be housed and 
mounted in a specially designed portable structure which could be 
set up on sites either in the centre or on the edge of towns 
throughout the country. Such an exhibition, the Executive believed, 
would fulfil two functions: 'firstly, it would meet the Lord 
108, Cab 124/1334, Executive Committee Minutes, 16 March 1948. 
The preliminary list drawn up by the Official Committee was not 
available, the Executive Council came up with its own list on 
20 May 1948. 
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President's desire for Festival exhibitions and activities to be 
dispersed as widely as possible over Britain; and secondly, they 
thought that it would, stimulate the ingenuity of 
architects, engineers and designers alike, to formulate something 
original and attractive, using new materials and methods of 
construction which might prove a permanent contribution to 
exhibition techniques for the future. 
109 This novel idea was 
discussed informally at the weekend conferences at Barry's home and, 
by 20 May 1948, at a formal meeting of the Executive it was decided 
that the Travelling Exhibition would be housed in a tented structure 
and would stay at each centre it visited for approximately ten 
days. The Executive felt that in order to cover as much of the 
country as was possible in the summer of 1951, it would probably be 
necessary to have a second, duplicate Travelling Exhibition. 
It was proposed that the following towns would receive a visit 
from the land Travelling Exhibition: two Scottish cities, Glasgow 
and Dundee, the maximum number the Executive were prepared to 
consider for Scotland; in Wales, Cardiff; and in England, 
Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, Newcastle, Nottingham, Bristol, 
Plymouth and Southampton. The Executive felt that there would be 
difficulties (which were not specified) in the Travelling Exhibition 
visiting Northern Ireland, and as such, it was precluded from the 
proposed itinerary. There was general agreement amongst the members 
that the list was sound although it was felt that amendments might 
be necessary. At this stage, it was felt that, apart from the 
inclusion of one more town, the addition of further Festival centres 
109, Ibid. Memo by the Director General to the Executive Committee, 
5 April 1948. 
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could not be justified as it would, they argued, facilitate the 
necessity for a triplicate Travelling Exhibition which would incur 
expenses which could not readily be afforded. The discussion now 
centred on how big the 'Travelling Exhibition would be and of what it 
should be composed. The Government's exhibition mounters, the COI, 
could not at this stage, in addition to all their other Festival 
commitments, handle anything larger than 30,000 square feet. The 
Executive decided that 20,000 square feet would be a worthy size but 
that this was to remain flexible, as it would be very much dependent 
upon the nature of the sites on which the exhibition was to be 
erected. They further decided that the Travelling Exhibition would 
be a copy of the Combined Exhibition but that the designers of the 
Travelling Exhibition would be given a free hand in organising the 
display. 
110 
On 17 July 1948, the Official Committee sent their report on 
the Executive's proposed sites for the Combined and the Science and 
Technology Exhibitions, and the other proposals for 1951, to the 
Lord President. The report presented the Executive's plan for 
Regional decentralisation, which at this stage only covered England 
because Scotland, 'Wales and Northern Ireland had only just started 
working out their plans. The Travelling Exhibition would, the 
report stated, be visiting eight towns in England= should its scope 
become more diverse, there would be a need to duplicate the 
Exhibition in order that all towns should be adequately serviced. 
According to the report, one or two venues planned for Scotland and 
Wales, would be dependent upon the Scottish and Welsh Committees 
110. ibid. Executive Committee Minutes, 20 May 1948. 
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wanting a visit from the Travelling Exhibition as part of their 
programmes. If this proved to be the case, the report ascertained 
that twelve towns would be the maximum that could be successfully 
visited by the exhibition in the summer of 1951. The Official 
Committee concluded their report by recommending that the Government 
approve the itinerary for the Travelling Exhibition and to allow 
the Festival Organisation to settle the arrangements for Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland without further reference to the 
Government, if agreements could be arrived at with these 
Committees. 
lll At a meeting of the Official Committee on 30 July 
1948, they received the Lord President's response to the requests 
contained in their report. The members were informed of the 
decisions reached at a meeting of the lord President's Committee on 
23 July 1948: the Lord President's Committee expressed no views 
about the proposals for regional decentralisation in England; the 
Lord President gave them his approval, in general, although he felt 
that it might be necessary to make some changes and additions. 
112 
As the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Committees began to 
formulate their plans for the Festival, they each decided that they 
would like a visit from the Travelling Exhibition, thus 
necessitating the addition of a duplicate of this exhibition. At 
the end of 1948, a proposal was put forward by the Festival 
Organisation that the duplicate exhibition, of approximately 20,000 
feet, should be seaborne. This novel idea was naturally adopted and 
ill. Cab 124/1335, Report by the Official Committee to the Lord 
President, 17 July 1948. 
112. Ibid. Official Committee Minutes, 30 July 1948. 
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the search for a suitable vessel began. The Ministry of Transport 
and the shipping companies in the city were consulted, resulting in 
one of the Mac Ships -a small escort carrier - being provisionally 
earmarked. The Festival Organisation also approached the Admiralty 
who, in May 1949, agreed to lend the Festival authorities for a 
period of two years, the 'Campania', a vessel which had served the 
nation well during the war years: it was duly inspected and 
accepted by the Festival Organisation. 
113 The Travelling 
Exhibition's itinerary was altered with the acceptance of the 
'Campania' and the inclusion of more centres, forwarded by the 
Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Committees (fourteen centres 
subsequently received visits from the Travelling Exhibition). In 
connection with the inclusion of the seaborne Travellling 
Exhibition, investigations were made' regarding the docking and 
berthing facilities at ten ports: Southampton, Dundee, Newcastle, 
Hull, Plymouth, Llandudno, Belfast, Greenock, Cardiff and Bristol. 
The Admiralty were unfortunately unable to supply the LCT4's which 
were considered necessary for safety reasons, to provide embarkation 
and disembarkation facilities for the visitors and it became 
necessary to locate berths for Campania alongside, at all ports. It 
was this problem that led to Birkenhead being substituted for 
Llandudno, as the only suitable port available to cater to the 
inhabitants of North Wales; and also for Glasgow being substituted 
for Greenock* 
114 
113. Work 25/3, Exhibitions Report, The Festival Ship "Campania", 
April 1949 - April 1951. 
114. Ibid. 
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Other problems persisted: the Land Travelling Exhibition was 
designated to visit Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester, Nottingham, 
Bristol and Cardiff, but in August 1949, when the Festival 
Organisation's budget was cut because of the nation's economic 
problems, the Land Travelling Exhibition's allowance was reduced by 
the sum of £180,000 (for an area of 12,000 square feet), and it 
would thus only be able to visit four centres: Birmingham, 
Manchester, Leeds and Nottingham; the Festival Ship 'Campania" was 
now rescheduled to include visits to Bristol and Cardiff in place of 
the Land Travelling Exhibition. This was not, however, the end of 
the matter for in 1949 the Festival budget experienced further 
curtailments: the initial cut of £180,000 was increased to £210,000 
(for 20 to 30,000 square feet) and the exhibition had to be 
redesigned so that it could be staged in permanent buildings in 
Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds and Nottingham. It would be staged 
t 
under rigid canvas in a rigid-frame tented structure. Negotiations 
were carried out by the Ministry of Works for the use of Manchester 
City Hall and Bingley Hall and also with the civic authorities in 
Leeds and Nottingham for the provision of suitable sites with 
electricity supplies and other necessary facilities. 
115 
In conjunction with the Land and Sea Travelling Exhibitions it 
was, as noted, the intention of the Government and the Festival 
Organisation that every town, city, village and county should make 
some kind of contribution to their communities in 1951. Although the 
115. Work 25/3, Land Travelling Exhibition, April 1949 to April 
1951. The whole subject of the economies enforced upon the 
Festival budget will be discussed in Chapter 4 on the financial 
arrangements for the Festival of Britain. 
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the Government fully supported this policy it was, however, made 
very clear to the Festival Organisation by the Lord President in a 
letter to Lord Ismay that the resources in money, men and materials 
available for carrying out the supporting activities were strictly 
limited", and that full use should be made, as far as possible, of 
voluntary "labour. Morrison also went on to state that as he 
perceived it, "it was the function of the Festival Organisation to 
stimulate and guide the supporting activities, not to undertake 
their execution". He further added that "nothing should be done to 
dampen the spontaneity of local responses ; 
116 
Through Ismay, the Executive Committee responded to this 
directive positively, acknowledging that their role was to stimulate 
and guide but always subject to the over-riding sanction of the 
Government, they retained the right to have the final say in all 
functions and events " which formed an integral part of the 
Festival. 
117 
Following this clarification of approach, the next task for the 
Executive Committee was to think of ways in which the country could 
be stimulated to produce activities for 1951, independently of the 
116. Cab 124/1339, Morrison to Ismay, 11 March 1949. The money 
available for this part of the project was £50,000, a figure 
Barry felt was unduly low, having wanted a ceiling of 
£100,000. It was felt to be sufficient by Morrison who thought 
the bulk of the financing for these activities should be met 
from local resources such as taxes, special funding, donations, 
etc., thus making the Local Authorities become self reliant. 
He was most adamant that increased funds would "destroy their 
initiative and upset reliance and moreover he felt that the 
Government in the Long run would get "robbed". The ceiling 
therefore had to stay as far as he was concerned at £50,000 and 
lower if possible. Cab 124/1339, Morrison to Nicholson, 16 
February 1949. 
117. Cab 124/1339, Ismay to Morrison, 16 March 1949. 
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official programme. Beyond mere stimulation, the Executive 
Committee considered it necessary to propose to the Local 
Authorities, in some manner, the types of projects they wished to 
see in 1951. 
In a memorandum to the Festival Council on this subject, Barry 
explained that there was already much evidence of the eagerness of 
Local Authorities to play their part in the preparations for the 
Festival. Some, he said, had already started to formulate 
preliminary plans, whilst others had indicated their willingness to 
do so to the Executive Committee but were waiting to be given a 
lead. The Festival Organisation, he said, was bound to ensure that 
the right kind of lead was given to each individual authority and 
then this should be followed up with advice, assistance and 
encouragement. As far as Barry was concerned, guidance was 
absolutely essential because without it, some of the authorities 
might fail to comprehend-the deeper implications behind the concept 
of the Festival of Britain. , The Executive Committee, he said, 
believed that the Authorities' attention should be directed 
primarily towards the encouragement of permanent physical 
improvements or to the creation of projects which would promote an 
enhanced appreciation of artistic and scientific values, and if 
guidance and support were given to them, it would enable the 
authorities to get on with their chosen projects rather than too 
much time being spent on discussing the options and possibilities. 
Barry cautioned, however, that great care had to be taken to avoid 




In accordance with his views regarding the use of existing 
resources in the form of voluntary effort of all kinds being given 
full scope in all the local activities, Barry also believed that 
nationally organised voluntary bodies should be given the 
opportunity to associate themselves in an active way with the local 
preparations for 1951. However, although these bodies as well as 
the Local Authorities would be involved in the preparations, Barry 
explained that the Executive Committee felt that it would be 
undesirable for Local Authorities to assume exclusive responsibility 
for the arrangements that were being made. The Executive Committee 
envisaged arrangements being made by local Festival of Britain 
committees operating under civic auspices and being as widely 
representative of the community as was practicable. The Festival of 
Britain office would, he said, liaise with these Committees through 
the Regional Offices of the Arts Council and the COI who would also 
co-operate with any of the national bodies who wished to play a part 
in local celebrations. 
119 
Having outlined their objectives for the local Festivals, it 
was decided by the Festival Organisation that the best way to 
approach the country as a whole was to hold a conference in the 
Guildhall in London under the leadership of the lord Mayor of 
London, and inviting the lord Mayors and chairmen of County, Urban 
and Rural District Councils to discuss the best way to get local 
Authorities interested in activities for the Festival. In addition 
118. Cab 124/1339, Council Minutes, Memo from the Director General 
on supporting activities for the Festival, 30 March 1949. 
119, Ibid. 
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to this, the Executive would send to the Local Authorities, after 
this meeting, further information on the kind of response they 
wished to see from them. 
120 
On 8 June 1949, the meeting arranged by Sir George Aylwen, the 
Lord Mayor of London, took place at the Guildhall. The gathered 
representatives were greeted with a message from King George VI, 
impressing upon them the importance of both the Festival's aims and 
of local and individual participation. He said: 
As we look forward to the year 1951, each one of us can 
share in the anticipation of an event which may be 
outstanding in our lives. 
The motives which inspire the Festival are common to us all 
- pride in our past and all that it has meant; confidence 
in the future which holds so many opportunities for us to 
continue our contribution to the wellbeing of mankind and 
thanksgiving that we have been saved from the disasters 
which threatened us, and that we have begun to surmount our 
trials. 
The Queen and I trust that every family in all parts of the 
country will share in this great Festival so that all of us 
may join in showing that Britain lives on, now as ever 
taking her rightful place among the Nations of the 
world. 121 
The Executive Committee had already decided that this meeting 
would be used as a platform by the Festival Organisation for making 
clear what the theme and underlying purpose of the Festival was, and 
to give advice as to the most appropriate kinds of activity that 
could be undertaken locally. At the meeting, the first person to 
address the representatives, after the reading of the King's 
stirring call to activity, was Ismay. Speaking in a general manner 
as head of the Festival Organisation, he began with a flourish, 
drawing military allusions, he started by examining the Festival's 
120. Ibid. 
121. Work 25/44, message from His Majesty the King to the Lord Mayor 
of London, 8 June 1949. 
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historical potential. The making of history, he said, was as a rule 
an unconscious process - it was doubtful whether Nelson, when he led 
the fleet into action at Trafalgar, realised that the name of the 
obscure cape on the coast would be immortalised, and, the gathered 
representatives, unlike Nelson, were consciously determined to make 
history. 'We are determined', he said, 'that 1951 will be not only 
the Centenary of the Great Exhibition of 1851, but that it will 
itself be a landmark in our island story for all time'. 
122 
To fulfil this ambition required time and planning and he 
cautioned the audience, telling them that there was not much time 
left to plan and, moreover, that the plans which were being drawn up 
were as complex as those drawn up for the Normandy Invasion. As a 
soldier he had learned that one never had enough time and, as far as 
he was concerned, there was not a moment to spare. He concluded 
this speech by touching on the delicate matter of expenditure on the 
Festival. The people of Britain, he said, after suffering the 
confusion and exhaustion of two World Wars, deserved some relief 
from the rigours of austerity that 'they had borne so cheerfully'. 
He went on to stress that obviously it would be foolhardy to waste 
money on unnecessary ostentation, but to skimp money on things that 
mattered and thus run the risk of spoiling for a 'ha'p'orth of 
tar', would, he warned, not be foolish but give the people the worst 
of both worlds. A happy medium, he said, 'must be our aim and a 
sense of proportion our guide .... let us not attempt too much but 
let us make sure that whatever we do attempt, we do well'. 
123 
122. Work 25/44, Text of speech made by Ismay at the meeting of 
Local Authorities at the Guildhall, 8 June 1949. 
123. Ibid. 
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After these general remarks from Ismay, Barry addressed the 
meeting with specific ideas for local participation in 1951. 
Explaining why local participation in the Festival was desirable, he 
said that due to the considerations of time and the scarcity of 
labour and materials, the Festival programme had to be limited and 
would therefore have to be 'supplemented and complemented by 
activities spontaneously undertaken on the initiative of local 
bodies throughout the land". Furthermore, he believed that local 
participation would ensure that 1951 was a season, not only of 
festivity, but one in which projects of lasting value to the 
community could be initiated or completed, thereby ensuring 'that 
the nation as a whole, and each entity within it, may be left a 
little better off at the close of the year than it was when it 
began'. This - aspect was, he added, one that the Festival 
Organisation was particularly anxious to emphasise. He went on to 
outline the types of projects that local communities could initiate 
which would fulfil this aspect of the Festival Organisation's aims: 
Local Authorities and voluntary bodies could tidy up eyesores; plant 
trees and shrubs; create art centres; form repertory companies; 
provide new playing-fields; lay out bombed sites as gardens; and 
clean public buildings. 
The last speaker, the Lord Mayor of London, Sir George Aylwen 
begun by stating how moved all present were by the boldness and 
inspiration of the Festival Scheme. For his part, be believed that 
if Local Authorities seized the initiative, they could produce 
124. Work 25/44, Text of speech of Barry at the meeting of Local 
Authorities at the Guildhall, 8 June 1949. 
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activities that would not only enrich and possibly compete with the 
official programme, but they could also ensure that the Festival was 
truly national in character. Sir George also stressed that he was 
in complete agreement with the Festival Organisation's notion that 
1951 should be the beginning of many positive things and, in view of 
this belief, he felt strongly that Local Authorities, by adopting 
some of Barry's ideas, could develop schemes that would bear fruit 
not only in 1951 but would be permanent thereafter. 
125 
Following this auspicious beginning, the Executive Committee 
prepared a booklet to be issued to all the Local Authorities. It 
explained in detail how the Festival Organisation thought that local 
communities should approach their projects. Taking an imaginary 
city as its model, the booklet outlined a possible programme: a 
historical pageant reconstructing historical events through the 
ages, crafts and industries for which the city was renowned; special 
exhibitions of pictures, art treasures and local museum collections; 
Shakespearian and other plays of a nationalistic character to be 
staged by local schools and amateur dramatic societies; a music 
festival and augmented concert programmes; massed brass bands; 
national and country dancing; a sports festival displaying both 
national and local sport; the construction of a new theatre, 
125. Work 25/44, Text of Speech by Sir George Aylwen at the meeting 
of Local Authorities at the Bildhall, 8 June 1949. Following 
the meeting at the Guildhall there was a meeting of the heads 
of Local Authorities of England and Wales at Central Hall, 
Westminster, at which the chairmen of the Welsh Regional 
Council and the constituent bodies of the Festival Organisation 
were present. Similar meetings were held in Wales and Northern 
Ireland and similar steps were taken to interest local 
Authorities in Scotland. 
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museum, art gallery or housing scheme, to be started on immediately 
to enable completion and occupation in time for the Festival's 
opening in 1951. This programme, the booklet explained, fulfilled 
three requirements: a new and permanent project to commemorate 
1951, in the form of the housing estate, art gallery, theatre or 
museum; the city surveyed and celebrated its past with particular 
reference to what was specific to it; and a gesture was made, 
through the historical bias of the programme, to the city's 
confidence in its future. 
126 
The booklet stressed the importance of contributions by local 
Authorities being of a permanent nature which the Festival 
Organisation emphasised was to be to the betterment of the nation. 
If the Authority could not afford to build a new housing estate, 
theatre, etc., they could endow bursaries and scholarships in the 
arts and sciences beginning in 1951 and continuing in perpetuity. 
Aside from these somewhat grandiose schemes, the booklet reiterated 
the ideas Barry had outlined at the meeting of the local 
representatives and added new ones, such as the provision of 
bus-shelters with seats perhaps overlooking some local view. As the 
Festival Organisation's plans for the participation of the local 
communities began to emerge, one begins to get a clearer 
understanding of Barry's statements at the inauguration of the 
Festival Organisation. 
127 
The whole concept of getting local 
communities to attend to their needs was novel in a society which 
126. COI, CL593, Draft Proposal, 6 April 1949. Seepp. 60for Barry's 
speech on the aims of the Festival. 
127. Ibid. 
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was being introduced to the principles of socialism, which in its 
essence dictated that Central Government, for the most part would, 
in a paternal fashion, take care of the country as a whole. 
However, having factual experience of office, Central Government 
found itself, due to the exigencies of the real world, not quite 
able to attend immediately to the needs of the local communities, 
and thus, the intervention of the Festival Organisation preaching 
self-reliance, was timely. If the concept was successful, the 
Festival and its organisers would have succeeded far beyond the 
expectations of a normal exhibition by not only redesigning the 
nation's homes and towns but in teaching the people how to create a 
future through self-help. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FESTIVAL OF 
BRITAIN 1951 
When initially conceived and agreed to, the Festival of 
Britain was perceived, as we have seen, as markedly the least costly 
way of celebrating the Centenary of 1851. In May 1949 when most of 
the Festival exhibitions and projects were planned, the Official 
Committee submitted a report to the Lord President on the financing 
and organisation of the Festival. The Festival proposals would, the 
Committee said, involve direct expenditure from the Treasury of 
nearly £14 million. 
1 
This sum was considerably more reasonable than the originally 
proposed expenditure of £70 million for a First Category 
International Exhibition to be housed at Osterley Park. Until 
December 1947, it was not thought that the nation's economic 
difficulties would threaten the plans for this modest celebration. 
The economic problems the country faced after the war were a direct 
result of the role the nation played in defending the Democratic 
sentiments and ideals of the western world. During the war Britain 
had lost approximately £7,000 million which constituted about a 
quarter of her national wealth. 
2 
Her overseas investments were 
largely dissipated, almost half of her merchant shipping lay at the 
bottom of the sea, and the exports on which her existence depended 
had shrunk to less than a third of their pre-war volume. 
3 
To further compound matters, on 21 August 1945 President 
Truman abruptly cancelled any further aid to Britain under the terms 
1. Cab 124/1252, Calendar of Progress. 
2. A. Cook and C. Sked, Post-war Britain, p. 27. 
3. Hopkins, p. 41. 
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of the Lend Lease Agreement at a time when the country was 
absolutely dependent upon American aid. The Americans 
unfortunately still regarded Britain with her network of imperial 
holdings as an economic threat and rival and, as such, they were 
determined to consolidate the economic advantages that had accrued 
to them as a result of the war. 
4 
The elation after election victory was shortlived and the 
first Christmas of the long-awaited peace found the Government much 
less triumphant as they negotiated from a position of extreme 
weakness, with a dominant American Government and nation. John 
Maynard Keynes was Britain's chief negotiator in the talks, the 
outcome of which was a loan of $3.75 million of the $6 billion 
interest-free loan the British had initially asked for. Repayments, 
at the rate of two per cent interest, were to start on 31 December 
1951 and to be spread over a period of fifty years. in addition to 
this, Britain was compelled to abide by the Bretton Woods Agreement 
to which the loan was inextricably linked. This meant that "within 
a year of the loan becoming fully operational, sterling was to be 
made freely convertible for purposes of current trading, that 
imperial preferences should be abandoned, and that Britain should 
settle with her sterling creditors before 1951". 
5 The issue of 
converting sterling would eventually cause the first of two serious 
financial crises (in 1947 and also in the 1948-1949 financial year) 
making economic prospects appear much worse than had originally been 
forecast and this led to many questions being asked in the press and 
1 
4. Cook and Sked, p. 28. 
5. Ibid., p. 29. 
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in Parliament as to whether or not it was justifiable, or necessary, 
to spend even this small sum of 914 million on providing the 
citizens of Britain with a tonic. In July 1947, the nation was 
alerted to the fact that the loan which had been negotiated with the 
Americans at the end of 1945 and the beginning of 1946, and which 
had been expected to last until 1950, was now almost completely 
exhausted and the convertibility clause of the loan was about to 
come into operation, bringing about the "convertibility crisis", 
causing many countries to take the opportunity of exchanging a very 
weak pound for the strong dollar and, by August 1947, with Britain's 
dollar reserves about to disappear, the Government was forced to 
renege on the terms of the loan by suspending convertibility of the 
dollar. 
6 
During the summer and autumn months of 1947 the British 
public became very familiar with the language of economic 
beleaguerment: they read about "the Battle of the Dollar Gap", 
"the Economic Dunkirk", "Equality of Sacrifice" and "Austerity now 
for Stability Later". 
7 
As the Government fought to balance its 
payments and its sterling, the words "cuts" and "austerity" not only 
made frequent appearances in the newspapers, but actually became an 
integral part of the nation's daily routine. 
Initially, it appeared to the nation that there was little to 
be concerned about for the factories were busy and once again 
producing goods= jobs were relatively abundant, and wages were 
rising and moreover, the weather that summer made up for inclement 
winter months of 1946 to 47. On 13 November, the spartan Sir 
6. Aewison, pp. 13-14" 
7. Hopkins, p. 77. 
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Stafford Cripps (formerly President of the Board of Trade) replaced 
Hugh Dalton as Chancellor of the Exchequer - austerity did not 
abate, but became entrenched. As a result of the country's economic 
problems, every week brought a new round of "cuts" or "lashings" as 
the newspapers reproachfully called them. There were shortages of 
basic foodstuffs as well as reductions in house and factory building 
due to shortages or absence of materials. Taxes were raised and 
were introduced on pools and betting. The people were cajoled and 
begged to produce more. 
By the spring of 1948 there was a welcome lull which brought 
with it a spark of hope for better conditions; in March 1948, 
Harold Wilson, the new President of the Board of Trade, publicly 
tore up a clothes ration book; and in April, men, women and children 
raced to the sweet shops as sweets came off the ration. The respite 
was not to last, however, for by the summer of 1948 there was 
another dollar crisis resulting in a new round of cuts and 
shortages: once again sweets were rationed, and holiday makers in 
western Europe -found themselves penniless and, stranded as banks 
closed their doors to them and moneychangers refused . their 
pounds. 
8 At home the grim reality of the country's position was 
finally being accepted and by the summer of 1949 a justification of 
the financial expenditure on the Festival became even more vital. 
By this time it had become evident that the balance of payments, 
which had been buoyant for well over a year, were in complete 
disarray: upset partially by a recession in the United States, the 
8. Hopkins, pp. 89-90. 
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gold and dollar reserves fell by $76 million in March and by a 
further $51 million in April. By 19 May 1949, it was reported that 
the weekly rate of dollar deficit was substantially above the 
projected level and the outlook was indeed gloomy. During the first 
quarter of 1949 the drain rose from £82 million to £157 million and 
by July 1949 the situation had worsened: in the week of the 10th to 
the 16th alone, the reserves fell by approximately $39 million. It 
was apparent that at the rate they were tumbling, even with a boost 
from Marshall Aid, Britain's reserves would in all probability last 
no more than forty weeks. To add further to the mood of 
despondency, there was worldwide speculative pressure against the 
pound in foreign currency markets which was fuelled by the prospect 
of a possible devaluation. Motivated by this expectation, overseas 
buyers either refused to take sterling goods or else deferred 
purchases made in sterling. 
9 
The response of the Government to this crisis was most 
uncertain, and this only helped to compound the nation's sense of an 
impending financial paralysis. The Cabinet was split over the issue 
of devaluation: on the one hand, the Chancellor, Sir Stafford 
Cripps, and the ex-Chancellor Hugh Dalton were against devaluation; 
and on the other hand, Morrison and his chief advisor, Max 
Nicholson, supported devaluation. Nicholson argued that devaluation 
might be the least of the evils amongst the options facing the 
Government. In this view both Nicholson and Morrison had the 
support of Attlee, the Prime Minister. Regardless of such 
9. Kenneth 0. Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 380. 
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opposition, Sir Stafford maintained the line advocated by the City, 
the Bank of England and certain top civil servants, that the 
Government should not devalue but impose a drastically tighter 
monetary policy. 
10 By the middle of August, however, the 
Chancellor had to abandon this stand and devalue the pound. In 
October 1949 the Prime Minister announced a consequent round of cuts 
in 'capital expenditure' affecting the fuel and power industries, 
the expanding education programme, new housing and the larger areas 
of miscellaneous expenditure. 
11 
10. Donoghue and Jones, pp. 437-438- 
11. Cook and Sked, pp. 39-40" 
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THE EARLY FESTIVAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
AND ORGANISATION 
The Festival expenditure, estimated in May 1949 in the midst 
of the economic difficulties at £14 million, naturally came under 
severe criticism. 
12 The financial crisis became the catalyst for 
a complete examination of the financial operations of the Festival 
organisation. Prior to these economic difficulties, the Festival 
Office, which had no distinct accounting section, could only present 
tentative estimates of their financial needs to the Official 
Committee for their consideration. From May 1948 at the inception 
of the Festival Organisation, the Executive Committee had been 
working with the Exhibitions Section within the Central Office of 
Information in the drawing up of plans for the proposed Festival 
exhibitions. The Executive Committee issued the staff of the COI 
Exhibitions's division with instructions for the proposed 
exhibitions but because of the lack of direct access to funds and 
the non-existence of an accounting section which could deal with 
costing and budgeting, the responsibility for all decisions 
implemented on behalf of the Festival Office would ultimately be 
with Robert Fraser, the Director-General of the COI. 
13 
In 
addition, certain composite parts of the Festival, such as the Arts 
Council, the COID, the British Film Institute, the Scottish and 
Welsh Councils, the Travelling Exhibitions, as well as the 
administration, preparatory work, publicity and running costs while 
12. Refer to Annex 1G for an example of the criticism of the 
Festival that appeared in the Press. 
13. Work 25/44, Memo by Ismay to the Festival Council and the 
Executive Committee, 30 March 1949. 
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the exhibitions were in progress, would be financed by grants from 
the Treasury and from other Government Departments including the 
COI, the Ministry of Works, the Ministry of Transport and the 
Stationery Office. The function of these various departments was to 
act as agents, responsible for carrying out their parts of the job 
economically and efficiently; they were not, however, authorised to 
approve, organise or accept financial responsibility for the main 
decisions related to expenditure on the Festival project as a 
whole. 
14 In the opinion of certain departments such as the 
Treasury, this kind of arrangement could only create problems in the 
long run. As early as July 1948, Treasury officials were expressing 
deep concern about the lack of proper financial management within 
the Festival Headquarters, and the financial implications of the 
whole project. In a letter to Max Nicholson, P. D. Proctor of the 
Treasury wrote: 
I am worried that at the moment we have no clear view of what 
the total cost is likely to be, and still more worried that we 
have not established any procedure through which we can get a 
conspectus of the cost and make sure that there is some 
financial control over the projects which are put forward. 
Moreover, he was concerned that the Treasury would be open to: 
grave criticism if the Government launched out into what now 
looks like being a large scale operation without having 
estimates of the total cost and of the cost of the component 
parts. 
He advised Nicholson that a picture of the proposed total 
expenditure should be submitted to Ministers without delay, so that 
14. Cab 124/1336, Proctor to Nicholson, 7 July 1948. The Science 
and Architecture Exhibitions would be financed by the Festival 
Office vote, which in reality was financed by the Treasury. 
The Government of Northern Ireland would finance all Festival 
projects for Northern Ireland. 
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very early on they would be fully conversant with the complete 
expenditure required. In addition to this, he stated very clearly 
that the Treasury looked "to the Lord President's office to accept a 
co-ordinating responsibility for the Festival on the financial and 
manpower side as well as all other general aspects. " Proctor 
stressed that the Lord President was ultimately responsible for the 
whole Festival, and Nicholson as his trusted Chairman had to clear 
up its financial ambiguities because, as they were both aware, a 
great many things could be done and commitments entered into without 
Ministers or the Treasury having any idea of the cost and Proctor 
said that if this happened they would all be in for a rude 
awakening". 
15 
Gerald Barry also wrote to Nicholson on 17 August 1948 
complaining about the less than adequate financial arrangements. It 
seemed to him that it was "unwieldy that expenditure should be 
authorised by the co-operating bodies, supervised by at least three 
different branches of the Treasury and accounted for in the last 
resort by different account officers, none of whom could exercise 
any direct policy control over arrangements for the Festival. " In 
this situation, he said, 
I find myself as Director General of the Festival and Chairman 
of the Executive, without financial responsibility for many of 
the policy decisions which the Festival Organisation must 
naturally make; and the Festival Organisation has no direct 
access to funds except amounts available for day to day 
administration of the Festival Headquarters, for which we can 
assume provision will be made. 
15. Ibid. 
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This was not, he argued, the kind of position any Director-General 
in charge of a large scale enterprise like the Festival could 
operate and perform well in, furthermore, the intensive planning of 
the last few months had resulted in a probable shape of the 
Festival's activities which would make the present system of finance 
even more difficult to administer. 
The problem as he perceived it was that there were activities 
connected to the Festival, such as the Live Architectural 
Exhibition, street decorations, the Pleasure Gardens and the 
fireworks display which the normal responsibilities of the 
co-operating bodies, the COI, the COID and the Arts Council, did not 
cover. Apart from this difficulty, he also foresaw problems in what 
he described as the 'preparatory phase' which would call for 
activities that needed financial provisions: for example, certain 
subsidies would be required for special scientific and architectural 
research; special publications such as guide books for tourists; 
the reprinting of books that were at present unobtainable; the 
commissioning of artists and writers for specific Festival purposes, 
and of independent film companies and publishers who were prepared 
to carry out promotional work for the Festival. He did accept, he 
explained, that a large amount of expenditure on the Festival would 
fit into the categories already established by the co-operating 
bodies: the services that the COI could provide would be fully 
utilized; the Arts Council and COID could function on grants from 
the Treasurys and the publicity for the Festival could be 
accomplished through press and poster advertising at home and 
abroad. There would be few problems, he said, if the co-operating 
bodies accepted the policy decisions of the Festival Organisation as 
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binding on their respective bodies. The problem with the system as 
it stood, he said; 
will not be so much to decide on what money is to be spent as 
to ensure that normal financial constraints under which their 
bodies co-operate, especially the COI, do not restrict the 
degree of freedom and imagination with which the Executive can 
operate and, therefore, jeopardise the whole show. 
The solution to these problems, as far as Barry perceived it, was 
the allocation to the Festival Office of a central fund that would 
cover a variety of expenditure for which the Executive would bear 
full responsibility. For this purpose, Barry asked for the 
appointment of a Finance Officer, who would be able to keep a record 
of the total expenditure incurred by the main Festival activities 
and those of the co-operating bodies. 
16 
Nicholson replied to 
Barry's letter on 23 August 1948. His reply was characteristic of 
the grace he consistently displayed under pressure, he said: 
I do not agree that the system of financing of the Festival of 
Britain activities is unwieldy and feel confident that it will 
prove flexible and adaptable to all the circumstances likely 
to arise. The trouble as I see it, is that a clear picture of 
finance must follow and cannot precede the emergence of a 
clear picture of the range of Festival events, exhibitions and 
so forth to be provided for and the taking of final decisions 
on the Executive responsibilities of the various bodies in 
respect of these. 
He correctly pointed out that financial arrangements would be more 
easily made when the scale, scope and location of the Obmbined 
Exhibition was known, and when a similar decision had been made 
about the Science and Technology Exhibition. Further, the financial 
arrangements could be finalised when a more detailed review of the 
ancillary activities such as processions, pageants, fireworks, 
16. Cab 124/1336, Barry to Nicholson, 17 August 1948. 
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floodlighting and street decorations which, Nicholson said, would 
have to be co-ordinated and probably directed by the Festival 
Organisation. He concluded his letter by stating: 
I, therefore, think that the diversion of effort asked for by 
your letter of 17th August would not only be fruitless, but 
would actually postpone the reaching of a stage at which the 
final arrangements can be defined with more precision. 
I share your view, however, that the greatest importance must 
be attached to a clear understanding of the financial drill 
and budget and have already promised the Treasury that the 
Official Committee, which is the right body to do this, shall 
get down to it as early as possible in the Autumn.... 
I hope meanhwile that you will discourage premature attempts 
to re-open broad questions of financial policy before a 
detailed scheme can be prepared on the basis of firm plans 
from the Festival Organisation and that you will bring to my 
notice informally any points which you feel should be covered 
in that scheme. 17 
As 1948 came to an . end, accommodation was 
found for both the 
Combined and the Science Exhibitions and plans were concluded for 
the Travelling Exhibition, and, as he had promised Barry, Nicholson 
began to concentrate his energies on sorting out the Festival's 
financial arrangements. 
18 On 17 January 1949, Proctor again 
wrote to Nicholson about the financial arrangements for the 
Festival. Acknowledging Nicholson's reply to his letter of 7 July 
1948, in which Nicholson had assured him that he would bear 
responsibility for bringing before the Official Committee a total 
estimate of the cost of the Festival and its composite parts as had 
been requested, Proctor reiterated the Treasury's concern about the 
"lack of any fixed point of financial and accounting responsibility 
for those parts of expenditure which are incurred to the order of 
the Festival Headquarters. " Proctor further restated that "the 
17. Cab 124/1336, Nicholson to Barry, 23 August 1948. 
18. See pp. 106-110,118-122,143-147, for the finalisation of the 
housing for the Combined, Science and Technology, and the 
Travelling Exhibitions. 
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general responsibility for co-ordinating the financial proposals and 
justifying them to the Treasury must continue to rest with the Lord 
President's office. " Apart from still being worried about the lack 
of financial control, the Treasury was, Proctor said, concerned 
about the Special Exhibitions Unit of the COI, which had been 
created specifically to deal with the Exhibitions in 1951. This 
unit, Proctor said, worked for all intents and purposes under the 
direction of the Executive Committee, but was being borne on the COI 
vote and as such, the Director-General of the COI, Robert Fraser, 
was accountable for all expenditure. Proctor argued that the 
Director-General was in no position to exercise control over such 
expenditure and that it was wrong that he should be the accounting 
officer for it. Further, a similar position arose with regard to 
the staffing and general expenses of the Festival Office which, he 
said, were being borne on the Treasury vote, with the Department's 
Permanent Secretary acting as the accounting officer; neither the 
Chancellor nor the Treasury' officials were in any position to 
exercise detailed control over the Festival Office's expenditure. 
19 
This situation could be remedied, Proctor advised, by giving 
the Festival Office its own vote, for which the Organisation, with 
Barry as its accounting officer, would be responsible. He assured 
Nicholson that the Treasury "would not seek to roll up on this vote 
the whole expenditure on the Festival. " The Arts Council would 
continue to bear the cost of the Festival of Arts from the grant 
remitted to them by the Treasury, and the OOID would similarly 
19. Cab 124/1266, Proctor to Nicholson, 17 January 1949. 
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continue to cover its own expenses in relation to its contribution 
to the Combined Exhibition. The Ministry of Works, Transport and 
the Stationery Office could, Proctor said, continue to use their 
votes for any allied services and the COI would continue to bear the 
cost for the publicity or for any other services it performed for 
the Festival Office, for which it was entitled to ask for repayment 
from the Festival office vote. 
20 
The remodelled Festival Office could be made up, Proctor 
explained, by transferring the COI Special Exhibitions Unit to the 
Festival Headquarters, thus making it a part of the staff already 
working under the Director-General. The Festival Office would be 
constituted as -an- independent department (responsible to the Lord 
President) employing its own staff and submitting its financial 
proposals to the Treasury like any other department. To help Barry 
with his added responsibilities, Proctor suggested that a finance 
and establishments officer be appointed to handle the direct 
expenditure on the Festival and an accounts section created to deal 
with the payments to the staff. These additional staff requirements 
would be met by the Treasury. So anxious was Proctor about the 
financial state of the Festival Office and Barry's management of it, 
that he went so far as to tell Nicholson that he and his colleagues 
thought that: 
It might be desirable to attach at once a good finance and 
establishment officer to the Director-General of the Festival, 
even in advance of his becoming responsible for the vote, - and 
to suggest to Gerald Barry that he should be brought in at an 
early stage on all projects involving expenditure, e. g. by 




The Government, all too aware that they were being heavily 
criticised for spending even the small sum they proposed on the 
Festival, were more than willing to find some kind of solution to 
the Festival's financial management deficiencies before they became 
publicly embarrassed by mispent or missing millions. Therefore, on 
30 March 1949, in his capacity as Chairman of the Festival Council, 
Lord Ismay sent a memorandum to the members of his council and also 
to the Executive, informing them that the Government had decided to 
set up a Festival of Britain Office, as a separate Department, by 
amalgamating the Festival Office with the COI Special Exhibitions 
unit. The new office would be directly responsible to the office of 
the Lord President and would become effective from 1 April 1949. 
As Director-General, Gerald Barry would, from that date, assume full 
responsibility as the accounting officer for the Festival Office's 
vote. 
22 
The items which would be paid for by the Festival 
Organisation included: staff and general expenses= the expenditure 
of the COI Special Exhibitions Unit= any other expenditure incurred 
which did not fall naturally within the scope of the existing 
departmental votes= and for the services provided on an agency 
basis by other government departments. 
23 
With the creation of the Festival Office and the consequent 
establishment of an accountable financial section, the Festival 
Organisation and the Official Committee could now direct their 
energies to working out the estimated expenditure for the whole 
22. Work 25/44, Memo by Lord Ismay to the Festival Council and 
the Executive Committee, 30 March 1949. 
23. Cab 124/1267, Review of Finance and Organisation of the 
Festival of Britain 1951,27 May 1949. 
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project. However, in the early months of 1949, before they could 
begin this task, certain individuals from the Treasury, including 
the Chancellor, Sir Stafford Cripps, began pressing the Festival 
Organisation through the Official Committee and the Lord President 
to fix a ceiling on the total expenditure of the Festival because 
they were of the opinion that, in view of the country's continuing 
poor economic performance, it could not afford even the most modest 
expenditure on the Festival. On 8 February 1949, O'Donovan of the 
Treasury wrote to Nicholson in his capacity as Chairman of the 
Official Committee, to say: 
There still remains the big question whether the scale on 
which the Festival is planned is within the country's means, 
and although I know you will disagree with me, I do want to 
put up to my chiefs here for the Chancellor's consideration 
the suggestion that something like a ration of the total 
expenditure should be fixed. Without such a ceiling, whether 
it is a low or high one, I think that the problem of 
controlling expenditure by the new Festival office will be 
extraordinarily difficult. Z4 
In replying to O'Donovan's letter on 17 February 1949, Nicholson 
explained that contrary to what O'Donovan thought, he was in favour 
of fixing a ceiling of expenditure provided it is not so low as to 
compromise the undertaking", and provided the question of "what the 
country can afford is sufficiently analysed. " For, he said: 
Just stated like that it might imply that the Festival was 
adding to the excess of demands over current savings, or that 
it would exceed available labour and materials, or that it was 
going to impose a strain on the Chancellor's annual budget, or 
that the expenditure was unreasonable having regard to what it 
has been decided to spend on other competing activities. If a 
standard of this sort is to be set up it ought to be very 
clearly analysed and justified, and I am rather doubtful of 
its value, except perhaps for parliamentary purposes. 
24. Cab 124/1266, O'Donovan to Nicholson, 8 February 1949. 
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What mattered in this respect of Festival expenditure was, he said, 
not so much the gross cost but the net cost, which he went on to 
explain depended on whether the Festival Organisation agreed to levy 
a charge on exhibitors in some manner, and also according to how 
much more the Organisation could get contributed in kind without 
charge to its vote. Furthermore he said: 
there is the further complication that a very important part 
of economic justification is the tourist attractions and for 
tourism the Festival is in the nature of a capital investment 
which should give a dividend, not only in 1951 but in the 
creation of goodwill and an increased volume of visitors for 
subsequent years. The importance of this revenue consists of 
course, largely in the fact that it is foreign exchange in 
relief of direct exports, and tourist earnings themselves will 
not to any large extent come within the 1951 budget. 
"It would" he said, "be a great fallacy to suggest that the 
particular figures which can be taken into account in such estimates 
of Exchequer expenditure as can be framed for 1951 are anything like 
the whole story even in economic terms. " He was, he added, very 
much in favour of emphasising the economic aspect of the Festival's 
expenditure and of keeping the designers and promoters from 
extravagance. But he said: 
I think a good deal more thought will have to be given to it, 
if we are to see that we really get value for money and that 
we do not do more harm than good. 25 
Despite Nicholson's sensible advice, the Treasury still insisted on 
fixing a ceiling to the as yet indeterminate cost of the Festival 
activities. On 25 March 1949, Sir Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor, 
wrote to the Lord President on this matter. He acknowledged that 
25. Cab 124/1266, Nicholson to O'Donovan, 17 February 1949. 
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the Official Committee and the Lord President's office were in the 
process of preparing a financial review of the Festival of which the 
earliest of the kind for this year had been prepared on 1 March 
1949. Several important points were still under discussion and Sir 
Stafford realised that these could affect the total cost. The 
Chancellor felt it to be important, that even at this early stage, 
some estimate of the scale of expenditure ought to be fixed so that 
the organisers would know earlier rather than later exactly where 
they stood. He therefore suggested that it would: 
be right at this stage to fix a ceiling for the total cost 
falling on the government. This is necessary in any case to 
avoid creating difficulty with future Budgets, but it would 
also probably be useful to the Festival Office and to other 
departments concerned, since it must be extremely difficult, 
without such a guide, to decided which of the many activities 
that have been, or will be suggested can find a place in the 
official scheme. 
Referring to the estimates of 1 March 1949 presented to him by the 
Official Committee, for £11.16 million gross and over £8 million 
net, he said that although they were much lower than the sum 
originally calculated for an International Exhibition in Osterley 
Park, it was still larger when compared with the £5 million spent 
annually on all information work at home, or the £11 million spent 
annually on overseas information work. The expenditure on the 
Festival would, he said, be additional to all the aforementioned 
expenditure. He acknowledged that the Festival would benefit the 
tourist trade and the export drive to a great though incalculable 
extent but that: 
On balance, I think that anything much above the present 
estimated figures would lay us open to the charge of 
extravagance. Would you agree that we might fix limits of £12 
million gross and £10 million net? I think that it would be 
as well to have a ceiling for the gross as well as the net 
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figure because receipts are so difficult to forecast. I think 
that these figures should leave enough margin in which to fit 
in any essential items that may have been overlooked, any 
excess over estimates on 
26 
the main projects, or any worthy new 
ideas that may crop up. 
on 29 March 1949, the Lord President replied to Sir Stafford's 
request. He said that while he was sympathetic to the C'hancellor's 
views on expenditure, he could not give him an answer until he had 
discussed the whole matter with Lord Ismay who was ill and out of 
London. He promised, however, he would ensure that no new items 
which might increase the proposed expenditure would be allowed to go 
forward. 
27 
Meanwhile, the Official Committee and the Festival 
Organisation continued to prepare their estimates of expenditure on 
the Festival. Three reviews were prepared on 1 March 1949,27 May 
1949 and 20 July 1949, with the location of sites for the Combined 
Exhibition at the South Bank, the Science Exhibition at South 
Kensington and the Architectural Exhibition at Poplar, it had thus 
become possible to obtain estimates (which were in some cases still 
speculative) for the gross expenditure on the Festival. As 
Chairman of the Official Committee, Nicholson explained in the 
report, that when looking at the gross and net cost of the 
Festival, the primary difficulty lay within the decision not to 
permit industrial firms to exhibit products of their choice in 
return for paying for space. This meant that the rent from 
exhibitors, the largest item on the revenue side, was eliminated 
but, the firms chosen to exhibit would, however, be required to bear 
26. Cab 124/1267, Cripps to Morrison, 25 March 1949. The 
estimates of 1 March 1949 made up by the Official Committee 
and the Festival Organisation will be discussed fully later on 
in this chapter. 
27. Ibid. Morrison to Cripps, 29 March 1949. 
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the cost of transporting their exhibits, their erection, maintenance 
and dismantling, as well as for the services of an expert guide, and 
insurance. Because of the loss of rent . the net cost of the 
Festival would represent a much larger proportion of the gross costs 
than would have been attainable had the Festival been arranged 
partly as a trade fair. 
28 
The overall estimates were further 
complicated by the fact that the sites chosen for the exhibitions 
would be required for other purposes at the end of 1951. In 
addition to this, the traffic and other disclocations involved in 
such a large and widely spread project could be accepted for a 
period of no longer than five months, and therefore the time in 
which some revenue could be earned to offset much of the initially 
28. Cab 124/1269, Review of Festival Finance and Organisation, 30 
January 1950. The decision not to allow a charge to be levied 
on firms whose goods were chosen for Festival exhibitions was 
for the most part forced by the COID (who were supported in 
this stance by the Board of Trade and the Executive) who 
objected on the grounds that such a move would inevitably 
prejudice the selection of exhibits. As design was to be an 
importance part of the Festival of Britain as a whole, the 
COID and the Executive wanted to make sure than only goods of 
the highest possible standard were displayed. Allowing 
manufacturers to display their goods for a fee would, they 
believed, lessen their control over the quality and standards 
of the items chosen. Moreover, the COID, who were in charge 
of approaching industry with the plans for 1951, were afraid 
that even if a nominal flat rate was charged some firms might 
refuse to pay and they might find themselves in considerable 
difficulty in finding equally good alternative exhibits. They 
felt that a nominal fee might also inhibit important 
industrialists from co-operating with them for the Festival in 
1951. Cab 124/1268, Memo by Lidderdale to Nicholson, 20 
December 1949 
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heavy capital expenditure was severely limited. 
29 
Although 
recouping of the initial outlay would be restricted, Nicholson 
pointed out that a large part of the expenditure on the sites in 
terms of their preparation, accommodation and traffic facilities for 
1951 would have a continuing and in some cases permanent value. 
However, he added that some large items such as the structures for 
the South Bank exhibition would virtually have to be written off at 
the close of the Festival, thus making a worse financial showing 
than would otherwise have been expected. The picture, Nicholson 
said, would have been much improved had the Government adopted the 
Festival Organisation's original plan for housing the exhibitions in 
steel structures which would have had a high re-use value. 
30 
Nicholson continued his memorandum by assessing the 
liabilities that would fall on the Government, considering first 
the major exhibitions. The main item of expenditure was naturally 
the piece de resistance on the South Bank. 
According to the Festival Office, this display by itself was 
going to cost its sponsors between £6 million and £6.4 million 
gross. They estimated that on the basis of 153 opening days 
including Sundays, from 1 May to 30 September 1951, with an 
estimated average attendance of 50,000 on weekdays and 75,000 on 
Saturdays and Sundays, the Government could recoup £1.5 million of 
the initial £6.4 million in takings at the turnstiles. The figure 
of £1.5 million was based on the assumption that the admissions 
charge, as yet unconfirmed, would be in the region of 4/- for adults 
29. Cab 124/1269, Review of Finance, 30 January 1950 
30. Ibid. The subject of the use of steel structures for the 
exhibition has been discussed in pp. 85-86 
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and 2/6d for children. It was decided by the Festival Office and 
the Lord President that if for any reason these charges should be 
lowered from 4/- to 2/6d for adults and half-price for children, the 
revenue would accordingly be lowered to £1 million, and consequent 
loss to the Exchequer of £500,000.31 The principal items of 
expenditure in this area were: the cost of preparing the site and 
the construction of the buildings at £2 million; the cost of 
display material was estimated at £1.75 million; and the maintenance 
and running costs were put at £1 million. The net deficit was 
estimated at approximately £4.5 million, less any net proceeds 
returned from the disposal of structures and the exhibits, less the 
permanent value of some of the site and river work. 
32 
31. Work 25/44, Finance Review, 27 May 1949. The subject of the 
admission charge was discussed by Nicholson in a memorandum to 
Morrison. Morrison, always mindful of public reaction, 
thought that the charge of 4/- was too high for the ordinary 
people. Nicholson said that planning was proceeding on this 
basis but admitted that the whole question would be reviewed 
early in the new year, enabling a new price to be fixed if it 
proved desirable. He went on to say that he had suggested 
that if the 4/- price was confirmed Festival publicity should 
leave the door open to cutting the price to 2/6d at some stage 
in the season. The advantages of this arrangement he 
explained were many. It could act as a deterrent, keeping the 
crowds down until the police had fully corrected any 
congestion problems. Added to this he said that in light of 
the complaints of the people who had visited the annual shows 
like the Chelsea Flower Show and had not had reasonable access 
to the exhibits, the last thing the Festival needed was for it 
to begin with a number of spectators being crushed to death as 
well as sending them home without seeing the show. This would 
he said be an unfortunate start. If the price was kept high 
the numbers could be kept down initially and later if the 
attendances were inadequate the price could be dropped. 
Finally he said that with the loss of rent from exhibitors, 
the loss the Exchequer would be even higher if the highest 
admission charge was not retained. Cab 124/1267, Nicholson 
to Morrison, 20 June 1949 
32. Ibid. 
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The Science Exhibition, which was to be housed in the Science 
Museum at South Kensington, and the newly developed scientific 
project demonstrating the laws of gravity, which was to be exhibited 
in Newton House were, because they were being housed in existing 
structures, considerably cheaper than housing them in make-shift 
structures on the South Bank or in Battersea. Apart from the 
proposed cost of getting the buildings ready for 1951, the bulk of 
the money would therefore be spent on the exhibition itself. The 
cost initially estimated in the first financial review of 1 March 
1949 was £750,000; £600,000 of which would be used for display and 
installation costs for the Science Exhibition at the Science Museum 
in South Kensington, and £150,000 for the exhibition at Newton 
House. The Newton . 
House Project had first been suggested by 
Professor Max Born, who grandly described it as being an exhibit 
which would be unique in the world, thus drawing visitors from all 
over the world. It was to consist of a place in which the laws of 
gravity would appear to have been modified sufficiently to allow 
visitors to experience an enchanted world in which people stood or 
sat, not on a flat floor, but on a curved wall on which their 
weight would change as they walked about and in which objects thrown 
or rolled on the floor would travel in peculiar trajectories. The 
exterior of this exhibition, which would be approximately 80 feet 
wide, would have a suitably fantastic and futuristic shape, and its 
interior would be composed of a revolving chamber with a parabolic 
floor. The visitors would enter through a specially designed 
approach, designed so that they would be unaware of any rotation; 
once inside they would be conducted to the rotating bowl and 
informed by loudspeaker about the magical world they were about to 
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enter. 
33 The Science Council approved the Newton House Project 
on 20 July 1949, deciding that it should be financed out of the 
Science Exhibition vote, up to £100,000, and the controller of the 
Festival Office (Bernard Sendall) agreed to arrange that any 
additional charges to this figure, up to a maximum of £50,000 would 
be met from the Festival Office vote. 
34 
In the subsequent financial reviews of 27 May 1949 and 20 July 
1949, the sum allocated to the science projects remained at 
ß750,000. As a result of the enforced economic cuts to the Festival 
budget which reduced the amount of money available for the Science 
Exhibitions, and also because further investigations in to Max 
Born's proposals revealed that it was possible that some of the 
visitors might experience uncomfortable side effects such as severe 
vertigo when suspended in the rotating bowl, the plans for the 
Newton House project were subsequently dropped. 
35 
The expected 
revenue and net cost of the Science exhibitions, which were 
explained by Nicholson in the-. reviews of March and May, were based 
on the assumption that there would be an admission charge of half a 
crown for adults with children paying half-price, the revenue thus 
expected from 5,000 visitors per day during the 153 opening days, as 
well as from all other sources, would be ß90,000 and the net cost 
would be about £660,000. The anticipated net cost was based on the 
33. Cab 124/1295, "The Newtonian Housea proposal by Max Born, 
18 July 1949. 
34. Ibid. Science Council Minutes 20 July 1949. 
35. Work 25/50, Memo by Director of Science to the Science 
Council, 15 May 1950. 
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assumption that after 1951 the museums would want to purchase some 
of the working models, which were of educational and technical 
value. 
36 
The Exhibition of Industrial Power at Kelvin Hall, Glasgow, 
was designed to be complimentary to the Science Exhibition at South 
Kensington and would show the results of applying scientific 
advances to the heavy engineering industries, including 
shipbuilding. By March 1949, the plans for this exhibition, which 
were being drawn up by the Scottish Committee, in consultation with 
the Science Council and the Executive, had not sufficiently 
progressed to enable a costing to be made: in the review of May 
1949 the gross cost was, however, placed at £425,000 and the 
receipts expected over the three month period in which the 
exhibition was opened were put at £75,000.37 In the July review 
the figures remained the same. 
38 
The last of the major projects considered were the Live 
Architectural Exhibition in Poplar; the proposed Live Architectural 
Exhibition in Edinburgh (which was subsequently abandoned in October 
1949 due to enforced cuts to the Festival budget), and the Festival 
Pleasure Gardens. The 'Live' Architectural Exhibition in Poplar, as 
has been discussed earlier, would consist of a cross section of 
permanent residential and commercial buildings which would be 
financed and designed in consultation with the Festival Office and 
erected and owned by the LCC. In the review of March 1949, 
36. Cab 124/1267, and Work 25/44, Financial Reviews, 1 March 1949 
and 27 May 1949. 
37. Work 25/44, Review, 27 May 1949. 
38. Cab 124/1268, Memo by the Director-General to the Festival 
Committee, 15 November 1949. 
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Nicholson stated that the LCC had put in a claim for reimbursement 
regarding overtime and other expenses which would be incurred. 
There would be, he said, considerable expenditure on display models, 
plans, pictures and other exhibits as well as on maintenance and 
running costs, but that it was too early to estimate the cost of 
this exhibition and the extent of its deficit. By the Review of May 
1949 the cost of the exhibition was estimated at £1.5 million with 
the sum of £800,000 falling on the Festival vote; the costs of 
running and maintaining the exhibition were put at £500,000 and the 
LCC put in a claim for £300,000 as reimbursement for the withdrawal 
of contractors during the exhibition, special building work to 
display building processes, and payment of overtime and other 
expenses which might be incurred. The receipts over a six month 
period conservatively put at £12,000.39 In the Review of July 
1949, the cost of the exhibition to the Festival vote was lowered to 
£270,000.40 
The Scottish Architectural Exhibition was discussed in the May 
1949 Review as being planned by the Scottish Committee, was to be in 
two parts: a live exhibition in East Kilbride, and a photograph 
exhibition in Edinburgh (which would become the Scottish 
Architectural Display Section of the "Living Traditions" Exhibition 
39. Cab 124/1267, Review, 27 May 1949. The LCC claims and how 
the Lord President secured their reduction (and in some cases 
their total cancellation) will be discussed further on in this 
chapter. 
40. Cab 124/1268, Memo by the Director-General to the Festival 
Council, 15 November 1949. These figures do not represent as 
in previous cases the cost to the Festival Office vote but, 
the cost of the Live Exhibition to the Festival vote and the 
LCC. 
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at the Royal Scottish Museum, Edinburgh). The costs had not yet 
been worked out for these early proposals but a rough estimate put 
the price at £60,000.41 In the July 1949 Review, placed under 
the broad heading of Scottish and Welsh projects, the allowance for 
such projects was still £60,000.42 
As was shown earlier, the Festival Pleasure Gardens were to be 
situated in 37 acres of the Battersea Park and were to be managed by 
a company, the Festival Gardens Limited. In March 1949 it was 
anticipated that the Gardens would cost £750,000, and as they would 
be opened for a five year period, it was hoped that the initial 
capital outlay would be fully recovered without any net loss falling 
on the Treasury. 
43 
In the July 1949 Review, a deficit of 
£90,000 (later lowered to £60,000) was estimated would fall on the 
44 
Treasury. 
Other Festival activities included a Land and Sea Travelling 
Exhibition which was estimated at £750,000 with a net cost, less the 
net disposal value, of £650,000. The revenue expected from all 
sources, including attendance figures of 7,000 visitors a day for 
twelve days (excluding Sundays) in twelve towns, at an admission 
41. Work 25/44, Review, 27 May 1949. 
42. Cab 124/1268, Memo by the Director-General to the Festival 
Council, 15 November 1949. 
43. Cab 124/1267, Review, 1 March 1949. By 4 October 1949 , 
Barry wrote a memo to the Festival Council on the proposed 
Festival Gardens, in which he stated that the Gardens would be 
run by the Festival Gardens Limited, which would be able to 
borrow £770,000 (the cost of the Gardens), £200,000 of which 
was being loaned by the LCC, and the rest of the amount from 
the Festival Office vote. 
44. Cab 124/1268, Memorandum by the Director-General to the 
Festival Council, 15 November 1949. 
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charge of 2/6d for adults and half price for children, was estimated 
at £100,000. In the reviews of may and July 1949, the land and sea 
exhibitions were valued together at £850,000 with expected revenue 
from all sources remaining at £100,000. In addition to this sum, 
also falling on the Treasury was the sum of £90,000 for purchasing 
the funfair equipment from the United States. 
45 
A fireworks 
display and street decorations, illuminations in London and bonfire 
chains up and down the country, were initially estimated by the 
Ministry of Works at £500,000; salaries and overheads for the 
Festival Office were estimated at £640,500 (and lowered in July to 
£615,000); supporting activities at £50,000; publicity at 
£600,000; documentary films made by the BFI at £120,000; a Press 
and Information Centre at £40,000; a contingency fund to cover any 
other additional projects contemplated, as well as covering any 
increases to the cost of agreed projects estimated at £1,5 million 
in May 1949 and lowered to £235,000 by July 1949.46, 
45. For further information on the purchase of funfair equipment, 
see pp. 39q-402. 
46. Cab 124/1267,1268, Reviews, 1 March 1949,27 May 1949, and 
20 July 1949. 
The press Club was set up with the agreement of all the 
members of the Press Association in the premises of Great 
Scotland Yard. The Festival Organisation felt that it was 
essential to make provisions for the correspondents covering 
the Festival as a whole, and did not want the location of the 
Club to be on the South Bank. The Club opened on 30 April 
1951 and closed on 30 September 1951. It had a membership of 
575 which included 28 nationalities, other than British. The 
Director of Publicity was later to admit in a report on the 
public relations for the Festival that the club was "only 
moderately successful and shortly after it had been opened, 
membership qualifications had to be extended to include 
advertising and publicity people as well as bona fide 
journalists; it was, however, used to a considerable extent 
by the foreign journalists". Work 25/3, Report by the 
Director of Public Relations, October 1951. 
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In addition to these projects, estimates were made for traffic 
and ancillary works at the gross cost of £1.25 million of which 
£600,000 would be spent solely for the Festival, the rest of the 
work would be of permanent value. The grants for the co-operating 
bodies of the Festival were also included in the list of liabilities 
that fell on the Government. The Arts Council was to get a grant of 
£200,000 for financing the Arts Festivals and for paying the 
artists, musicians and writers whom they commissioned. The COID, 
responsible for selecting all the industrial and design exhibits in 
the Festival exhibitions, was given £300,000. The British Film 
Institute, responsible for organising a festival of notable British 
feature and documentary films, was given a grant of £15,000 for this 
task. The gross expenditure on the Festival, as reported in these 
three reviews was respectively £11.16 million in March 1949, £13.715 
million in May 1949 and £12 million in July 1949.47 
The figures attained in July 1949 were taken by all those 
concerned with the Festival as the final figure arrived at after a 
great deal of manipulation of the budget. The Official Committee 
and the Festival Office had managed to cut their gross costs from 
£14 million to £12 million on the orders of the Chancellor who had 
communicated to the Lord President that he could not accept the sum 
of £14 million gross expenditure as an estimate for the Festival. 
By June 1949, the Chancellor and the Lord President had agreed to 
compromise and both parties had further agreed to accept "an outside 




48. Work 25/47, Official Committee Minutes, 22 September 1949. 
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achieve this figure, the Festival Office lowered the amount of 
direct contributions from their vote to the various projects. For 
example, the cost of the Architecture Exhibition in Poplar was 
lowered from £800,000 to £270,000, and contingencies were dropped 
from £1.5 million to the very low sum of £235,000. Thus having 
complied with the Chancellor's request and brought the gross 
expenditure down to £12 million in July 1949, the Festival Office 
and the Official Committee felt that the matter of expenditure was 
settled. 
They were, however, rudely awakened from this position for 
with the country's continuing poor economic performance, in October 
1949 the Prime Minister announced cuts in 'capital expenditure' 
which would affect not only the fuel and power industries, but also 
the expanding education programme, new housing and the larger area 
of miscellaneous investment. The Festival Office was informed that 
it had to make a five per cent reduction to its budget. The Lord 
President, the Festival Office and Nicholson were not at all pleased 
with this request. Morrison took the view that, as far as the 
Festival was concerned, the issue of economies had been dealt with, 
the Festival's budget had been reduced from £14 million to £12 
million. The Treasury did not accept this view, however, and took 
the line that the original sum of £14 million had not been agreed 
to, whereas the sum of £12 million was the agreed amount, arrived at 
between the Chancellor and the Lord President. It was from the 
ceiling of £12 million that they said the Festival Office had to 
make a reduction of five per cent, or £600,000. The Official 
Committee discussed the Prime Minister's directive fully and Barry, 
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who was present at the meeting on September 1949, said that in spite 
of the substantial cuts in the estimates that had already been made 
and the resulting delays, he was prepared to examine the Festival 
budget once again to explore ways of making the required five per 
cent cut. However, he said that he would only do so on the 
understanding that, as the budget of July 1949 was based on current 
costs, any higher cuts which occurred as a result of devaluation 
would not be reflected in the ceiling figure and that no economies 
could be accepted which would cause the Festival not to be ready by 
1 May 1949.49 
By October 1949, the spirit of co-operation from the Festival 
Office was changing to signs of dissatisfaction and frustration. 
They were experiencing difficulties in achieving the five per cent 
cut and Barry had informed Nicholson that the Festival Council were 
unanimously opposed to sanctioning cuts which they felt would in all 
probability harm the Festival. 
50 
While being sympathetic in general to the Festival 
organisation's dilemma, and despite believing in the merits of the 
Festival, Nicholson was aware of the mounting criticism to it and 
saw the necessity of making a cut of five per cent, for he knew that 
when the Government programme of cuts in housing, school building 
and other vital areas in the nation's life was announced, it would 
become much harder to defend the Festival. On 19 October 1949, he 
received a memorandum from S. C. Leslie echoing this dilemma. Leslie 
said: 
The details of the investment cut may not yet be revealed and 
49. Ibid. 
50. Cab 124/1268, Nicholson to Morrison, 24 October 1949. 
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it may be difficult for anyone to determine the relation 
between the proposed total budget for the Festival and so 
profoundly important a matter as the educational building 
programme. But there are bound to be comparisons. 
Leslie made it clear to Nicholson that the Government's rejoinders 
to the criticisms that he had read and heard were not only not good 
enough, but they were simply not convincing. The Lord President, he 
said: 
compared the Festival and its funfair to cinema-going and 
general amusement; but surely the right comparison would be to 
an extensive new programme for building cinemas, theatres and 
amusement parks. Again, there has been a reference to 
increased dollar earnings. This year during the material 
period, every ship and every London hotel were crammed 
continuously but if anyone has actually made a realistic 
estimate of the possible increase in tourist earnings in 1951, 
taking account of all bottlenecks and if this increase (over 
and above what can in any case be expected in another two 
years) bears a satisfactory relationship to the capital cost 
of the Festival, that would be another matter. 
Nicholson was left in no doubt as to Leslie's opinion of the Lord 
President's seemingly cavalier attitude towards the problem of cuts, 
which was that cuts should be made on the basis of priorities with 
the overriding aim being to increase the nations's productive 
capacity. Leslie's view of this was made in a terse comment: 
I do not know how the continuance of the Festival (for which I 
have never found any definite evidence of active public 
demand) would square with this approach. 
He further added: 
If the Government wanted to give a lead to the country about 
the right approach to the problem of priority in expenditure, 
and if it wanted to demonstrate to the individual citizen how 
he should regard his own financial affairs during this crisis, 
what a powerful and effective demonstration it would be to 
announce the scrapping of the Festival. 51 
Nicholson forwarded this memorandum to the lord President on 
51. Cab 124/1268, Leslie to Nicholson, 19 October 1949. 
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21 October 1949 along with his own views on the matter. The 
Festival was, he said, going to require a first-rate public 
relations exercise to convince the growing number of critics that 
its continuance was fully consistent with the cuts which were being 
made in other areas of the economy. Casting himself in the role of 
protector of the Festival, Nicholson outlined the areas where there 
were going to be difficulties and what was being done to overcome 
them. He said that it was hard to judge the full weight or extent 
of support or criticism to the Festival, for so far only the 
Beaverbrook press had spoken out strongly against the Festival, the 
rest of the press had been generally helpful. Despite this, 
however, he warned Morrison that "it would not be difficult for a 
considerable part of the press to swing against going on with it if 
a good lead is not given. " On the political front he told Morrison 
that apparently Lord Ismay had had a full talk with Walter Elliot, 
one of the Conservative , 
Party representatives on the Festival 
Council, and that he had been assured that he and Butler, after 
reconsidering things, would stand by the Festival, so there would be 
no Front Bench criticism from the Opposition. 
52 
Neither man 
could, however, guarantee the discipline of the Backbench 
Opposition. Nicholson felt that if the Government stated quite 
firmly that it was still determined to make a success of the 
Festival whilst paying due attention to the economy, the vast 
majority would accept this decision; but he cautioned that a 
critical minority would be even more active for some time and could 
52. Cab 124/1268, Nicholson to Morrison, 21 October 1949. 
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only be silenced by a public relations effort greater than that so 
far applied. 
53 
As to the problems of cuts, and the manner in which the 
Festival Organisation was dealing with them, Nicholson wrote that he 
had received a letter from Barry which showed quite clearly that the 
Festival Office were still having difficulties in achieving the 5% 
cut. Nicholson felt, however, that these difficulties had to be 
overcome and one of the ways this could be achieved was by cutting 
or abandoning some of the larger projects. The dropping of the Land 
Travelling Exhibition had been considered but thought this would be 
most unfortunate "as it would add to the preponderance of 
expenditure in London", which would in turn give rise to the 
criticism from other parts of the country, that London was getting 
the largest share of what was meant to be a nationwide project. 
54 
The projects which he felt should be abandoned were either the 
Live Architectural Exhibition or the Battersea Park Festival 
Gardens. He described the Festival Gardens as the "greatest public 
relations liability" of the whole Festival enterprise and warned 
Morrison to expect opposition from the residents of Battersea and 
Chelsea, which would be further intensified by the financial 
crisis. In addition to this, the residents could well present the 
Government with heavily backed local petitions or some other form of 
protest against the Gardens which would be very embarrassing for 
them. Nicholson stated that he felt bound to explain to the Lord 




on this point, that the Government could save £100,000 and the 
expected friction over the Gardens by persuading the Festival Office 
to abandon this scheme. He further added that he did not think 
that the Festival Council would reject this idea in the present 
circumstances. Moreover, he said: 
It is probably still not too late to ask the Crystal Palace 
Trustees in concert with the amusement caterers to put on an 
amusement programme which, although no doubt inferior to 
Battersea Park, would get by perfectly well in the 
circumstances. 55 
He ended his comments by telling Morrison that if he agreed with 
this proposition, he should talk to Lord Ismay and Gerald Barry as 
soon as possible. However, in the postscript to his memorandum, he 
told Morrison that he had spoken again to Barry who said that he 
thought that the Festival Council would resign if they were forced 
to accept or implement the cancellation of the Festival Gardens, and 
so it would appear, Nicholson wrote, that all the difficulties over 
Battersea Park would have to be accepted. 
56 
55. Ibid. The residents of Battersea and Chelsea opposed the use 
of Battersea Park for the Pleasure Gardens because they felt 
the proposed gardens would restrict the area of Battersea Park 
available for exercise, and there would be delay in 
reinstatement of the park. The park areas that had been 
requisitioned during the war had still not been reinstated, 
therefore the residents had little confidence that the areas 
of the park used for the Pleasure Gardens would be reinstated 
immediately after the Festival of Britain was over. The 
erection of structures and services for the Pleasure Gardens 
gave grounds for disquiet. Cab 124/1302, Grounds for 
residents of Battersea and Chelsea protest, Proposed 
Amusement Park in Battersea Park 
56. Ibid. 
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On 24 October 1949, Nicholson sent another memorandum to the 
Lord President informing him that Barry considered that the Festival 
Council, normally so cautious and co-operative, would be unanimously 
opposed to a cut in the Festival budget which they believed would, 
in all probability, harm the Festival. If pressed to enforce the 
cut, Barry informed Nicholson that they might well call an emergency 
council meeting, where this whole subject would be discussed and 
would probably lead to the Council coming out openly against the 
Government's line and statement on cuts. 
57 On hearing this, the 
Lord President displayed his total commitment to the Festival by 
telling Nicholson that the most important thing as far as he was 
concerned was to stop the Festival Office panicking. "We've got to 
make our contribution" he said 'even if it hurts or the Festival 
will be hurt much more". 
58 Despite Morrison's commitment to the 
Festival, however, neither he nor Nicholson, who had predicted a 
high level of criticism to the Festival, could prevent the members 
of the House speaking out critically against the Festival on 25 and 
26 October 1949. Mr Bossom (Conservative MP for Maidstone) asked 
the Lord President to state precisely the total cost of the Festival 
projects, both temporary and permanent which had been sanctioned by 
his Department. Morrison replied that the Government proposed to 
cut the total budget by ßl million and that he would make a 
statement to the house as soon as the budget had been revised. Not 
57. Cab 124/1268, Memo by Nicholson to Morrison, 24 October 1949 
58. Ibid. Memo by Morrison to Nicholson, 24 October 1949. 
Morrison's comments were written on Nicholson's memo to him of 
the same date. 
193 
satisfied, Bossom questioned the Lord President further: 
Is it not a fact that the total cost of this development is 
something in the neighbourhood of £10 million and would it not 
be far better at a time like this, as the Prime Minister said 
yesterday, to spend part of the money on schools and hospitals 
which are badly needed, rather than on concert halls of which 
we already have a lot? 
Morrison answered that everything was being taken into account and 
these matters would probably come up in the debate on the Festival. 
Sir Waldron Smithers (Conservative MP for Orpington) asked Morrison: 
What is the latest estimate of the cost of the 1951 Festival 
of Britain on the South Bank of the Thames; and in view of 
the economic and financial crisis, if it is still proposed to 
hold it. 
Morrison replied by telling him to refer to the answer he had given 
Mr Bossom. Sir Waldron pressed him further stating: 
How can the Right Honourable Gentleman expect continued help 
from America if, when good dollars are sent to relieve us from 
the result of four and a half years of Socialist Government, 
they are squandered in this way. 59 
59. Parliaments Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series 468 
(1948-49), 1155. The subject of cuts to the Festival Budget 
is at best confusing. All Departments were asked after the 
Prime Minister's directive of October 1949 to make a five per 
cent cut to their budget. However, in the aforementioned 
statement we have Morrison talking about a cut of £1 million 
.... nor is this the first time this figure is mentioned. In 
his memo to the Lord President of 24 October 1949, Nicholson 
states that Barry had asked him to inform the Ministry of 
Transport (whose figure for ancillary and transport work for 
the Festival was £1.25 million) to tell them that the Festival 
budget was being cut by £1 million and that it was therefore 
essential that they reduce their claim by at least £100,000. 
In his reply to Nicholson, Morrison said "on the bench today 
(24 October 1949) I drew the Chancellor of the Exchequer to 
the position of £1 million and he agreed that we could so 
shape it that the latest cut need not be a million so long as 
he gets an identifiable cut of £1 million". Ultimately the 
Festival's budget was only cut five per cent, not £1 million. 
Cab 124/1268, Morrison to Nicholson, 24 October 1949. 
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This question, the Lord President said, was highly mischievous. Be 
assured the House that dollars were not being spent on the 
Festival. Smithers continued unconvinced, asking Morrison if he was 
aware that the Government could not have arranged the Festival 
without dollars; 
60 
Justifying the Festival was becoming an increasingly difficult 
task for the Government and for the Lord President as the Minister 
in charge, because, as Nicholson had written in a memorandum in 
September 1949 reviewing the status of the Festival: 
If the Festival goes on it may be difficult to get the public 
to treat realistically the Government's proposals for economy 
in other fields, some of which may involve real hardship or 
the suspension of projects that would normally be considered 
as essential. 61 
60. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series 468 (1948-49), 
1323. 
Contrary to Morrison's statement, dollars were spent on the 
Festival. The Festival Gardens company made an application to 
the Treasury, which surprisingly was granted, for up to 
£30,000 worth of dollars ($84,000) to enable new funfair 
features to be purchased from America. 
61. Cab 124/1267, Memo by Nicholson to Offficial Committee, 21 
September 1949. 
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CONSIDERATION BY THE GOVERNMENT AND THE 
FESTIVAL ORGANISATION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO PROCEED 
WITH THE FESTIVAL 
At the same time as the Festival Organisation was trying to 
implement the five per cent cut, discussions about the possibility 
of cancelling the Festival began in September 1949 within the 
Government circle. This subject was also considered by the Festival 
Organisation. In a memorandum on the status of the Festival, dated 
21 September 1949 and circulated at a meeting of the Official 
Committee on the following day, Nicholson outlined both the positive 
and negative arguments for continuing or cancelling the Festival. 
After reviewing the state of plans arranged for the Festival, he 
proceeded to expand on the possible courses of action open to the 
Government. He wrote that they had four options open to them, they 
could: go ahead with the Festival as planned; or expenditure on it 
could be cut by five per cent; the exhibition could be cancelled, 
retaining only the Festival of Arts as arranged by the Arts 
Council; or the entire Festival programme could be cancelled. He 
then stated that, for the sake of convenience, it would be easier to 
deal with the first and last points and set out the arguments for 
and against holding a sizeable Festival at all. 
62 
The Festival would, he argued, be a moral tonic which was 
desperately needed in the stressful times then facing the country, 
furthermore, it would give Britain and the world at large a more 
62. Cab 124/1267, Memorandum by Nicholson to the Official 
Committee, 1 September 1949. 
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vivid appreciation of British achievements in the fields of science, 
art and industry. He continued that the Festival had been planned 
as a great national event with many independent bodies representing 
all sections of the community offering their services, thus 
producing a co-operative effort the scale of which had never been 
seen in peacetime. Their Majesties, the King and Queen, had, he 
said, sent a highly publicised message to the Lord Mayor of London 
warmly welcoming the plans for the Festival "as an expression of 
pride in our past and confidence in the future"; and had spoken of 
the Festival as an event "which may be outstanding in our lives". 
In addition to this, the support of all parties in Parliament had 
been gained and a distinguished body of men and women, prominent in 
many walks of public life, had been serving on he Festival of 
Britain Council since 31 May 1948, when Princess Elizabeth addressed 
their first meeting. After all the planning and the involvement of 
various parties, from the King and Queen downwards, it would be 
disastrous, Nicholson said, to even contemplate cancelling the 
Festival: it would be "a confession of failure to ourselves and to 
the world and coming at the present moment it would seem to be done 
at American dictation". In his arguments for holding the Festival, 
he further added that to date, about ß500,000 had already been spent 
by the Festival Office: that sum and the expenditure of the 
associate bodies would for the most part be wasted. The Festival 
would, he said, in all probability draw tourists to Britain, 
especially from North America, and so help the balance of payments. 
He concluded his case for the Festival by saying that the object of 
the Festival included giving an impetus to the arts and sciences, 
thereby improving taste and understanding in those areas. Those 
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were, he felt, still desirable objectives and their influence on 
industrial design and technology would ultimately have an economic 
value. 
63 
In discussing the case against holding the Festival, Nicholson 
argued that as the country was forced to face the prospect of a 
reduced standard of living, it could be said by some that under 
those circumstances the Government should not be seen by either the 
public at home or by the people of the United States, from whose 
pockets aid was arriving in Britain, to be embarking on expensive 
festivities. Moreover, if the Government chose to go ahead with the 
Festival, it could become a focal point for criticism from all the 
people who felt they were suffering as a direct result of the 
country's straitened economic and financial circumstances. 
Cancellation would be a way of saving the nation £9 million of 
public money without any adverse public reaction and in addition to 
this, the cancellation would probably appear to most of the western 
world as striking evidence of Britain's determination to become 
solvent. In terms of the expected tourist trade in 1951, he argued 
that the French and some others might still be hindered from coming 
to Britain by their own currency difficulties. Lastly, he expanded 
on another area likely to be highly criticised: the buildings to be 
erected at the cost of some £2 million on the South Bank, were to be 
demolished and their foundations destroyed after only five months of 
use. Criticism would be levelled at the fact that the work and 
materials diverted for the buildings could have been used for the 
construction of houses, schools and hospitals. The critics might 
63. Ibid. 
198 
furthermore complain that if these structures were to be built at 
all they should have been built at Crystal Palace or some other site 
where they could have been used for a longer period. 
64 
If the decision was taken by the Government not to cancel the 
Festival then they would have to decide, Nicholson said, whether it 
should be retained at its present level or scaled down, and the only 
way to reduce the exhibition was by cutting out some of the major 
items such as whole pavilions on the South Bank site, or the 
Architectural Exhibition or one or two of the Travelling 
Exhibitions. This would, he said, "diminish the bad psychological 
effect of leaving so 'inessential' a project unscathed". But he 
warned that "the cash saving would be small and the result would be 
unbalance". 
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However, before the Government could make any 
decision on the Festival's future, they had to consult members of 
the Festival Organisation directly, some of whom although present 
at the official Committee meeting where this matter was discussed, 
had as yet not been asked, or indeed given, their collective views 
on the subject. 
After the meeting of the Official Committee on 22 September 
1949, where the members read and discussed Nicholson's memorandum on 
the future of the Festival, Barry wrote to Nicholson on 23 September 
1949 to state that he had decided to "obtain the views of the 
Chairman of the Festival Council and the Arts Council on the 
proposition that the Festival of Britain should go forward in 1951 




Council". He was still in the process, he said, of trying to find 
out the Arts Council's views but he had been able to ascertain Lord 
Ismay's thoughts on the matter. Lord Ismay had authorised him to 
tell Nicholson that in his view: 
the cancellation of the Main Exhibition, let alone the 
cancellation of other supporting activities, would completely 
alter the whole original conception and render it 
meaningless. If, therefore, this was the Government's 
decision, there would be no case for continuing the high 
powered Festival Council as at present constituted and he 
himself would certainly not be prepared to continue as 
Chairman. Nor, indeed, as he sees it, would there be any 
case for maintaining the Festival Office as now constituted, 
since the Arts Council, possibly with some slight 
reinforcement, should be able to undertake the direction of 
the new programme. 66 
It was clear from Barry's letter that both he and Ismay felt that 
the entire raison d'e"tre of the Festival was being stripped away by 
Government indecision, they and, their Organisation would play no 
part in the Government's modified version of the Festival. 
The Festival Office was so concerned with the Government's 
proposals that Ismay felt it his duty to call a meeting of his 
Council-to solicit their views on the matter, thereby enabling him, 
at a future date, if necessary, to inform the Government that the 
Council fully supported his views. Ismay opened the meeting of the 
Festival Council on 11 October 1949 by telling the members that he 
believed strongly that it would be a mistake, amounting to 
confession of defeat, to abandon the Festival merely because the 
economic sky was dark, on the contrary, he said that this was the 
very reason for keeping the intitiative and going boldly ahead. He 
was careful to stress however, that it was not his view or even the 
66. Cab 124/1267, Barry to Nicholson, 23 September 1949. 
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united view of the Council that would solve the problem; the 
answer, he said, would depend on the wishes of the country as a 
whole. If there were to be found a substantial body of "informed" 
opinion who thought that the Festival ought to be abandoned, then, 
he said, it would be a grave mistake to attempt to continue with 
it. For in his estimation there would no longer be "that unity 
which was at once the inspiration, the strength and, indeed, one of 
the main purposes of the project". He felt bound to state frankly 
that if the conditions he outlined arose, he would find it necessary 
to inform the lord President that he could no longer continue as 
Chairman of the Festival Council. Furthermore, the possibility of 
compromise also required serious thought as appreciable economies 
had already been made in the Festival's estimates, any further cuts 
would risk spoiling the entire venture and again he had no doubt 
that in these circumstances the Festival should be cancelled. 
Lastly, he said, the present uncertainty imposed an unfair strain on 
all those connected with the preparation for the project. He 
continued in rather military tones that "if the trumpet sounds with 
an uncertain voice, who will arm himself for the battle? " If the 
Festival was to continue there must be, he said, a public 
reaffirmation to this effect from the Government, preferably at a 
very early date. 
67 
After his opening remarks every member of the Council who was 
present was given the opportunity to state his views. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the majority of the members were in favour of 
continuing with the Festival. Mr Johnston, Chairman of the Scottish 
67. Cab 124/1268, Festival Council Minutes, 11 October 1949. 
201 
Committee, stressed in his remarks that the Festival must be 
perceived as a strictly non-party event and active steps had to be 
taken to secure the Opposition's complete agreement. If the 
Festival was to be abandoned, he was of the opinion that it should 
be done at once. If this course of action were to be undertaken it 
would, he felt, be regarded as "a confession of defeatism". He 
further remarked upon "the unprecedented success of the 1949 
Edinburgh Festival and the Scottish Industries Exhibition recently 
held in Glasgow and deplored the contrast between the spirit of 
enterprise in the North and that of hesitancy in the South. " Sir 
Henry French, soon to become Chairman of the newly formed Festival 
Gardens Company, spoke next. Like Johnston and Ismay, he stated 
that he had no reservations about the necessity and desirability of 
going forward with the Festival, but felt that if a halt were to be 
called, it should be done immediately. Such an action would, 
however, he said, "be regarded as perhaps one of the greatest 
indications of defeatism in this country. " He further expressed the 
fear that ultimately the matter would be taken out of their hands by 
the coming general election and a new Government might decide. to 
abandon the Festival as a demonstration of its determination to cut 
down on all unnecessary expenditure. He therefore asked the 
Chairman to enquire through the Government from highly placed 
Opposition members what their views would be towards the Festival 
and its future bearing on the general election. Sir Wyn Wheldon, 
chairman of the Welsh Committee, echoed the views previously 
expressed, that if there was controversy on a political level, the 
Festival had not chance of succeeding. Sir Ernest Pooley, chairman 
of the Arts Council, distinguished himself by being the first of the 
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members so far to say that he would not go as far as the previous 
speakers in thinking that abandonment of the Festival would be 
tantamount to defeatism. It was not, he said, a question of 
defeatism, but of what was the most sensible thing to do. He 
stressed that if the Festival was to go ahead, it was essential that 
it should be conducted on a non-party basis. More importantly, a 
suitable amount of money would have to be made available for the 
project for, in his opinion, any more whittling away of funds would 
be a grave mistake and one that the Arts Council would definitely 
not agree to. Sir Ernest concluded his statement by remarking that 
it was his personal impression that for the average person, there 
was no real enthusiasm for the Festival. In spite of this he was 
in favour of proceeding with the Festival provided three conditions 
were met: of utmost importance in his priority he wanted a clear 
demonstration and, indeed, reaffirmation of all party support for 
the Festival; also no further cuts in expenditure were to be made, 
and finally he wanted a guarantee of wide public support for the 
Festival. 
68 
The speakers after Sir Ernest seemed to echo his view that 
abandonment of the Festival need not necessarily be defeatist. Sir 
Frederick Bain, for example, felt that it could in fact be seen as 
the first step on the road towards national recovery. The Council 
showed unanimity, on a vital issue they were willing to see the 
Festival go ahead provided that there were no further cuts made to 
its budget. As T. S. Eliot pointed out, the worst thing that could 
68. mid. 
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happen would be for the Festival to continue with constantly 
diminishing and/or uncertain resources. In summing up the points 
made during this meeting, Ismay quite correctly said that the 
majority of the members present clearly regarded it as right to 
proceed with the Festival, although some members felt less strongly 
about this than others and about the way any decision would be 
interpreted both at home and abroad. All the members were, he said, 
in agreement that the estimated cost of the project was realistic 
and no further cuts could possibly be made in its expenditure and, 
in addition to this, all members agreed both that unity was 
essential and that the Festival had to be free from any hint of 
political partisanship. To secure these ends, the Council agreed 
to seek reaffirmation and further assurances from the Government 
that the plans for the Festival would proceed without being 
subjected to uncertainty or change of policy, and with the full 
support of all parties in Parliament. Further, they asked 
Nicholson to report their views to the lord President. 
69 
The Lord President had in fact been notified by Nicholson in 
an aide-memoire, as early as 4 October 1949, of the very points made 
by the Council members on 11 October 1949. Nicholson stated that 
both he and Barry wanted the Lord President to persuade the 
Government to make, at the first suitable opportunity, a public 
reaffirmation declaring their intention to proceed with the 
Festival. Nicholson went on to say that both he and Barry felt 
strongly that: 
it would be a terrible confession of defeat if, at this 
69. Ibid. 
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juncture, the Festival were to be abandoned, or even 
substantially curtailed. We also feel that it would be wrong 
not only from the psychological but also economic point of 
view. At the same time. it is evident that the Festival would 
lose its meaning and its purpose if this opinion were not 
shareäand publicly endorsed by informed opinion, including all 
political parties. 
As far as further cuts were concerned Nicholson said: 
it may well be that some people, including the opposition, 
will propose a compromise, i. e. that the Festival should go 
forward on a less ambitious scale. As to this, we would point 
out that the estimates of expenditure were reduced from £13.25 
million to E12 million at the request of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer a few weeks ago, and that the Director-General is 
now completing definite proposals for a further percentage cut 
in accordance with the recent directive to all Government 
Departments - and this is at the moment when the prices of 
certain raw materials required for the Exhibition have already 
risen. We both feel strongly that any further request for 
reduction at this eleventh hour would be impossible to meet 
without undermining the whole conception and success" of the 
project, as well as causing delays which might ultimately 
result in greater expenditure than the sums so saved and 
jeopardising the entire timetable. 70 
In the midst of the discussions about the possible abandonment of 
the Festival, Barry sent a letter to Nicholson on 20 October 1949 
outlining the progress that had so far been made towards achieving 
the five per cent cut (i. e. £600,000). Barry reminded Nicholson 
that this cut could only be made provided the Arts Council and the 
COID accepted a cut of five per cent to their Festival budgets, and 
if the sum allocated to the Ministry of Transport for traffic and 
ancillary works was reduced to a maximum of £570,000 (the figure 
that the Ministry of Transport was working with was £670,000). He 
went on to say that since writing that letter, the attempts to get 
the Ministry of Transport to reduce their budget to he 
above-mentioned figure had failed and, unless some adjustment could 
70. Cab 124/1267, Aide memoire by Nicholson to the Lord President, 
4 October 1949. 
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be made to this figure, another item on the Festival would have to 
be sacrificed. To achieve the desired cut meant, he explained, 
scaling down expenditure on numerous important projects and in some 
cases abandoning them altogether. The items that would have to be 
abandoned were, Barry said, the River displays, the Live 
Architecture Exhibition in East Kilbride, Scotland, the Exhibition 
of Building Science and Research with the Live Architectural 
Exhibition in Poplar; and another major project still to be decided 
involving the economy of £250,000.71 By 24 October 1949, Barry 
was able to send Nicholson further revised and definite estimates 
about how the Festival's budget could be cut in the form of three 
sets of revised estimates: the first he described as a definitive 
re-estimate of the budget showing how a five per cent reduction on 
the ceiling of £12 million to £11.4 million could be achieved; both 
the second and third estimates, showing cuts of £800,000 and of £1 
million respectively, could only be deemed as illustrative. This, 
he explained, was because while Lord Ismay was prepared to accept 
the first estimate, albeit very reluctantly, he was definitely not 
prepared 'to move an inch' further without the express approval of 
the full Council, which, as has already been seen, would not 
necessarily have been forthcoming. The cut of £600,000 could be 
achieved, Barry said, by reducing the cost of the South Bank site by 
£122,000. This would be done by getting the LCC to reduce their 
financial claims on the site and by reducing the sum of £22,000 
which was set aside for a proposed Press Club. The Heavy 
Engineering Exhibition at the Kelvin Hall, Glasgow, would be reduced 
71. Cab 124/1268, Barry to Nicholson, 20 October 1949. 
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by £2,000; the Live Architectural Exhibition in Poplar would be 
reduced by £30,000, by excluding the Exhibition of Building Science 
and Research. The special projects in Scotland and Wales were to 
be reduced by £65,000, by dropping the proposed Live Architectural 
exhibition in East Kilbride, and by eliminating a reserve fund of 
£25,000 which had been set aside for additional projects in Scotland 
and Wales. A saving of £30,000 would be made by dropping the River 
Display Scheme and a further £175,000 would be saved by scaling down 
the ambitious plans for street decorations and fireworks 
displays. 
72 
The publicity of the Festival was to be cut by 
£110,000; the documentary films for the Festival were to be cut out 
completely, thereby saving £100,000; and the cost of the Information 
Centre was to be reduced by £10,000. The Arts Council and the COID 
had accepted five per cent cuts to their budgets, thereby losing 
£20,000 and £15,000 respectively. All these economies, Barry 
stated, produced a total saving of £679,000. That this figure was 
still over by £79,000 was due to the fact that the Ministry of 
Transport had not yet found a way to- reduce their claims from 
£670,000 to £570,000, and the sum of £9,000 had been added to the 
contingency fund. 
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The illustrative second and third estimates showed a reduction 
of £800,000 to £11.2 million, and of El million to £11.05 million. 
As far as the Festival Organisation was concerned, however, the only 
estimate they were prepared to consider was the first one. It 
represented, Barry said, the limit of further economy that can be 
72. Cab 124/1268, Barry to Nicholson, 24 October 1949. 
73. Ibid. 
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effected without transgressing the expressed wish of the Festival 
Council and the understood intention of ministers. 
74 
On 28 October 1949, Nicholson sent both Barry's letter and a 
memorandum to the Lord President, pointing out that the estimates 
from the Festival Office seemed to him to fulfill the conditions 
laid down by the Cabinet when discussing the subject of cuts, and 
"that the economies should not be such as would seriously impair the 
Festival and subject economies should not be less than £600,000 and 
if possible £1 million". 
With this advice from Nicholson, Morrison decided to put the 
revised estimates before the Cabinet and press for their 
acceptance. In a memorandum for the meeting, he wrote that when the 
Economic Policy Committee,. and later the Cabinet, discussed the 
treatment of the Festival in relation to the economic cuts, it was 
generally agreed that they "ought not to spoil the ship for a 
ha'p'orth tar". He went on to outline his efforts to secure the cut 
of £1 million, stating that he had, with great difficulty, obtained 
economies of. E700,000- (the actual saving the Festival Organisation 
made because they were £300,000 over the £12 million ceiling in July 
1949), and was pressing the Festival Organisation strongly for the 
full £1 million. He went on to explain that in order to make any 
greater saving, a large item would have to be dropped from the 
exhibition programme and that the choice of this item would be a 
matter, not for the Government, but for the Festival Council and 
Executive. If this course was followed and the Land Travelling 
74. Ibid. 
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Exhibition was abandoned, as the Chancellor had suggested, the 
effect would be to eliminate the cities of Birmingham, Manchester, 
Leeds and Nottingham from any experience or participation in the 
Festival activities. This would, he said: 
"almost certainly be regarded as a repudiation of the 
Government's assurances that the rest of the country, not only 
London, would be given a real share in the Festival events. 
The storm of criticism which would arise in the Midlands would 
be very difficult to answer and would severely prejudice the 
atmosphere of goodwill, without which the Festival could not 
succeed. - 
Furthermore, there was a real risk that the whole Festival Council 
or several of its key members would resign if they were pressured to 
agree to a course of action which they perceived to be inconsistent 
with the Government's earlier assurances. The Government could 
not, he added, prevent these resignations and if they did occur, 
they would undoubtedly have repercussions on the Festival staff and 
indeed on public opinion - the Festival would be doomed to 
failure. 
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If the idea of cutting out an item was abandoned, the Lord 
President told his colleagues that he had heard from Ismay that he 
had managed to obtain "the most categorical assurance" from R. A. 
Butler guaranteeing the Opposition's support and that he was willing 
to reaffirm this support publicly in the House, provided the 
Government made a statement to the House confirming substantial cuts 
in expenditure. On the strength of the commitment from the 
Opposition and knowing the impossibility of pursuing the idea of 
scaling down the Festival, Morrison stated that whilst he was "most 
reluctant to forego the last £300,000 of savings the gross cost 
75. Cab 124/1268, Memorandum by the Lord President to the Cabinet, 
November 1949. 
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originally envisaged, " the risks involved in pushing the matter any 
further would far outweight any possible benefits. Accepting this 
decision need not, he said, affect the main objective of reducing 
the net cost of the Festival to the Exchequer. The net cost target 
of £9 million could be attained, he explained, by making an 
additional revenue of at least £300,000. This sum could be 
attained by charging the firms whose exhibits were chosen by the 
COID for display during the Festival. Of course, this idea went 
against the concepts of the COLD and the Executive who both believed 
that the exhibits would be chosen solely on merit, thereby inducing 
industry to work harder to reach the COID's high standards. 
Morrison felt, however, that whatever objections they might have, 
this new scheme ought to be examined in the interests of economy in 
public. expenditure. This charge would have to be imposed unless 
they could find an alternative way of raising the much needed 
revenue and thereby make a full £1 million contribution. 
76 
76. Ibid. The COID's attitude towards the charge on 
industrialists was clearly demonstrated at a meeting on 20 
December 1949 held in the rooms of Bernard Sendall, the 
Controller of the Festival Office. Present were: Gordon 
Russell, Director of the COID; Mark Hartland Thomas of COLD; 
Jane Lidderdale of the Official Committee; and a Board of 
Trade representative. Both Russell and Thomas, supported by 
the Board of Trade, objected in principle, to the suggestion, 
on the grounds that it would inevitably prejudice the 
selection of exhibits. The Board of Trade representative felt 
that the suggestion was open to grave objections from an 
administrative principle. The COID were further supported by 
Campbell (Finance and Establishments officer) of the Festival 
Office who felt that it was unwise to potentially alienate 
industry by charging a flat fee. The basic fear of the COLD 
and Campbell was that if a fee was levied that industry might 
refuse to co-operate with the COID and therefore the Festival. 
Cab 124/1268, Memo by Lidderdale to Nicholson, 20 December 
1949. 
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With the estimates arranged as best they could, the Lord 
President wrote to the Chancellor stating that as he was now in 
possession of a report from the Festival Office concerning the cuts, 
he could with all certainty say that "a ceiling of £11.3 million 
gross, and approximately £9 million net, is the lowest that can be 
imposed consistently with the Cabinet's view that the economies 
should not be such as would seriously impair the Festival. " 
As if trying to placate the Chancellor's possible irritation 
at this problem, Morrison assured him: 
I shall, of course, continue to maintain the strongest 
pressure for economy on the Festival Office and, subject to 
your views, I would like to tell them to re-examine the 
question whether some offsetting revenue might not be obtained 
in the form of a rent charge from the Manufacturers whose 
products are exhibited, without in any way limiting the 
independence and freedom of the selectors to choose and reject 
entirely on merits. 
He concluded his letter by forewarning the Chancellor that the 
Festival project was experiencing rising costs due to the 
devaluation and was likely to be hard hit in the architectural 
sphere where architects were using substitute building materials 
such as aluminium. Morrison promised to do his utmost to keep the 
Festival strictly within its budget, providing that the rise in 
prices following the devaluation did not become excessive. In 
return, Morrison wanted the Chancellor to give him permission to 
authorise the Festival Organisation to continue their work within 
the fixed ceiling figure of £11.3 million gross while still 
maintaining pressure on them to increase the revenue in the manner 
211 
he had proposed. 
77 
The Chancellor did not have a great deal of choice in this 
matter as the Cabinet had already decided that the Festival was to 
go on, therefore he sanctioned the reduced expenditure. Having 
received permission for the Festival to proceed at this agreed cost, 
Morrison now turned his attention to preparing a statement on the 
whole matter to be presented to the House of Commons. On 15 
November 1949, the day before the presentation, Nicholson sent a 
note to Morrison to brief him on the financial aspect of the 
statement: 
You will notice that at the Treasury's request we have 
inserted that the estimated net expenditure was £10 million 
immediately before the cuts and is now £9 million. This way 
of putting it matches the Prime Minister's statement on the £1 
million saving and comprehends both the £700,000 reduction in 
expenditure and the £300,000 increase in revenue. 78 
Clearly none of the parties concerned was above manipulating the 
figures in order to present a more acceptable picture to the House. 
the fact remains that Festival expenditure had been roughly 
estimated at £14 million, reduced to concrete £12 million, and from 
this sum to £11.3 million, £300,000 short of the £1 million 
requested by the Chancellor and the Prime Minister. On 16 November 
77. Cab 124/1268, Morrison to Cripps, November 1949. (No date 
is given on this letter). The figure of £11.3 million was 
achieved, as the Festival Council was informed on 15 November 
1949, by getting the Ministry of Transport to provisionally 
lower their costs to £585,000 and by reducing the salaries and 
overheads of the Festival Office by £15,000. Work 25/44 
Festival Council Minutes, 15 November 1949. 
78. Cab 124/1268, Nicholson to Morrison, 15 November 1949. 
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1949 Morrison made the following statement to the House: 
As I told the House in the debate on 27 October, the projects 
originally proposed by the Council of the Festival of Britain 
1951, would have involved a gross cost to the Exchequer of £14 
million. I had already given instructions for a substantial 
reduction in this total which was well in train when it was 
overtaken by the general programme of economies in public 
expenditure announced to the House by my Right Honourable 
friend the Prime Minister on 24 October. The final outcome is 
that the limit of gross expenditure from the Exchequer on the 
Festival account has been set at £11.3 million. Possibilities 
of increasing the receipts to the Exchequer from the Festival 
have also been reviewed, and it is estimated that revenue will 
be forthcoming to bring the net expenditure, without taking 
account of receipts for the disposal of assets, down to £9 
million. This compares with an estimated total net 
expenditure of £10 million immediately before the cuts. The 
expenditure will be spread over the current financial year and 
the two following ones. These cuts have involved some 
curtailment of the programme which had been envisaged. The 
various exhibition projects will, however, go forward broadly 
as planned and there will be no reduction in the industrial 
content of the South Bank and Glasgow exhibition. I am 
satisfied that with enterprise, ingenuity and care the 
Festival organisation will be able to put on a first-rate 
effort for the money available. 79 
Morrison concluded his statement by giving further details of the 
way in which the expenditure on the Festival was to be divided, and 
the cost of some of the individual projects. It was a bravura 
performance, designed to make the uninformed believe that they now 
understood fully the complexities of the expenditure on the Festival 
- it lulled rather than stimulated further arguments or questions. 
The Government and the Festival Organisation had managed, through a 
series of deft manipulations of the figures, to get the public 
picture of expenditure to look quite simple and clear cut when in 
reality, however, this was far from being the case. In the course 
of all this, two episodes occurred which threatened to ruin all the 
79. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, 469 (1948-1949), 
2026-7 
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agreements and arrangements that had so far been reached: since 
June 1949 the LCC, who had been playing the role of generous 
benefactors, now started talking vociferously about monies never 
previously mentioned, which were owed to them by the Festival Office 
as a result of clearing and preparing the site. In addition to this 
problem, by December 1950, it was becoming clear that the managers 
of the Company set up to run the Festival Gardens at Battersea Park 
appeared to be quite unaware that they were sinking deeper into a 
quagmire of financial mismanagement and possible fraud. 
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THE LCC'S FINANCIAL CLAIMS 
The first hint of the problems that the Festival Organisation 
would have with the LCC came when an alarmed Barry wrote to 
Nicholson on 1 June 1949, stating that he thought the Lord President 
ought to be aware of the large claims being put forward by the LCC 
for the South Bank site and the concert hall. They were, according 
to Barry, claiming £200,000 for accelerating work on the main 
concert hall and £50,000 for the premature withdrawal of contractors 
from the concert hall area during the exhibition: this claim was, 
Barry continued, initially presented to G. Campbell, the Director of 
Finance and Establishments at the Festival Office, by Holland, one 
of the LCC's Finance Officers. In his financial capacity, Campbell 
questioned this claim on the grounds that the LCC was understood to 
be anxious to have the concert hall completed in time for the 
Exhibition and that it was an unfair charge on the Government. 
Barry said that the LCC had apparently then withdrawn this claim but 
had since revived it. He went on to explain that Henry Brooke, 
leader of the Opposition at the LCC, had objected most strongly to 
the waiving of the claim and Hayward, the Labour leader of the LCC 
was unwilling to contest the Opposition view. The LCC's Finance 
Division was thus instructed by the Council to press the claim. 
80 
As if this was not bad enough, the rental and occupation of 
the South Bank site by the Festival Organisation was being called 
into question. As Barry explained it, the LCC had let two parts of 
the site to the Ministry of Works at a peppercorn rent (how much he 
80. Cab 124/1270, Barry to Nicholson, 1 June 1949. 
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did not specify), for a period of four years on one part, from 24 
June 1949-1952, and on the other for two and a half years from 
1950-early 1952. Barry said that the LCC was unwilling to extend 
the peppercorn rental period to cover the duration of the Festival 
Office's occupation of the site. According to Barry, the Ministry 
of Works claimed that as they were being denied use of the site from 
May 1950 because of the Festival Office's occupation, the Festival 
Office should meet the cost of the two years rent and, as the 
economic rent of the two parts of the site was assessed at £106,000 
per annum, this totalled £212,000. Barry explained that, if the LCC 
did not agree to extend the peppercorn rent for the duration of the 
Festival's occupation, the Government would have to spend an 
additional £212,000. Barry went on to say that: 
When the use of the site was originally discussed with the 
LCC, I recollect that the LCC stated that they would expect 
compensation for loss of rent, but no indication was given 
then or subsequently that a substantial figure like that now 
claimed would be involved. Nothing so far as I know, was 
specifically said about the rent of the two parts of the site. 
Furthermore he said the LCC's attitude on this matter was that: 
having given two parts of the site to one Government 
Department at a peppercorn rent which covers the Festival 
period, it is a matter for the Festival Office to clear the 
incidence of payment with the Department and the LCC is not 
concerned so long as they do not forego rent at the end of the 
peppercorn period. 
Barry concluded his letter by stating that the total amount demanded 
by the LCC was about £500 and that as far as the rental of the site 
was concerned, the line being taken by the Festival Office was that 
the LCC, by refusing to extend the peppercorn rent period, was in 
fact charging the Festival Office for use of part of the site which 
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was contrary to what they understood the position would be. 
81 
The first difficulty to clear up was the misunderstanding 
between the Ministry of Works and the Festival Office over the 
rental of the South Bank site. On 30 June 1949, in response to a 
letter from J. Lidderdale, Secretary of the Official Committee, Mr 
Burton of the Ministry of Works outlined the Ministry's attitude to 
the whole problem. The Ministry questioned the statement in Miss 
Lidderdale's letter which said the "the development of the South 
Bank site would not yet be in sight if it had not been for the 
Festival". Burton said that the Ministry felt that this was 
definitely not true and moreover it would, they thought, be most 
unwise for the Lord President to use this argument because the LCC: 
In their early negotiations with us concerning the site for 
Government offices on the South Bank stipulated that we should 
give fair wind to their proposals for constructing the 
embankment, that we should make an early start with our own 
building. We did, in fact, tell them nearly three years ago 
that we should not raise any difficulties about the 
construction of the embankment, and last summer we signed a 
document setting out Heads of Agreement for our building lease 
which embodied the same understanding. All this took place 
before it was decided last October to use the site on the 
South Bank for Festival purposes. The LCC might well argue 
that the preliminary development of the South Bank will, in 
some respects be retarded by the exhibition. 
In respect of the site rental he made it clear that the Ministry of 
Works would find it necessary to recover the full rent of the site 




82. Cab 124/1270, Burton to Lidderdale, 30 June 1949. 
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From the Ministry of Work's attitude, it was clear that there 
would be no compromise. Direct negotiations would have to take 
place with the LCC, and due to his past association with the LCC, 
the Lord President with the help of his Office, was in the best 
position to succeed. On 14 July 1949, Lidderdale sent Morrison a 
memorandum which he was to use at his discussions with the LCC "on 
the contribution which they should make to the Festival of 
Britain". From the wording of this sentence it was obvious that 
the LCC's erratic behaviour was not going to be tolerated for much 
longer. It seemed that they would now be made to understand that 
they were morally bound to make a contribution to the nation's 
celebration. Lidderdale began her memorandum by reminding the Lord 
President that unless the LCC were made to drop their claims, the 
Festival's budget would be distorted and a major item would probably 
have to be discarded. As it had now become essential to bring the 
LCC into line, she therefore suggested that the lord President might 
be wise to use some of the following arguments. Firstly, she 
stated that out of the £13.75 million to be spent by the Government 
on the Festival (this figure included the cost of traffic works and 
the Pleasure Gardens), some £10 million was being spent in London, 
at a time when the maintenance of full employment could not, as 
hitherto, be taken for granted. This expenditure and all the 
ancillary activities which it would bring in its train would do much 
to maintain London's economy in the next two years. She continued 
that, apart from this, London would be getting one of its biggest 
promotional boosts in both paid and unpaid publicity from the 
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Festival; all this would, she said, do much to maintain and even 
increase rateable values. In short, London was getting the lion's 
share of national expenditure and publicity on the Festival and 
would get all the benefits which flowed from this. Secondly, she 
argued that because of this privileged position, London and indeed 
the Government would be under close scrutiny from other part of the 
country which had been told that they must pay for any Festival 
projects they undertook and should not look to Government for direct 
help. She pointed out that the comparisons would inevitably "be 
drawn between London's almost total reliance on national funds and, 
for example, Sheffield which must put up all the money needed for a 
local show, or even Edinburgh, where two-thirds of the cost of its 
Festival activities are to be met by the Corporation and local 
interests". She further stated that "serious pressure must be 
expected from other large cities which have not been recognised as 
official centres in the Festival programme partly because so much is 
being concentrated in London". Finally, she argued that the 
Festival would enable London to achieve a number of substantial and 
permanent improvements such as road, rail and other transport 
facilities, clearing of bomb sites and the like, which would not 
have otherwise materialised for many years. She emphasised that a 
great deal of expenditure on the Festival: 
will, of course be ephemeral but the lasting assets will leave 
London in a consequently strengthened position both generally 
and in important branches of its physical development. The 
most outstanding is, of course, the South Bank concert hall, 
whose development would still not yet be in sight if it had 
not been for the Festival. Then there is the neighbourhood 
unit at Poplar; the important experiment of the Festival 
Gardens in Battersea Park; and other projects such as the new 
wing of the Science Museum and the Queen's Hall which though 
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not LCC responsibility, will bring benefits to them 
indirectly. 83 
Lidderdale proceeded to outline the complete picture of the 
LCC's claims for the Lord President: apart from the claims for the 
acceleration of work on the South Bank and the rent for the site 
which had now risen to £220,000 and for which the Festival Office 
had made no provision, she added that the Festival Office had been 
informed that further claims of £118,000 in respect of the South 
Bank site were likely to arise. These new claims would be, 
Lidderdale explained, for payment of the dispossessed traders, the 
loss incurred on provision of temporary shops and loss of other 
rents. In addition to this, the LCC had included in this claim the 
sum of £7,600 for removing a dump of rubble, even though it would 
have had to be removed in the ordinary course of events. Added to 
these claims, the LCC was asking for approximately £30,000 for the 
cost of acquiring the Poplar site (home of the Live Architecture 
Exhibition) earlier than they would have done; reimbursement for 
withdrawing contractors during the Exhibition; special building 
work to show building processes; payment of overtime and other 
expenses which might be incurred. The total amount of this claim 
depended on what the Festival Office asked the LCC to do, but 
Lidderdale warned that it was not likely to be less than £100,000 
and probably a lot more. She added that, in any case, it was 
only right that any work undertaken by the LCC acting as agents for 
the Festival Office, should be paid for as Festival expenditure out 
of national funds. However, the main anchor of her contention was 
83. Cab 124/1270, Lidderdale to the Lord President, 14 July 1949. 
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the long term beneficial effect which the development of Poplar 
would have on the LCC. She said: 
It is important to the LCC, however, that they should be 
regarded internationally as in the van of housing progress and 
the Poplar Exhibition should do much to raise the standards of 
the LCC development work and give them the position they 
should hold by attracting to the site large numbers of experts 
from all over the world. Further, the inclusion in the 
Exhibition of Building Research should, by encouraging the 
adoption of already known improved methods, produce 
substantial savings in the cost to the LCC in their future 
work, as they are amongst the biggest customers of the 
building industry. 84 
The last area of difficulty with the LCC involved the Festival 
Pleasure Gardens at Battersea. According to Lidderdale, when the 
five year scheme was first discussed, the LCC had talked of 
contributing £200,000 towards the £1 million needed. Now they were 
suggesting that a contribution of only ten per cent (i. e. £80,000) 
of the total sum of £770,000 would be satisfactory. "Why", 
Lidderdale asked "should the national taxpayer be required to 
shoulder the cost of making good the park? "85 
Not satisfied with presenting claims to the Festival Office, 
the LCC were also pressing further claims on the Ministry of 
Transport which Lidderdale said had not yet been fully worked out. 
They were asking for full reimbursement of all expenditure on work 
undertaken for the Festival and, in addition to this, they were 
asking for a grant amounting to £200,000, a sum over and above the 
road fund grant, regarding works undertaken for the Festival which 
would have some value for a limited period after the Festival. Of 
84. Ibid. 
85. Ibid. For the early financial arrangements concerning 
Battersea Park, see pp 132-133. 
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this claim, Lidderdale said: 
It is difficult to know at this stage what the total claim on 
the Ministry would be, particularly as almost all "Festival 
Only" expenditure is on account of car parks and the coach 
park on Clapham Common, and this will be recouped by an 
unknown but large income collected from parking charges. 
Taking this income into account, their total claim on the 
Ministry of Transport in respect of the Festival might amount 
to something like £150,000. 
The LCC should, Lidderdale said, match the example being set, albeit 
with some reluctance, by the City of London who were undertaking the 
scheme for a Garden Exhibition near St Paul's. The City was 
providing the site, laying it out, putting up the exhibition 
structures and cafes, and planning and running the exhibition. The 
LCC should, she said: 
make its own contribution on a comparable scale and the most 
obvious and appropriate way in which they should do this is by 
carrying some of the burden of the great exhibitions to be 
staged in London and of some of the traffic works which they 
entail. 
Although she acknowledged that the LCC were involved in considerable 
expenditure because of the Festival, they should, she said, stop 
considering each claim separately and start considering their 
expenditure as a whole and look to the benefits the Festival would 
bring to London. More significantly, they should start thinking 
about the criticism they would be exposed to if the taxpayers of 
Britain were to learn that they were being asked to compensate the 
LCC for various events which would ultimately bring them the credit 
and benefits. 
86 
Lidderdale's memorandum to the Lord President was followed by 
a stronger one from Max Nicholson, dated 19 July 1949. This 
86. Ibid. 
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memorandum reinforced all of Lidderdale's arguments. Be 
emphatically reminded Morrison that having agreed to the 
Chancellor's ceiling of £12 million there was now no margin for 
compensating the LCC, and if such compensation was insisted upon it 
could only be met by cancelling at least one of the major 
exhibitions. He further advised Morrison to ask the LCC to put up a 
larger share of the cost of the Battersea Pleasure Gardens, if 
possible to the sum of £200,000 which they had originally 
mentioned. They would recoup about £150,000 of this expenditure 
and, ever mindful of the criticism that the Government and the LCC 
would face if these issues were not resolved, he told Morrison that 
it would look much better if Londoners, who were getting "the main 
share of the fun", carried at least a quarter of the total risk. 
87 
On 21 July 1949, Bernard Sendall, the controller at the 
Festival Office, received a letter from Nicholson stating that the 
Lord President and his Parliamentary Private Secretary had been to 
see the Leader of the LCC and the Chairman of the Finance Committee 
on the afternoon of 20 July 1949. The Leader of the LCC was 
accompanied by the Leader of the Opposition, the Clerk, and the 
Controller. The Lord President duly presented all the appropriate 
arguments and concluded by asking the LCC to waive all their claims 
against the Festival Office and to put up the sum of £200,000 for 
the Pleasure Gardens, which they had originally proposed, as well as 
shouldering a proportionate share of the anticipated loss on this 
item. The LCC representatives replied to the Lord President's 
87. Cab 124/1270, Nicholson to the lord President, 19 July 1949. 
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requests by pointing out that London was getting no Government grant 
aid, except for a few special services, and that it was not by their 
request that so large a proportion of the Festival expenditure was 
being concentrated in London. They had, they said, "undertaken many 
obligations to co-operate in this national project on the basis that 
they would look for compensation and now they found that they were 
being asked to face a commitment of £1 million one way or another". 
In spite of their arguments, the LCC had agreed to consider the Lord 
President's requests either on the basis that their claims would be 
recognised and paid by the Festival while they would make a 
substantial grant to the Festival as an offset. In addition to 
this, they agreed to reconsider the amount of money they were 
prepared to put towards the Festival Gardens. 
88 
On 9 August 1949, Nicholson sent a memorandum to the Lord 
President explaining the LCC's position. He said that the LCC had 
based their arguments on the assumption that they would be 
reimbursed for any extra costs incurred in getting the Festival 
ready for 1951 and thus, from this point of view, they preferred to 
maintain their claims and have them met. After their meeting with 
the Lord President on 20 July, however, the LCC realised that the 
Government would only accept this if they agreed to make a 
substantial offsetting contribution to the Festival; but the LCC 
said that they could not do this or even agree to it at that time. 
Nicholson continued by outlining the views of the Clerk of the LCC 
on this matter; Sir Howard Roberts had pointed out that when an 
attempt is made to fix figures were adopted as the basis for a deal 
88. Cab 124/1270, Nicholson to Sendall, 21 July 1949. 
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with the Government and the estimates proved different in reality 
then both parties could, he warned, be acutely embarrassed. He 
argued therefore that a possible solution might lie in the 
Government taking note of the existence of these claims, and while 
bearing in mind the ceiling on Festival expenditure, agreeing that 
the LCC do their utmost to keep excess costs down for all work 
carried out for the Festival. When the Festival projects were 
successfully concluded the LCC could then, Roberts said, present a 
claim to the Government that would take into account only the 
expenditure incurred, but the contribution which the Festival would 
by then have made to the promotion of London's development and 
rateable value. 
89 
Sir Howard's points were not lost on Nicholson who saw that 
the room to manoeuvre was small indeed. He wrote: 
Obviously it would be preferable, if it were possible to get a 
clear cut solution at this time, but quite apart from the LCC 
politics, any settlement based on estimates made before the 
event is likely to be very uncertain, and there are serious 
objections to letting it become widely known that large 
amounts have been provided for overtime and other claims which 
might still be kept below the present estimates by good 
management and an effort on the part of the contractors and 
all concerned. 
He concluded his memorandum by asking Morrison for permission to 
write to Sir Howard to suggest that the effort to reach a final 
settlement could be abandoned if both parties could agree on an 
acceptable exhange of letters. 
which, while taking note that the LCC would eventually be 
putting forward the claims, would preserve the Government and 
the Festival of Britain from having to make a provision to 
meet these claims on a scale which would be inconsistent with 
the maintenance of the £12 million ceiling. 90 
89. Cab 124/1270, Nicholson to the lord President, 9 August 1949. 
90. Ibid. 
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Whatever approach was taken by the Lord President's Office, it 
could not, it seemed, bring the speedy and quiet conclusion that 
Nicholson and Morrison had hoped for. 
on 16 August 1949, Nicholson sent a letter to O'Donovan of the 
Treasury stating that Sir Howard Roberts had informed him that the 
LCC were deadlocked over their response to the Lord President's 
requests to waive their claims or to make an offsetting contribution 
to the Festival. Nicholson explained that the problem was that 
there had been some difficulty reaching an agreed two-party policy 
on the matter within the LCC, because the Opposition on the Council 
had at each stage made their agreement to 1951 expenditure 
conditional on the recovery from the Government any excess cost 
incurred in respect of the projects carried out which were either 
useful only for 1951, more expensive to get ready by 1951, or 
accelerated for 1951. Added to this, he said that: 
the Opposition are committed as an electoral point to claiming 
that the present majority on the LCC is too subservient to the 
Government and does not press the interests of the London 
taxpayer. 
Thus he concluded that the Opposition would, in these circumstances, 
be highly unlikely to agree to a settlement along the lines proposed 
by the Lord President. 
91 Beyond the intractability of the 
opposition, the Government were not at all keen to arrive at a 
settlement based on the LCC's speculative figures. They objected to 
these estimates for a number of reasons, cited as follows - they 
believed that the figures being presented by the LCC were highly 
inflated for work which the LCC claimed to have accelerated for 
91. Cab 123/1270, Nicholson to O'Donovan, 16 August 1949. 
226 
1951: they felt that if a settlement based on these figures was 
achieved, the contractors and Council Officials would lose all 
incentive to keep the costs down. Added to this, the Government 
were afraid that if the figures and agreements were to become 
public, they and the LCC might be placed in an embarrassing 
position, appearing to have made poor decisions in a seemingly 'ad 
hoc' manner, therefore exposing themselves to criticism for having 
entered into commitments without knowing the full facts and 
figures. Reiterating a point often used, they were convinced that 
the Festival in London would, bring a great many advantages. The 
visitors to London from the provinces and abroad would be spending 
large sums of money with businesses which paid rates to the LCC, and 
it was expected that a lot of lasting rateable value would be 
created in the South Bank area. In addition to all this, the 
Government was giving the LCC's concert hall (which Nicholson said 
could have become a white elephant losing money annually) a great 
publicity boost and launching. From the Government point of view as 
expressed by Nicholson, the LCC really had no right to ask for money 
on top of all the favours being thrown in their direction. 
92 
Thus, in light of the inability of both sides to reach a 
compromise and therefore a settlement, Nicholson suggested that it 
would perhaps be better if all negotiations were postponed until 
1951, a course which he said that as far as he understood, the LCC 
would prefer. However, this approach would, he said present its own 
peculiar difficulty, as an adequate sum (agreed to by the Treasury 
92. Ibid. 
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and Festival Office) to cover the LCC's claims had to be included in 
the Festival's budget. If an agreement could be reached between the 
Festival Office and the Treasury, an agreed sum could be inserted 
into the budget under the contingency section. If this option was 
pursued, a letter agreed to by the Treasury could be sent to the LCC 
stating that: 
In view of the deadlock of which the Clerk has informed me, it 
seems unprofitable to pursue the Lord President's proposals 
for reaching a final settlement at this stage, and that the 
Lord President would be prepared in the circumstances to let 
the LCC claims be put forward and argued on the basis of the 
financial outturn for the various items in 1951, or as soon as 
possible afterwards. 
If the LCC officials accepted these proposals the Government could 
then say that while taking note of these claims, it could not commit 
itself in any way about the nature of the settlement and it would 
be, Nicholson cleverly pointed out, "for the LCC to convince the 
Government of the day that reimbursement is justified on each claim 
which they present, having regard to the benefits which will accrue 
to London". He said that the lord President feels, 
confident that, as the full value of the Festival to London 
unfolds, and the happy partnership between the Festival Office 
and the LCC, there should be no difficulty in disposing of the 
matter in a way which would be mutually acceptable when the 
full financial implications are known. 
He ended his letter to O'Donovan by emphasising that, while he knew 
this was not necessarily the most satisfactory solution to the 
problem, he was sure that the majority party at the LCC and its 
officers were extremely sympathetic to the proposition that the 
claims should not be pressed, but were prevented from following this 




On 24 August 1949, O'Donovan informed G. Campbell, the Finance 
and Establishment's Officer at the Festival Office, that the LCC 
claims could be left over until 1951, on the understanding that, 
purely for internal Government accounting purposes and without 
telling the LCC, a sum of £200,000 should be provided against this 
contingency. 
94 On 26 September, Lidderdale sent a memorandum to 
Nicholson stating that the Lord President had been to see Mr 
Hayward, the Leader of the LCC. At this meeting, Hayward proposed 
that the Government should pay the LCC £500,000 to cover all claims, 
thereby resolving the whole subject of LCC claims. He also told 
the Lord President that the LCC was going to recommend to its 
General Purposes Committee that 5200,000 should be invested in the 
Pleasure Gardens. 
95 
On the following day, Nicholson sent a memorandum to Morrison 
to offer him some guidance as to the best way to handle this new 
approach from the LCC. He remained adamant that the LCC was not to 
get any money until the Festival was over. He said: 
I would advise you to tell Mr Daines (the Chairman of the 
Finance Committee of the LCC) that you are sorry the LCC have 
not been able to decide at this stage to do the big thing and 
waive their claims, or to give the counterpart, and that as 
the extra costs and the benefits to the LCC are at present so 
difficult to assess, you do not think it would be profitable 
to start bargaining about the figure until the project in 
respect of which claims are proposed have been completed, and 
that the LCC and the Government can then review the matter 
without prejudice either way. The Government, however, will 
probably wish then to abide by the proposals they have already 
made, and hope that by that time, the Festival will be such an 
acknowledged success, and that the LCC fears about extra costs 
will prove so exaggerated, that in view of the benefits to 
London and its rateable value you would be confident that the 
LCC would then agree with you. 
94. Cab 124/1270, O'Donovan to Campbell, 24 August 1949. 
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He continued that if Daines accepted this proposition, which he felt 
would have the support of the Clerk of the LCC, Sir Howard Roberts, 
then he advised that letters between the Lord President and the 
Leader of the LCC, I. J. Hayward, be exchanged stating that the 
matter had been concluded for the present. He further added that 
if Daines continued to press for an early settlement, he should be 
told that his request for £500,000 would gravely undermine the 
Festival project which was barely managing to keep intact after 
several economic cuts. 
96 
By 1 October 1949, the LCC were finally beginning to realise 
that they were fighting a losing battle. Nicholson sent a 
memorandum to O'Donovan to say that Hayward and Daines, respectively 
the Leader and the Chairman of the LCC, had been to see the Lord 
President and that the Lord President was asking Nicholson to 
arrange with Sir Howard, the Clerk of the LCC, for an exchange of 
letters, stating that the LCC's claims would be dealt with after 
1951. The LCC had now agreed that this approach would be 
acceptable. 
97 
On 26 January 1950, the controversy over the claims was 
finally settled with a highly diplomatic letter from the lord 
President to Hayward, the Leader of the LCC. He began by stating 
that the Government greatly appreciated "the helpful and energetic 
part" which the LCC were playing in promoting the various aspects of 
the Festival. Some of the works, he continued, 
which will contribute to the success of the Festival are of a 
96. Cab 124/1270, Nicholson to the Lord President, 27 September 
1949. 
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long term nature, and from the manner and timing of their 
execution have not raised any question of claim for Government 
grant, except in so far as some of them, such as road works, 
qualify for grant in the normal course of administration. In 
other cases the LCC have undertaken work, for instance the 
South Bank site, virtually as agents of the Festival 
Organisation or the Ministry of Transport, and the whole cost 
of such work will be met out of the appropriate vote. 
Outside this area of expenditure, there remained, he said a 
miscellaneous range of cases in which expenditure was being 
"incurred by the LCC either mainly or partly in connection with the 
Festival, or on a greater scale than would have been necessary if 
the work did not need to be completed in time for 1951: For 
expenditure in respect of such items, the LCC had asked, he said, 
for recoupments from the Government. Of this request, he said: 
As I have explained to you and some of your colleagues, the 
Government have felt that while sympathising with this 
attitude, it is also necessary to take into account that the 
Festival will involve a very large sum of Government money, 
and the attraction thereby to London of a very large spending 
by visitors both from overseas and from other parts of the 
country. In view of this, and of the great contribution which 
the Festival should make to forwarding the Council's long-term 
plans for South Bank development, it would in the Government's 
view be most equitable if some at any rate of the LCC's claims 
in respect of the Festival were to be waived or offset by an 
equivalent grant from the LCC to Festival funds, in 
recognition of the outstanding benefits which this large 
national expenditure and effort will incidentally bring to the 
Administrative County of London. 
The benefits the Festival was bringing to London was, he said, well 
illustrated for example, by the concert hall - "a great LCC 
enterprise which had received special facilities from the Government 
to make possible its completion by 1951. 
" Furthermore the concert 
hall would be receiving a big publicity boost and opening because of 
the Festival. 
98 
98. Cab 124/1270, Morrison to Hayward, 26 January 1950. 
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As far as the specific claims were concerned, Morrison said 
that "it would be impracticable at the present stage to compute the 
amounts which the LCC consider should be re-imbursed as some of the 
factors in the contribution are unknown and likely to remain unknown 
for a lengthy period (e. g. until the Exhibition is over)". The 
claims as they stood at the time of his writing to the LCC were 
£240,000 for the concert hall in respect of completion in time 
for1951 and extra costs for suspension of building on the site in 
1951; £40,000 for loss of rents on the South Bank site; £25,000 for 
removal of river piers, mounting temporary bridges and reinstatement 
of works on the South Bank site; £40,000 for expediting the 
acquisition, clearance and building on Unit No. 9, Poplar; £55,000 
for early acquisition, clearance and ex gratia payments to tenants, 
and special work for Festival needs on the South Bank site; in 
addition was £424,000 for roundabouts (specifically for 1951), river 
piers, car parks and temporary bridges. Both sides, Morrison 
concluded in respect of these claims had agreed that further 
discussions regarding them should be adjourned until the LCC were in 
a position to ascertain more precisely how much extra cost had 
actually been incurred by them in respect of the Festival. When 
this information was available they could present their claims to 
the Government and they would be discussed without prejudice at that 
time. He ended his letter by thanking the LCC for all the trouble 




The LCC had very little choice in this matter, their only 
option was to accept these proposals. On 15 February 1950, I. J. 
Hayward, the Leader of the LCC, wrote to Morrison: 
I have had the advantage of the controllers of the Council's 
scrutiny of the figures and the statements in your letter 
about the timing of the various claims, and I agree that the 
position as there described represents the understanding 
reached between us. 
He added, however: 
You will, of course, realise thbtnothing I have said commits 
the Council, nor indeed, as no-one knows better than yourself, 
could I commit the Council in any way, to the acceptance of 
the proposition put forward as the Government's view in the 
third paragraph of your letter, namely that it would be 
equitable if part of the Council's claim were to be waived or 
offset by an equivalent grant from the Council to Festival 
funds. 
He concluded his letter by thanking. Morrison for the full and frank 
manner in which he had handled these difficult problems. 
100 
Thus, the Festival Office appeared to have settled the 
difference with the LCC - at least until after 1951. However, 
before all parties concerned could turn their attention to the 
composition of the Festival exhibitions, the Government and the 
Festival Organisation were to be confronted with alarming problems 
from the Festival Pleasure Gardens in Battersea Park. 
100. Cab 124/1270, Hayward to Morrison, 15 February 1950. 
233 
THE PLEASURE GARDENS: 
ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD AND MISMANAGEMENT 
By December 1950 and in the early months of 1951, it was 
becoming increasingly evident to the members of the Treasury, the 
Lord President's Office and the Ministry of Works that the financial 
situation at Battersea was in need of close scrutiny. The Chairman 
of the Festival Gardens Company Limited, Sir Henry French, had 
written to the Lord President on 18 December 1950, stating that it 
had proved impossible to observe the normal process of economic 
planning on the site and that events had moved ahead of both the 
Board and its Officers. 
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Sir Henry asked the lord President to 
make an additional loan to the Company, who had already been allowed 
to borrow £770,000 for the construction of the Gardens. With this 
letter it was to become clear that the financial management of the 
Gardens had reached crisis point. 
The Pleasure Gardens were first considered by the Executive in 
June 1948. The LCC offered the Festival Organisation thirty-seven 
acres in Battersea Park and a five year scheme for operating the 
Gardens was drawn up. The plan created by the LCC and the Executive 
was based on the assumption that the proposed Gardens could not be 
made self-supporting in a single year, but could clear all expenses 
in five years and possibly make a small profit. In view of this, 
the LCC agreed to make over the thirty-seven acre site for five to 
seven years, thereby making the Gardens permanent or semi-permanent 
thus helping to cover the overhead costs and avoiding losses. The 
101. Cab 124/1278, French to Morrison, 18 December 1950. 
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Festival Organisation was told informally that the Government was 
prepared to give consideration to a project on this basis. The plan 
continued that in order to clear expenses there would have to be an 
admissions charge of one shilling or one shilling and sixpence, and 
with probable attendance figures in 1951 in the region of 50,000 on 
weekdays and 75,000 on Saturdays, Sundays and Bank _ 
Holidays, 
allowing for a natural drop in these figures in 1952 and 1953, with 
a possible recovery in 1954 and 1955, the initial outlay could be 
recovered at the end of five years. Profits would be in the region 
of £320,000, increasing to £600,000 if legislation was passed 
permitting pleasure centres and amusement parks to be opened on 
Sundays. The early provisional estimate of the cost of 
construction of the Gardens was put at £1 million by the designers 
(this sum was later lowered to £750,000). 
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The Executive felt that if on examination this scheme proved 
to be financially sound, a Government-sponsored company, with the 
authority to borrow from the Treasury and the LCC should be set up 
to oversee the construction of the Gardens. The LCC further 
informed the Executive that it was prepared to consider making a 
loan to the Company of either twenty per cent of the total cost or 
£200,000, whichever was the 
, 
lesser amount. Reports of the 
Executive's and LCC's plans were sent to the Lord President who 
asked the Official Committee to set up a Working Party to 
investigate the use of the park for this purpose. After meetings of 
the Borough Councils of Battersea and Chelsea, it was decided that 
102. Work 25/44, Memo by the Director General to the Executive 
Committee, 1 February 1949. 
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the Pleasure Gardens could be situated in Battersea Park but only 
for six months (extended on 1 June 1949, to one year) not for the 
originally envisaged period of five to seven years. On 16 November 
1949, a Company, known as the Festival Gardens Limited, was formed 
and incorporated to run the Gardens; it would be allowed to borrow 
up to £770,000 (i. e. the cost of the Gardens), £200,000 of which was 
being lent by the LCC, the remainder coming from the Festival 
vote. 
103 On 25 November the Company held its first Board 
meeting, beginning with the task of finding designers and 
contractors to carry out the work on the site. On 2 February 1950, 
the officers of the Company met to discuss the selection of 
contractors, during the course of which they agreed to rule out the 
major firms such as Higgs and Hill, MacAlpine, Costains, Cubitts and 
Peter-Lind, on the grounds that they were fully employed on work for 
the Festival Office at the South Bank and also for the Ministry of 
Works and, as in the case of Peter: Linas they were essentially heavy 
builders. Howard Lobb, the Chairman of the Architectural Council, 
recommended the firm of Lavender MacMillan, whilst, G. Campbell of 
the Festival Office suggested the firm of Kirk & Kirk, and the 
Company's Quantity Surveyor proposed the firm of Dowsetts. The 
Company Directors decided to send out invitations to these three 
firms to submit tenders for work on the Pleasure Gardens. 
104 
The three firms duly submitted tenders which were all 
comparatively close to one another: Lavender MacMillan's was 
103. Work 25/44, Memorandum by the Director General to the Festival 
Council, 4 October 1949. 
104. Cab 124/1278, Marwick to Stokes, Notes pertaining to the 
Festival Gardens position. 
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£535,777.12s. 4d, with the work being completed in fifty-four weeks; 
and Kirk, & Kirk's was £525,496, with a fifty-two week completion 
schedule. The Board decided to award the contract to Dowsetts 
which was a most unusual choice because Dowsetts were a firm of 
Civil Engineering Contractors, not Building Contractors, and the 
work to be carried out on the Battersea Park site was of a building 
nature - not an engineering nature. However, what prompted the 
Board to choose Dowsetts tender was that it was the lowest, even so, 
the difference between Dowsetts bid and that of Kirk & Kirk's was 
minimal, a mere £1,211. The contract was awarded to Dowsetts on 29 
March 1950 and they began work on 1 April 1950. By this date the 
Company was only able to make available nine acres of the site on 
which work could begin, with a further sixteen acres being turned 
over to them in June 1950 and the remaining twelve acres in October 
1950. The reason for the delays in making the site available was 
because the co-ordinating architects and designers as well as the 
Quantity Surveyors (who had been formally appointed on 26 January 
1950) had only prepared a very general layout of the site which they 
changed and added to in the months that followed. As a result, the 
layout of the buildings and the site was neither fixed nor approved 
by the time the contractors arrived on the site. 
105 
The work proceeded extremely slowly during the summer months 
and the bulk of it was thus being carried out in the winter in 
inclement weather conditions, furthermore, industrial relations on 
the site were far from exemplary: the contractors seemed to have 
105. Ibid. 
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little idea of constructive labour relations and had difficulty in 
controlling the work-force. In October 1950, the carpenters went 
on strike because they wished to carry out all the work on the 
amusement booths and were no longer willing to honour an interim 
agreement to share the work on a fifty-fifty basis with the steel 
workers. 
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When the men were not striking, they adopted a 
work-to-rule attitude. The lack of productivity was reported to the 
Minister of Works, Dr Richard Stokes, in a letter from Lord Hardwick: 
I spent over an hour walking around and one thing that 
commanded my attention was the unpleasant fact that Dowsett's 
men were not attempting to do a modicum of work. There 
appeared to be no supervision whatsoever except on the site of 
the model railway track where I saw a foreman (for the first 
time) who made a feeble attempt to suggest to one of the men 
that he might do some work; the individual who was requested 
so mildly to do something which he evidently considered to be 
outside his range of desire, simply threw his spade down and 
walked off the site; the rest of the gang merely smirked and 
stood around doing nothing - the foreman took no action 
whatsoever. I can safely say that all the gangs I saw on the 
grounds, consisting of well over one hundred men, together did 
not put in a man hour's work during the time I was on the 
ground. 107 
On 24 October 1950, Dowsetts registered official complaints 
with the Board of the Company demanding reimbursement for the 
uneconomical manner in which they had been forced to operate, due 
entirely to conditions beyond their control, such as the 
availability of the site, the inclement weather, and the lack of 
plans and layout drawings by the architect. They further added 
that in their estimation, conditions on the site would continue to 
be unfavourable for certain reasons which they listed: there would 
be shorter working days which would require temporary lighting for 
106. Cab 124/1302, Lidderdale to Morrison, 23 October 1950. 
107. Cab 124/1275, lord Hardwick to Richard Stokes, 6 April 1950. 
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the operation of night gangs: inclement weather, the workforce 
would have to be increased in order to establish a float to enable 
the contractors to work in a proper sequence; additional supervisory 
staff would be required; and they anticipated further labour 
problems. They had, they said, taken part in a meeting on the 
morning of 24 October 1950 with the labour delegates, during which 
it was suggested that as the men were unable to work overtime due to 
the lack of suitable lighting facilities compensation should be paid 
to them. If they were not paid such compensation the labour force 
would probably leave the Battersea Park site to go to another one 
where overtime was in operation. 
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On 1st November 1950, Dowsetts followed up their letter of 
24th October. They requested an immediate decision by the Festival 
Gardens Company for suitable remuneration to be paid to them, as 
requested in their earlier letter. The basis upon which this 
additional payment should be made was, they said, either by a 
percentage on schedule rates or by a valuation of each building, 
which would be made by them in light of their knowledge of the cost 
of material and labour as well as the appropriate sub-contractors' 
charges against each building where they could be reasonably 
assessed. 
109 
The Company replied immediately stating that it had 
hoped to be able to put Dowsetts requests before the Finance and 
General Purposes Committee which was to have met on 2 November 1950, 
but which had been postponed until 9 November. In the meantime the 
108. Cab 124/1279, S. Crawshawe (Contract Manager, Dowsetts) to 
Festival Gardens Ltd, 24 October 1950. 
109. Cab 124/1279, S. Crawshawe to Festival Gardens Ltd, 1 November 
1950. 
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Secretary of the Board, F. A. Ricketts, who was writing in the 
letter on the Company's behalf said: 
Subject to the formal confirmation of my Board, you are 
authorised to work on the assumption that any reasonable extra 
costs incurred by you through conditions outside your control, 
but designed to promote and accelerate the authorised work in 
connection with our whole project at Battersea Park will be 
recognised by my Company, subject to suitable safeguards and 
certification. The method of assessment of such extra 
charges remains a matter between yourselves and the Company's 
Quantity Surveyors Messrs C. E. Ball and Partners; In these 
circumstances, it is felt that so far as is practicable each 
items or category (as the case may be) of extra cost should be 
certified by the Quantity Surveyors through the Chief 
Architects, and without such prior authorisation my Company 
would not feel able to accept the Addition. 110 
On 8th November 1950, a meeting took place at which Leonard 
Crainford, the Managing Director of the Company, was present; also 
in attendance were G. U. Ball and C. F. Smith of Messrs. Ball and 
Partners, the Quanitity Surveyors for the Company; Mr Higgins, the 
Technical Controller; Howard Lobb, the Chairman of the 
Architectural Council, and P. O'Hara, the General Manager of the 
Festival Gardens Company. At this anxious meeting, of which no 
record was kept, it was decided that special steps would have to be 
taken to speed up the process of work on the site. It was 
therefore decided to meet any consequential increase in the 
contractors cost. Mr Ball suggested that in view of the contractors 
complaints as to delays to which he had been subjected, it might be 
necessary to change the nature of the contract to a 'cost-plus' 
basis. This idea was initially met with disapproval by both Howard 
Lobb and Higgins, on the grounds that the Festival Office would not 
approve of such a contract. During the course of this meeting, 
110. Cab 124/1279, Ricketts to Dowsetts, 1 November 1950. 
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however, all the participants agreed that there was little 
alternative to a 'cost-plus' contract and the decision was taken to 
change the terms accordingly. 
ill 
On 8th December 1950, Mr Crainford wrote to the contractors: 
With further reference to the letters exchanged between this 
Company and yourselves on November 1st, my Board has now 
confirmed the payment to you of additional costs occasioned by: 
1. Difficulties outside your control in carrying out this 
contract. 
2. Approved action taken outside the provisions of the 
contract to accelerate work. 
My Board agree with you that the competent authority to decide 
and assess the necessary additions to the Contract is the 
appointed firm of Quantity Surveyors, Messrs. Ball and 
Partners, and as suggested in your letter is prepared to leave 
the matter entirely in their hands to arrive at a fair 
settlement. 112 
The Chairman, Sir Henry French, was not present at the meeting 
of 8 November 1950, nor were he and the other Board members aware, 
with the exception of Mr Crainford, that a letter making new 
arrangements had been sent to the contractors, and although it did 
not necessarily alter the terms of the original contract to that of 
a 'cost-plus' basis, the contractor and the Quantity Surveyor 
regarded the letter as virtually doing so, as had been agreed at the 
meeting of 8 November 1950.113 
Dowsetts continued work on the site with the knowledge that 
any cost therefore incurred by them in the prevailing difficult and 
unpredictable labour conditions would be met by the desperate 
111. Documents relating to the Festival Gardens Limited: (1951= 
Cmnd. 8277) Para 9. 
112. Cab 124/1279, Crainford to Dowsetts, 8 December 1950. 
113. Cmnd. 8277, Para 10. 
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officials of the Festival Gardens Company Limited. By 15 March 
1951, however, the whole Board realised that there had been a grave 
misunderstanding resulting from their letter of December 1950. It 
had not been their intention to change the terms of contract but 
they came to the conclusion that as the contractor had been working 
on this basis and, moreover, as the work on the site was of primary 
importance, there was little alternative to officially confirming 
the new terms of contract. 
Accordingly, on 23 March 1951, Leonard Crainford, the 
Company's managing Director, sent the following letter to the 
contractors: 
My board considered at the meeting yesterday, the contractors 
position with regard to the construction work at the Festival 
Pleasure Gardens in Battersea Park. On the advice of its 
professional advisers, the Board accepts the fact that the 
amount to be paid to the main contractors, Messrs. Dowsett 
Engineering Construction Limited, will be the total cost 
approved and certified as necessary by yourselves, on the 
valuation made by Messrs Ball and Partners, the Quantity 
Surveyors, with the addition of a fixed sum of £51,000 to 
cover all overheads and profit until completion and you are 
now authorised to issue certificates on this basis. 114 
By the end of March 1951, by which time the Lord President had 
become aware of the financial problems at the Gardens, the 
contractors had presented the Board with a total bill which had 
risen markedly from its original estimated tender of £524,370 of 
March 1950, to £1.5 million which included the provision of the 
fixed fee of £57,000 for overhead expenses and profit of the main 
contractor. The Board was warned that the figure of £1.5 million 
was not fixed and it would be subject to any further delays or rises 
114. Cab 124/1278, Crainford to Dowsetts, 23 March 1951. 
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in material and labour costs experienced by the contractor. 
115 
The earliest notification the Government received of the 
problems at Battersea Park came, as has been noted earlier, in a 
letter on 18 December 1950 to the lord President from Sir Henry 
French, the Company's Chairman. In his letter Sir Henry explained 
that in November 1950 an estimate presented to the Board had risen, 
to the great dismay of all the Directors and senior Officers of the 
Company, from £1.1 million in March 1950, to a total of 
£1,624 million. The anticipated revenue was £1,265 million, based 
on an average attendance of forty thousand per day, seven days a 
week, and a resultant estimated deficient of £359,000. The Board 
has, he said, investigated every possible way of reducing 
expenditure, without much success, and were now convinced that it 
had become necessary to incur the extra expenditure in order to 
provide the Pleasure Gardens in time for 1951. Any reduction in the 
proposed expenditure on the Gardens would, he said, result in a 
greatly diminished revenue and an increase in loss. He went on to 
say: 
Emergency measures dictated by the final time factor have made 
it impossible to observe the normal process of economy 
planning and rendered it imperative to employ a 'blitz' 
strategy. It is, indeed, true to say that throughout the 
short period of the Company's existence, events have been 
ahead of the Board and its Officers. We have been faced by 
the stark fact that, since the primary estimates were prepared 
prices of labour and raw materials have been on continuously 
ascending scale. Moreover the belated start compelled us to 
employ a variety of designers and architects, instead of 
relying on a small number wholly employed as members of our 
staff, with an inevitable increase of fees and expenses. 116 
He went on to give further reasons as to why the cost of the 
115. Cmnd. 8277, para 2. 
116. Cab 124/1274, French to Morrison, 18 December 1950. 
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Gardens had risen so markedly. None of the Directors had, he said, 
contemplated that the difference would be so large between the cost 
of providing cafes and other catering facilities, and that of the 
revenue likely to be obtained by the Company from our catering 
contracts. He said that there were two major reasons for this, the 
facts were that the cost of the catering units was out of all 
proportion to their short term purpose, and the revenue returns of 
these facilities was much lower than initially anticipated. It was 
he said: 
Always obvious that the cost of the building and services 
required for the feeding of visitors to the Gardens could not 
be recovered in a six months run - but the gap has proved much 
larger than anticipated. 
The financial problems were further compounded by the fact that the 
Board had introduced certain indispensable features at the Company's 
cost for which they had not succeeded in finding sponsors. He said 
that the main reason for this disappointment was the change in the 
general world situation and other factors beyond the Board's 
control: for example, a national newspaper which had been 
enthusiastic about three essential features suddenly refused to give 
them any further consideration because of the shortage of 
newsprint. Ultimately, his conclusion of the poor state of affairs 
was that: 
When it was decided to limit the Gardens to the summer of 
1951, the whole scheme which was originally intended to have a 
life of five - seven years should have been scrapped and a 
revised plan involving a much lesser capital outlay should 
have been prepared. Whether such a modified plan would have 
been a credit to the Festival of Britain is doubtful, but one 
thing is certain, that by the time this Company was set up, 
such a scheme could not have been devised , approved by the 
Government and carried into effect by May 1951. 
Sir Henry concluded his letter by stating that it was with the 
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utmost regret that he had to send such a statement to the Lord 
President which he realised would cause him much disappointment and 
anxiety which he stressed that the Directors shared acutely. 
Nevertheless he said, we trust that you will see your way to 
authorise the necessary financial provision to be made in future 
estimates for the Festival Office"117. Sir Henry's final 
sentiments about how Morrison would feel when he received his letter 
were not underestimated - the Lord President was not only alarmed, 
he was furious. He replied to Sir Henry in no uncertain terms that 
he "would not be prepared to seek any increase in the loan authority 
given for the Festival Pleasure Gardens. " He added that he was 
willing to authorise financial provision to be made in the 1951-52 
estimates for the Festival Office within the limits of the existing 
loan authorisation, and to approve the use of revenue to meet 
outgoings in the budget which the Board submitted. He concluded his 
letter by stating: 
While the increase in the expected loss on the Festival 
Pleasure Gardens on the current basis of operation has 
aggravated my difficulties in keeping within the £9 million 
net limit for Festival expenditure as a whole, I am not 
prepared to contemplate exceeding that figure on the final 
return of the Festival and I hope that your Board and Officers 
will use the utmost ingenuity to show some further increase in 
revenue in mitigation of the very heavy increase in 
expenditure. 118 
So disquieted were the lord President and his staff that in 
early January 1951, before the Lord President replied to Sir Henry 
French's letter, Nicholson took the unusual step of demanding on 
behalf of the Lord President a formal assurance from the Festival 
117. mid. 
118. Cab 124/1274, Morrison to French, 11 January 1951. 
245 
Gardens Company that no more financial assistance would be required 
from the Government. 
119 The Board sent the following reply on 
1st January 1951 to the office of the Lord President: 
I understand from Mr Campbell that the Lord President desires 
to have an assurance in writing that the Company would be able 
to fulfill its programme without asking for any increase in the 
loan. 
I am happy to confirm that this is indeed the considered 
opinion of the Officers of the Company. 
120 
On 3 January 1951 Nicholson wrote to Leonard Crainford to say 
that he would advise the Lord President that he could rely on the 
Company existing on the loans already authorised without requesting 
any additional finance. 
121 
In his letter of 11 January 1951, 
Nicholson further advised the Lord President to ask the Board 
through Sir Henry to appoint a Finance Officer to take charge of the 
Company's financial management. The Company, desiring to retain its 
autonomy, were slow to take the lord President's suggestion, though 
they had decided to appoint a Finance Officer to take charge of the 
Company's financial management at the Company's inception on 16 
December 1949. However, on 9 February 1951, the Company informed 
the Lord President that they had secured the services of a seasoned 
Finance Officer, E. Sawers, a Civil Servant who had been the Director 
of Navy accounts at the Admiralty, recommended to the Company by the 
122 
Treasury. 
The Lord President informed Sir Henry on 19 February that he 
was pleased with the appointment of Sawers who could now take charge 
of the Company's financial situation. This appointment is, he said: 
all the more desirable since I anticipate considerable 
119. Cab 124/1274, Memo by Nicholson to Stokes, 5 April 1951. 
120. Cab 124/1274, Crainford to Nicholson, 1 January 1951. 
121. Ibid. Nicholson to Crainford, 3 January 1951. 
122. Ibid. French to Morrison, 9 February 1951. 
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criticism when the increased prospective loss on the Festival 
Pleasure Gardens is made public and it is absolutely vital 
both from your point of view and mine that there should be no 
reasonable ground for charges of waste or extravagance which 
are only too easily brought in such conditions. Having seen 
the pleasant and profitable examples of this kind of 
enterprise in Scandinavia I am convinced that the Gardens can 
be a financial as well as a social success and I would like to 
see everyone concerned imbued with the determination to make 
them so. 123 
On 8th March 1951, a meeting was held at which Sir Henry 
French, Crainford, Sawers, Sendall, Barry, Campbell and Nicholson 
were present. Nicholson explained to the gathered members of the 
Company and the Festival Office that the lord President "was 
extremely disturbed at the apparent tendency of expenditure to run 
away in excess of the estimates and of the great difficulty he would 
have in defending the Company if some overt and drastic steps were 
not taken to stop the rot". 
Sir Henry proceeded to explain at great length the troubles 
the Company had had over the past year which arose from a late 
start, bad weather, loss of morale due to Parliamentary and press 
criticism, as well as other factors which had delayed the work and 
thereby increased the costs. He further went on to state that he 
was of the opinion that the contractors had used far more manpower 
than was necessary or essential but as they would be finishing their 
work by 31 March 1951, there could be no substantial cut in manpower 
(and therefore costs) without possibly creating ill feelings and 
thereby further jeopardising the work on the site. Sir Henry also 
added that he was of the opinion that the contractors and the 
Quantity Surveyors were tending to put in and pass bills on the 
123. Cab 124/1274, Morrison to French, 19 February 1951. 
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basis of whatever the work had cost rather than on the basis of 
schedule prices to which the contractors were entitled. This 
practice in some cases causes excesses by as much as sixty per 
cent. Although he recognised that it was important that the 
contractors were not upset or angered, thus delaying their departure 
from the site by the end of March 1951, he intended to warn them 
that expenditure without proper authority and in excess of sums to 
which they were entitled could not be accepted by the company as 
binding. Furthermore, he proposed to speak very sternly to the 
Quantity Surveyors who, although employed by the Company, seemed not 
to be exercising sufficiently strict control. 
124 
It was further revealed at this meeting that Sir Henry had not 
yet resolved the matter of how the Company would keep afloat until 
the revenue from the Gardens came in. The question was whether or 
not the Gardens could survive without borrowing additional monies 
from the Government and the LCC. The Company's Finance Committee 
were examining this issue but it was thought, even at this early 
stage, that some further borrowing facilities would have to be 
arranged. Nicholson responded to these points by stating that he 
did not think that the Lord President would entertain the idea of 
approaching the Chancellor for extra funds or seeking a 
supplementary estimate, and that some way must, therefore be found 
to carry on over the interim period without asking for more public 
money. If the Company could not function without resorting to 
borrowing additional funds then, Nicholson said, the Lord President 
124. Cab 124/1274, Nicholson to Morrison, Note for the Record. 
8 March 1951. 
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would be bound to ask for an estimate which showed explicitly why 
and how the Company needed additional funds. The Lord President, he 
concluded, wished it to be known to the members that while he was 
very anxious to see the Pleasure Gardens successfully launched, the 
financial trend of the Company was highly embarrassing to him 
especially in view of the country's economic problems and it should 
be clear to all concerned that economy was an overriding 
consideration. 
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On 9th March 1951, Nicholson sent a memorandum to the Lord 
President stating that the Finance Committee of the Festival Gardens 
had met with the Quantity Surveyors and "the worst fears about the 
worsening financial situation were exceeded. " It emerged at this 
meeting that the total expenditure on the Gardens could well be at 
least E2.1 million and that the financial resources of the Company 
would not only carry them through until May 1951, they would not 
take them much further than one more week. To compound matters, Sir 
Henry had conveyed the situation to the Public Accounts Committee on 
27 February 1951, " and Nicholson said that rumours were circulating 
to the effect that £2 million had already been spent on the 
Gardens. He said he had informed the Treasury "that trouble was 
afoot" and, at a meeting held with the Board on the afternoon of 
9 March 1951, he was told that in view of all the assurances the 
Board had given to the contractors, any chance or hope of disputing 
the vast additional figures would have to be abandoned. The 
Treasury had, he said, been very prompt and helpful in the crisis 
and were putting forward some initiatives upon which to act: they 
125. Ibid. 
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suggested that an independent enquiry should be carried out by 
Chartered Accountants to examine the Company's financial situation; 
and secondly, that Parliament, who had authorised the original loan 
to the Company, had to be told of the financial difficulties. 
Nicholson also added that it was the opinion both of himself and Sir 
Wilfred Eady of the Treasury that when Parliament was told of the of 
the problems at the Gardens, the Lord President would be open to the 
charge of having failed to disclose to the House the full extent of 
the additional losses of which he ought to have been aware. He 
further added that: 
While it is a fact that the Chairman of the Festival Gardens 
Limited has not up to this moment felt in a position to supply 
you with any estimate to supercede the £1.625 million, he has 
now put you in an impossible position by quoting the Public 
Accounts Committee very much higher figures, which, although 
probably not accurate, are evidently much nearer to the true 
order of magnitude in the light of yesterday's meeting with 
the Quantity Surveyors. 126 
Nicholson's advice to the lord President was that he ought to 
have a Private Member's Question, or issue in some alternative form 
an early statement making it clear that the higher' figures given by 
Sir Henry to the Public Accounts Committee must be taken as 
representing more clearly the correct level of expenditure than the 
figure of £1.625 million; that the Lord President gave the house on 6 
March 1951. Further, the Treasury were exploring the possibility of 
advancing the sum of E5081000 (which was not due to be paid to the 
Company until April 1951) so that the Company could be kept afloat 
long enough to enable it to get a loan from the bank. Nicholson 
concluded his memorandum to Morrison by asking him if he wished any 
126. Cab 124/1274, Nicholson to the Lord President, 9 March 1951. 
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steps to be taken towards preparing a Private Members Question, and 
also informing him that Sir Henry was writing to him to say what had 
occurred at the Public Accounts Committee meeting. The Lord 
President's response to the memo was one of exasperation. He wrote 
that he was quite simply 'fed-up' and that he would be available 
after the Cabinet Meeting for further discussion on the subject. 
127 
On 9 March 1951 the lord President received Sir Henry's 
account of the meeting with the PAC. Be explained that on the 
morning of 8 March 1951, Gerald Barry was due to attend a second 
meeting with the PAC (his first meeting had taken place on 27 
February 1951 when Sir Henry was present). This meeting was held by 
the Finance Committee of the Festival Gardens at which three of the 
Company's Quantity Surveyors was present. In Sir Henry's words 
this meeting had, 
brought home to members of the Board, including myself, two 
very disturbing and unacceptable facts: first, that the total 
expenditure of the Company as set out in our November-December 
estimate is undoubtedly going to be exceeded (I cannot say at 
present by how much), and secondly, that whereas we had 
previously been confident ' that we could meet all our 
expenditure previous to the opening of the Gardens on the 
£770,000 loan plus revenue already secured, it was now 
apparent that owing to increased expenditure our expectations 
were not going to be fulfilled. 128 
Sir Henry explained that these facts were not available at the 
first meeting of the PAC on 27 February 1951 at which he was 
present, thus, when he faced the Committee for a second time on 
8 March 1951 and was questioned by Captain Waterhouse, the 
Committee's Chairman, who asked whether the figure of £1.625 million 
127. Ibid. Morrison's comments were written on the top if this 
document and dated 11 March 1951. 
128. Cab 124/1274, French to Morrison, 9 March 1951. 
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expenditure (as given to the House by the Lord President on 6 March 
1951) was the final figure. Sir Henry wrote, "Obviously I could not 
say that it was", and this led, he said, "to further questions and 
eventually, much against my wishes, I was driven to admitting that 
the situation had changed even since you gave your reply two days 
before". He further added that he had emphatically defended the 
Lord President against the charge that he had misled the House with 
his reply of 6 March 1951, and when he was asked if he knew of the 
contents of the lord President's reply of the 6 March, to which he 
replied that he did, but that at the time, he could not amend it nor 
was he in a position to get figures other than those given by the 
Lord President. He concluded by stating: 
My general impression is that although the beginning of my 
evidence was extremely difficult and made me conscious all the 
time of how embarrassing it might prove to you, the last half 
of the time when I was in the witness chair brought about a 
considerable change. Then the matter was brought into 
considerable perspective and there was a reasonable measure of 
understanding of the difficulties of our position on the 
appointed date and the impracticability of making in advance 
reliable estimates of expenditure seeing that overtime and 
other factors have been quite unpredictable. 129 
On 12 March 1951, Sir Henry wrote another more desperate 
letter to the Lord President stating that since his letter of 
9 March 1951, detailed estimates had been sent to the Treasury who, 
earlier had intervened to attempt to sort out the Company's 
difficulties. The Company had not only supplied the Treasury with 
estimates but with particulars of the additional loan which they 
would require in order to complete the construction and preparations 
to enable the Gardens to open on 3 May 1951. Sir Henry said of 
129. mid. 
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these estimates, "Yet again, I regret to say that both these 
estimates are greatly in excess of anything that I had in mind when 
giving evidence to the PAC on 8 March 1951". So distressed was he 
by the present state of affairs that, at an emergency meeting on 
15 March 1951, he proposed, subject to the Lord President's 
approval, to ask the Board (who would no doubt agree) to appoint 
some person or firm, whose appointment would inspire the general 
confidence that the Festival Gardens so clearly lacked, to look into 
the Company's financial and accounting arrangements and to take over 
control of all the Company's future financial commitments. The 
selection of the person or firm to oversee the Company's financial 
arrangements, as well as the terms of reference by which they would 
operate, could, he added, be discussed and approved by the Treasury 
and the Lord President's office. However, although the Treasury and 
the Lord President's office could discuss the selection of a 
suitable person or firm, Sir Henry felt that their appointment 
should be made by the Board of Directors of the Company. 
130 
On 14 March 1951, Nicholson replied to Sir Henry on behalf of 
Morrison (now Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) to say that 
the Foreign Secretary agreed with him that there was a need to take 
some action to restore public confidence in the future financial 
arrangements of the Gardens and that he hoped the Board would accept 
Sir Henry's recommendations. It was of course essential, Nicholson 
concluded, that the Treasury should be consulted regarding any 
appointment the Board made and that any arrangements arrived at 
would be acceptable to them. 
131 
130. Cab, 124/1274, French to Morrison, 12 March 1951. 
131. Ibid. Nicholson to French, 14 March 1951. 
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On 16th March 1951, Sir Henry wrote to Nicholson to say that 
the Board had accepted his proposal for a firm to be appointed to 
sort out the Company's problems, but that some members of the Board 
felt it to be essential that the responsibility for financial 
decisions should rest with the Board. He said that this seemed to 
be necessary and he was sure this request would meet with the 
approval of both Morrison and the Treasury. (This was indeed a 
ridiculous request from a Board that had shown themselves completely 
incapable of handling the Company's finances. ) Sir Henry concluded 
his letter by saying that the firm or person to be attached to the 
Board should be given the role of Financial Secretary, as the 
Company could not accept the title that was being considered, namely 
that of Executive Vice-chairman. 
132 
On 29 March 1951 the firm of Moores, Carson and Watson were 
appointed to this role by the Board of the Festival Gardens company, 
with the full support and approval of the Lord President's Office 
and the Treasury. The firm's terms of reference were: 
To investigate and report on the circumstances which have 
caused the financial commitments of the Festival Gardens 
Limited to be greatly in excess of the amount which it was 
estimated would be sufficient in December last. 133 
The firm's Interim Report was presented to the Company on 
17 April 1951, and one of its preliminary suggestions was that a 
full inspection of the contractors' books and records' should be 
undertaken, as soon as possible, by an independent firm of Chartered 
Accountants to verify how, and if, the contract signed with the 
132. Ibid. French to Nicholson, 16 March 1951, 
133. Cab 124/1278, E. N. Butler of Moores, Carson and Watson to the 
Directors of the Festival Gardens Limited, 16 April 1986. 
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Company was on a 'cost-plus' basis and to investigate the 
allegations of fraud and inefficiency. 
135 
In this connection, 
on 23 April 1951, taking up Butler's suggestion, the Board appointed 
the firms of Peat, Marwick and Mitchell, whose terms of reference 
were: 
To conduct a full inspection of the contractors' books and 
records in accordance with the accepted practice of 
'cost-plus' contracts; to investigate the allegations of 
fraud and inefficiency; to examine all other matters relative 
to the cost of the project of the Festival Gardens as may be 
necessary. To report thereon to the Chairman and Directors of 
the Company. 136 
The final reports of these firms formed the main body of the 
Government's White Paper on the Festival Garden's Company Limited 
which was presented to Parliament on 25 June 1951. The two reports 
came to the same conclusion: the Company's financial predicament 
was not so much the fault of the contractors, as of the Board of 
Directors who had failed to keep a proper grip on project 
expenditure. Similar opinions were expressed with extreme candour 
by Sir Wilfred Eady of the Treasury and by Richard Stokes (formerly 
the Minister of Works, who was appointed Lord Privy Seal on 26 April 
1951). After reading the Interim Report of Moores, Carson and 
Watson, Sir Wilfred Eady said in a memorandum to Stokes that the 
report confirmed an important observation which he had made to the 
Lord Privy Seal from the outset, on the; 
extraordinary composition of a Board of a private company 
which purports to carry out business with public money. The 
Board more closely resembles an interdepartmental committee 
than a business concern. Apart from its diversity, its 
vagueness as to allocation of responsibility and the absence 
134. Ibid. Interim Report of Moores, Carson and Watson, 16 April 
1951. 
135. Cmnd. 8277, para 1. 
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of anyone with a knowledge of building construction contracts, 
etc. it is most unusual to find officials as Directors of a 
private company. I refer to Barry, Campbell, Cooke and 
Sendall. Where the Treasury or Board of Trade advance loans 
to industrial concerns, e. g. in development areas, it is usual 
for the Treasury to appoint some independent person as a 
nominated director on the Board to look after the taxpayers 
interest. In this case no single person was appointed, but 
for some reason the Board included members of the staff of the 
Festival Office. 136 
Putting forward his views in the most blunt language, Richard 
Stokes wrote to Herbert Morrison asking how frank he should be with 
Parliament concerning this situation: 
(1) Fundamentally the extra cost rose from the sheer 
incompetence on the part of those who should have known 
better. 
(2) I lay the blame at the door of the Festival Office who 
appointed the Board of Directors to run the Festival 
Gardens Limited but failed to think it necessary to find 
a suitable Managing Director. 
(3) On top of that the Chairman, in my opinion, from my 
examination of the accounts had not a clue as to what he 
was doing. 
(4) In consequence, no real check was kept of actual 
expenditure against estimates and on top of it all, the 
contract was let to a contractor who was quite incapable 
of carrying out the work and who had no experience in 
handling the large and varied workforce. 
(5) What is worse, it was specifically stated in the Minutes 
that certain of the big contractors should be excluded 
because they were too large and that two contractors 
engaged on the South Bank should not be invited to quote 
because they would be too busy. In point of fact, had 
either of the contractors on the South Bank been chosen, 
it would have given them the flexibility, being next 
door to the South Bank, to help them out on the South 
Bank project. 
136. Cab 124/1278, Eady to Stokes, 19 April 1951. 
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(6) When the Managing Director was appointed he was 
appointed merely because they could not find anybody 
else and the poor fellow did not want to do it. The 
fact that he had left his previous job under a cloud was 
not even known to the Festival authorities because they 
did not check up and get proper references before they 
appointed him. 
(7) The Communist Party were dead set to exploit every 
possible grievance on the site. This would never have 
happened had a competent contractor been in charge. The 
contractor had not the remotest notion of how to handle 
a large, varied and poor quality workforce. 
(8) As far as I can see, the Officers of the Festival 
Gardens Limited took very little interest in what was 
actually happening at the site, except on paper. I am 
prepared to believe that they were completely unaware of 
what was happening on the ground except that everybody 
was being as difficult as possible. 
(9) But there is no doubt whatever, that the workers slacked 
and allowed themselves to be exploited. On the other 
hand there must have been a large number of first-class 
men there who did a very good job of work despite the 
opposition of their colleagues. 
(10) All sorts of points have been made as to why the cost 
should have gone up, including the weather, but in point 
of fact they could have had worse weather. Provided, as 
they were, with protective clothing, the men had really 
little to grouse about, merely because the weather was 
wet. Had it been freezing the situation could have 
been different for it is impossible to carry out 
excavating work or concreting under cold weather 
conditions but the weather was mild throughout. 137 
Despite the veracity of Stokes' comments, he neglected to add 
the plain fact that the Government were responsible for vetting the 
soundness of the scheme in the first place and for choosing an 
experienced board of directors. It can be argued that the 
Government failed in both respects. 
The comments circulating privately about the Festival Gardens 
fiasco were made public, with more balance, in the White Paper. 
137. Cab 124/1278, Stokes to Morrison, 31 May 1951. 
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Butler, of Moores, Carson and Watson, gave the following reasons for 
the Company's strained financial position: 
' A. The failure to attain a more advanced stage of planning 
during the winter of 1949-50 and to get the foundation 
work done in the summer of 1950. 
B. The lack of an expert building contractor on the Board 
with specific responsibility for placing and supervising 
the construction of the contract. 
C. The lack of an expert accountant on the Board with 
specific responsibility for planning and supervising the 
books and financial records. 
D. The general failure to delegate responsibility for the 
Company's affairs. 
E. The lack of a suitable Managing Director to co-ordinate 
the various aspects of the work, to seek and obtain 
policy decisions in good time and, above all, to see 
that when they were obtained they were carried out 
quickly and efficiently. 
F. The alleged change in the basis of the contract which 
makes it necessary to provide for the possibility that 
all excess expenditure may be chargeable to the Company. 
G. The exceptionally heavy rainfall and the shortage of 
certain materials which were expensive during the winter 
of 1950/51. 
H. The exceptionally low labour output which has resulted 
from adverse working conditions, the excessively rapid 
expansion of the labour force and the desire to avoid 
strikes. In this connection, I have noted that there is 
a general concensus of opinion that certain influences 
have definitely sought to foment discontent on the site. 
In his report, Butler recommended that further attention 
should be given to the present status of the contract and the 
changes made resulting in a move to 'cost-plus' from a fixed-price 
basis. He further recommended, as in his Interim Report, that an 
independent firms of accountants should check the contractors' books 
in the light of the charges of inefficiency and fraud, and he also 
suggested that a small management committee should be set up, with 
its members being delegated definite responsibilities for the 
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various aspects of the Company's business. 
138 
The report of Peat, Marwick and Mitchell, the second firm of 
Chartered Accountants recommended by Moores, Carson and Watson, 
examined and exposed the causes of some of the problems of the 
Festival Gardens Company. Their report explained that the tenders 
the Board received were obtained under abnormal circumstances, in 
that the Architects and the Quantity Surveyors had to produce a 
sketch plan and a Bill of Quantities, based upon this plan, within 
three weeks of their appointment which, the report stated, 
inevitably represented to a large degree what could only be 
described as intelligent guesswork. As the Quantity Surveyor had no 
detailed or accurate information upon which to determine, with any 
precision, the quantities of work of varying types required, the 
contractor providing evidence of the total cost. 
139 On the 
matter of the alleged change in the terms of the contract, the 
Company's Auditors said that this alteration was not to a 
'cost--plus' in the ordinary sense of the term, but to that of 
'cost', plus a fixed fee. 
This fixed fee was determined in negotiation with the 
contractor who originally suggested a figure of £100,000, but 
ultimately settled for £57,000.140 The firm attributed the rise 
in costs to the uneconomic working of the contractor, adding, 
however, that conditions leading to this were beyond the 
contractors' control and that the expense which occurred was a 
138. dnnd. 8277, paras 2-3. 
139. ibid.., para. 6. 
140. Cab 124/1278, F. W. Charles of Peat Marwick Mitchell and 
Company to Richard Stokes, 21 June 1951. 
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result of the Company refusing to grant an extension of time for the 
completion of the contract. The Auditors concluded their report by 
stating: 
A. No valid comparison can be drawn between the original 
tender of £524,370 and the probable estimated cost of 
£1.5 million, as the extent of the work has been greatly 
increased, thus rendering direct comparison irrelevant. 
B. The authority for extensions and alterations in the work 
to be carried out was retained by the Company and was 
exercised through its Advisory Panel of designers, 
headed by the thief Designer, Mr James Gardner. The 
respopnsibilities for these increases must rest with the 
Company. 
C. The increase in costs attributable to uneconomic working 
by the contractor is at least partially attributable to 
conditions beyond his control which we have described in 
an earlier part of this report and which were created, 
primarily, by the fact that no extension of time for the 
completion of the contract could be granted. It also 
appears, however, that expense has been incurred by the 
contractor, arising 'out of an apparent lack of control 
and organisation at a time when the volume of work to be 
completed in a specified time was suddenly expanded by 
reason of earlier delays. 
D. The increase in the volume of work and consequently of 
costs, is also partially attributable to a lack of 
success in obtaining sponsors for certain buildings 
which were not included in the original estimates but 
which, in event, had to be erected by the contractor as 
a charge on the Company. 
E. We have seen no evidence to suggest that the managements 
of any of the contracting firms or of the professional 
firms engaged on the contract have knowingly been party 
to any irregularities which may have taken place at a 
lower level. 
They further added that: 
We think it apparent from the foregoing survey that the 
fundamental cause of the inflation in the costs of the 
Festival Gardens project has been its initial delays for which 
the Company and its management must accept responsibility, 
even if it was unavoidable. The subsequent effort in 
unfavourable weather conditions to make good lost time has 
been productive of a material increase in costs, some part of 
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which may be attributable to inadequate control. 141 
The Board never completely happy with the enforced 
investigations into their Company's finances, sought the opportunity 
to reply to the criticism of the firms and asked that their 
explanation be published in the White Paper. 
They presented feeble excuses for the financial problems at 
the Gardens and blamed the delay, cited by the two firms of 
Chartered Accountants, on the fact that they, as a Board, were not 
constituted until 25 November 1949. They further added: 
When we commenced our work, plans and designs were in outline 
only and consisted of some broad general sketched plans of 
suggested layout of the Gardens and some rough sketched 
designs of certain features which it was proposed to include. 
Certain important alternatives were suggested to the Board and 
negotiations took place with a view to engaging the service of 
expert designers to take over responsibility for a large 
section of the work. These negotiations broke down and on 
the 12 January, Mr James Gardner was entrusted with the full 
responsibility of the preparation of the overall layout of the 
Gardens as a whole. It will be appreciated that certain 
fundamental work, such as the laying of mains and services, 
could not be undertaken until the general layout had been 
approved and the location of the buildings requiring those 
services had been, at any rate, approximately fixed. A 
contributory cause of the delay was that we considered it 
141. Onnd. 8277, paras. 24-27. The fourth point in Marwick's report 
was confirmed earlier by Nicholson, in a memorandum to Richard 
Stokes to explain how some problems in the Gardens arose. He 
said that the original scheme provided for a number of very 
simple canvas and other light temporary structures, 
appropriate for operation during a single season and their 
subsequent removal. At some stage, however, and by some 
unexplained process, a whole number of elaborate buildings of 
a permanent and semi-permanent character evolved out of these 
cheap and simple prototypes. If, Nicholson concluded, the 
specifications that were adopted, had been submitted in the 
first place, it would have been obvious that the cost was 
bound to be higher than the authorised estimate. Cab 
124/1274, Nicholson to Stokes, 27 March 1951. 
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desirable that the design and layout of the catering buildings 
should meet the requirements of the catering concessionaires, 
with whom negotiations were more prolonged than we could have 
foreseen. The fact, therefore, that the site became available 
to the contractors in sections did not, of itself, result in 
any material hold-up in operations. 142 
With regard to Messrs. Carson and Watson's criticisms of the 
composition of the Board, the Directors stated that being appointed 
with the approval of the Festival Council, the Lord President's 
Office and the LCC, they had nothing to do with the directorial 
structure of the Company which did not dictate that each member be 
assigned special functions, as the Report suggested. Furthermore, 
they did not think it necessary, even if the constitutional 
arrangements of the Company had permitted it, to nominate any one, 
or more, of their number to take individual responsibility for the 
work of construction, operation of finances etc. 
143 
Acknowledging 
his unsuitability for the position of Managing Director, Leonard 
Crainford said that his colleagues knew at the time of his 
appointment that he had no experience at all in the conducting of a 
building and construction Contract and had little financial 
experience. All his experience had been in the theatrical field 
where the contracts drawn up and arranged were a great deal 
simpler. "144 The Directors said of this appointment that due to 
the temporary nature of the project, they were unable to find a 
candidate whose qualifications and experience measured up to the 
standards they felt were desirable. The Board had appointed a 
Deputy General Manager on 13 December 1949 and claimed that, 
142. Cmnd. 8277, Para. 2. 
143. Ibid., Para. 6. 
144. Cab 124/1278, Crainford to Joseph, 20 April 1951. 
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although every possible effort was made, no suitable person outside 
the Festival Organisation could be found and, therefore, in June 
1950, they appointed Leonard Crainford. 
145 
A man whom Nicholson 
had warned the Festival Office "was not up to the more responsible 
duties he was assuming". Nicholson said, "it has always been my 
view that Mr Crainford can be quite helpful in a limited sphere, but 
is not up to any post of major responsibility". 
146 On the 
subject of Dowsetts Construction and the contract, the Board 
confirmed the fact that not only had they chosen Dowsetts because 
they had produced the lowest tender, but moreover, they felt 
entitled to assume that this tender was based upon a full 
understanding, by the tenderer, of the measured quantities which 
they believed were based on a reasonably accurate assessment. (It 
appeared that, regarding the contract, the Board as a whole were 
completely inept). Leonard Crainford claimed that at the meeting 
of 8 November when the initial change in the terms of contract was 
discussed, no definite- agreement about the contract was discussed, 
no definite agreement about the-contract was reached, nor could any 
authority or instructions have been given at this meeting which 
would have led to the contractors being informed of the contract 
being changed to that of a 'cost-plus' nature. Moreover, he 
regarded the meeting of 8 November of such little significance that 
he did not view it necessary to report it to the Finances and 
General Purposes Committee of the Company. 
147 
The Directors admitted to sending a letter in November 1950, 
145. Qnnd. 8277, para. 8. 
146. Cab. 124/1275, Nicholson to Stokes, 5 April 1951. 
147. Onnd. 8277, para. 15. 
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on the advice of their financial advisors, accepting liability for 
extra costs for which they provided the sum of £80,000 recommended 
by their Quantity Surveyors. The Company said that they did not 
perceive that this sum would involve the Company in expenditure 
heavier than that for which contingency provision had been made in 
their November estimates. They said that neither they themselves 
nor their Finance Officers knew of the alleged change of contract in 
November but, after consulting their financial advisors and 
extensive discussion with both the Quantity Surveyor and the 
contractors, there had been little alternative but to accept the 
situation, and the letter of 23 March 1951 had been sent confirming 
the change of contract to that of a 'cost-plus nature'. 
148 
The Government's White Paper tactfully exposed the reasons why 
the financial problems occurred. ' Amongst Morrison and his former 
staff, and the Auditors and Treasury Officials, there was an unusual 
unanimity of opinion as to who was responsible for the chaos. Sir 
Henry French, whom Nicholson had recommended for the job of 
Chairman, wanted to resign as early as 12 March 1951, but his 
resignation was refused on the advice of Sir Wilfred Eady of the 
Treasury, who felt that "French should stay on and face the matter 
out, making sure that the whole situation was cleaned up". 
149 
By 2 April 1951, however, it had become clear that Sir Henry 
was quite incapable of this and his resignation was duly accepted. 
Leonard Crainford was forced to resign before the White Paper was 
published, and Major Leslie Joseph, the Chairman of the National 
148. mid., paras. 16 & 22. 
149. Cab 124/1274, Eady to Nicholson, 13 March 1951. 
264 
Amusements Council, was appointed to the post of Managing Director 
and Chairman of the Festival Gardens Company Limited, by Richard 
Stokes, in order to finish the job, with an additional loan of e1 
million which was granted by Parliament. 
The Festival had managed to survive the traumas of its 
financial resources being depleted. firstly by the necessity of the 
country's economic problems; secondly, by the politically-motivated 
claims of the LCC; and lastly, by the hugely embarrassing problems 
of the Pleasure Gardens. This survival was in no small was way due 
to the dedication of both the Lord President and Nicholson to the 
project. Their ability to compromise at the early stages of the 
financial arrangements, to manipulate when compromise was no longer 
feasible, and to be resolute and persistent when disorder and chaos 
threatened, had not only saved the Government from the embarrassing 
option of cancellation, but had given the organisers of the Festival 
a chance to present their version. intact, of the future that awaited 
Britain and her people. 
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CHAPTER 5 
"APPROACHING 1951" AND THE OPENING 
OF THE FESTIVAL OF BRITAIN 
Financial matters resolved at last, the Festival Organisation 
turned their attention to implementing the required finishing 
touches before the opening of the Festival on 1 May 1951. One of 
their primary tasks at this stage was to ensure that the Festival 
was satisfactorily publicised. This job fell to Paul Wright, the 
Director of Publicity, and the Publicity Planning Group which was 
composed of representatives from the Central Office of Information 
(COI), the Board of Trade's Overseas Department, the Travel 
Association, and the Advertising Agents. With a budget of £408,500 
the chief priority of the Publicity Planning Group was to sell the 
Festival both at home and overseas. Their brief was to attract the 
attention of the United States, North America, Europe and the 
important Commonwealth Countries (Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, Rhodesia, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon). The Festival 
Organisation and the Government had convinced both themselves and 
the people that 1951 was going to be a great dollar-earning year. 
They believed that the Festival would give a much needed boost to 
Britain's tourist industry by urging visitors to return to Britain 
on a regular basis and to encourage their friends to do so also. 
l 
It was so central to the Festival's success and impact that Britain 
should, as a nation, be perceived as having a glorious future that 
the Festival Office drew up a list of countries which they felt it 
necessary to court. The list was presented to the Foreign Office 
for its opinion and approval. Listed in order of importance, the 
Festival office placed the Commonwealth Colonies, British Colonies 
and Protectorates first, closely followed by the United States and 
1. COI, CL593, June 1949 - March 1951. 
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Canada. Then came the European countries (outside the Iron 
Curtain): France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, as 
well as their colonies; Luxembourg, the Irish Republic, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Greece and Turkey. The last group 
included Central and South America, the Middle Eastern countries, 
the Far East and the Iron Curtain countries. 
2 
The Foreign Office 
made a few interesting alterations to the list which reflected the 
interest and concerns of foreign policy makers and advisors in the 
post-war era. They advised the Festival Office to add the newly 
created West Germany to their European section as part of their 
policy to treat West Germany as soon as possible on the same basis 
as the other European nations. They also asked for the inclusion of 
Austria who was shortly to sign a treaty which would entitle her to 
be treated as the other European nations. 
3 
With regard to the 
lowest priority group, the Foreign Office said that the Middle East 
should be courted with a healthy supply of advertising material. 
They warned the Festival Office, however, to be wary of dealing with 
Israel and that they considered any efforts made in the Iron Curtain- 
countries to be a waste of time. 
4 
The Publicity Planning Group made approaches to these 
countries as well as to the cities, towns and countries at home, 
through the usual media of film, magazines, radio, press, and 
leaflets. To assist the Publicity Department, the Festival 
Organisation selected the Inndon Press Exchange, a large and 
experienced organisation with many contacts overseas, as Agents for 
2. COI, FP2/9/l, February 1949 - October 1951. 
3. Ibid. Publicity Planning Group meeting, 14 October 1949. 
4. COI, CL593, Paul Wright to Mr Briggs, 1 June 1949. 
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the Festival. Publicising the Festival was not however, an easy 
task because of its very nature and also because of the obligation 
facing the publicity planners in trying to sell the idea of the 
national character of the Festival both at home and overseas. The 
problem was that the Publicity Group was attempting to market a 
large number of products, "many of them appealing to different 
sections of opinion, with an appropriation that was barely adequate 
for one alone". 
5 
This meant that they either had to concentrate 
on the South Bank Exhibition and run the risk of underplaying the 
nationwide aspect of the Festival as a whole or, produce 
advertisements which, while being factually correct and fulfilling 
all their obligations, would probably be less effective from an 
advertising point of view. The publicity planners chose to adopt 
the latter approach but at the same time they managed to introduce 
some novel advertising techniques: there were two notable examples 
of this, one of which was a campaign in Europe and the other, was 
designed to cover the United States. 
6 
In conjunction with the 
Executive Committee, the publicity planners approached the London 
Transport Authority to organise the dispatching of four 
double-decker buses on a continental tour to promote advance 
publicity for the Festival in the form of a preview exhibition. 
Three of the buses were designed as publicity vehicles, while the 
fourth retained its original form as a London bus. In the autumn of 




1950, this touring exhibition attracted the attention of some 
171,000 people as it journeyed 4,000 miles through twenty-six cities 
in seven different countries. The policy adopted for America was 
described by the Director of Publicity as "the most startlingly 
single piece of advertising placed and could be described as a 
calculated risk which succeeded brilliantly". The Publicity Group 
had approached the Time/Life Magazine Company and persuaded them to 
place the Festival in one issue as a major feature, covering four 
pages of colour advertisements. Paul Wright, the Director of 
Publicity, said that the success of this Campaign: 
was due not only to the broad nature of the Life plan but also 
to the fact that by the policy adopted, that is of placing 
nearly all the appropriation into one splash in one magazine, 
the support of the vast and powerful organisation of Time-Life 
Inc was thereby enlisted with continuing repercussions 
favourable to the Festival throughout the world. 7 
Other forms of advertising included the press: in the 
overseas market 2,520 insertions were made in 386 newspapers in 
sixteen different languages, at the cost of £131,000: the Home 
market consisted of 1,616 insertions of 32 differing advertisements 
in 587 newspapers, thereby ensuring national coverage. Leaflets 
were also widely used: for the overseas market, 2,640,000 leaflets 
of five differing types were printed in seven languages (French, 
German, Portuguese, Spanish, Afrikaans, Dutch, and Italian), these 
were distributed to 105 countries throughout the world. In addition 
to this, 25,000 duplicated leaflets were also distributed 
world-wide. For the home market, 1,385,000 leaflets of five 
differing types were printed and distributed nationwide; 45,000 
ý. Ibid. 
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information leaflets were distributed to local Authorities; and over 
2 million leaflets were produced by the Scottish, Welsh and Northern 
Ireland Committees for distribution by the Festival's Public 
Relations's Department. The Public Relations Department also 
distributed a further 750,000 leaflets produced by the Arts Council, 
which detailed the activities of the various Arts Festivals. The 
expenditure on leaflets to serve both the home and abroad 
advertising, totalled £32,400.8 In addition to the leaflets, 
posters were also printed: the overseas share of the posters 
amounted to 35,000 which was composed of three different designs by 
Abraham Games. The design comprised a four pointed compass 
surmounted by Britannia's head and the Festival flag with a 
simplified version of the Festival symbol printed in three different 
colour arrangements. 
9 For home consumption, 294,000 posters were 
produced in thirteen different designs which included the three 
designs for foreign distribution. Wo official information centres 
opened in London during the Festival period at the cost of £22,000, 
as well as a temporary centre which opened for a period of nine 
months, closing at the end of January 1951. A total of 760,000 
enquiries were made to these three centres, by personal call, 
telephone and letter. In addition to this the Ocean Terminal 
Information Bureaux at Southampton dealt with over 50,000 passengers 
B. Ibid. 
9. Work 25/3, The Story of The Festival of Britain 1951. 
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disembarking from the Queens Liners and also the America. 
10 
Despite ' the seemingly widespread Home Campaign, it is 
questionable, however, as to how successful it actually was. In an 
inquiry made for the Festival of Britain Office by Joy Ward of the 
Social Survey of the COI in June to July 1950, actual knowledge of 
the Festival and its various officially sponsored events was found 
to be very patchy. The inquiry was carried out in five towns 
(Shrewsbury, Eastbourne, Wolverhampton, Newcastle, and Bath) and in 
two London Boroughs (Bermondsey and Chelsea): in each of these 
places a sample of 250 people between the ages of sixteen and sixty 
was drawn at random from the National Register. The towns chosen 
differed considerably from each other. According to the report 
Eastbourne was selected as a typical seaside town, within easy 
access to London, but which was not itself a Festival Centre. 
Newcastle (a Festival Centre) and Wolverhampton were selected as 
industrial towns some considerable distance from London; Bath was 
one of the Arts Festival Centres, and Shrewsbury was chosen as a 
"typical country town" at a considerable distance from London. The 
10. Work 25/3, Report by the Director of Public Relations, October 
1951. There were a number of Information Centres dealing with 
Festival Enquiries throughout London. 
The Information Office at the Festival Headquarters, Savoy 
Court, dealt with 35,500 enquiries in the course of three 
years up to 30 September 1951. 
The other Festival Information Centres includes those at: 
Swan and Edgar: 29 January to 30 September 1951 this office 
received 500,000 visitors, 72,000 telephone calls, 37,000 
letters, and there were ten languages catered for either in 
written form or spoken by the attendants. 
Leicester Square: mid-May 1950 to 30 January 1951 there were 
1,000 visitors to this centre, 300 telephone calls and 250 
letters received. 
Charing Cross: 3 May to September 1951 (i. e. the Festival 
period. There was a total of 150,000 telephone calls and 
personal visits made to this centre. 
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31 participants 'in the report were asked firstly whether they had heard 
of the Festival at all; secondly, they were asked questions 
designed to establish to what extent the different individual events 
of the Festival were known; thirdly, they were asked what they 
thought was the purpose of having such a Festival. 
11 
As has already been stated, the report found that actual 
knowledge' of the Festival was very patchy: 63% of the people 
interviewed had heard of the Festival and knew something of its 
purpose; 15% had heard of it vaguely but could not give any details 
of its purpose; and 22% had not heard of it at all. Knowledge of 
the Festival varied considerably between the seven areas sampled: 
the two London Boroughs were well-informed, only 3% of the sample in 
Chelsea had not heard of it. Of the areas chosen outside London, 
Eastbourne and Bath were well-informed but the other towns knew 
little about it: in Wolverhampton, for example, 41% of the people 
sampled did not know about the Festival. Of all the Festival 
Organisation's projects for the Festival, the South Bank scheme was 
the only event that was widely known; 35% of those interviewed 
mentioned this site spontaneously; a further 30% claimed to have 
heard of it after being prompted; only 12% had heard of the proposed 
Arts Festivals to be managed by the Arts Council= and a further 32% 
claimed to have heard of them after being prompted. Battersea 
Pleasure Gardens was mentioned spontaneously by 10%, and by a 
further 31% of those interviewed after being prompted. The report 
said that most of the people interviewed thought of the Festival 
11. J. C. Ward, Knowledge and Opinion about the Festival of Britain 
1951, June - July 1951. 
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largely in terms of a Trade Fair with the emphasis on selling 
"British goods abroad" and of "attracting foreign trade" or of 
"making Britain known abroad". The report concluded that there was 
not very great general interest in the Festival at the time the 
survey was made (June to July 1950). Amongst all the participants 
in the survey, the score which was awarded for the degree of 
favourable opinion towards the Festival showed an average of only 
2.6 out of a possible count of four points. The people seemed, the 
report said, to have an incomplete idea of the purpose of the 
Festival; most people appeared to think that the Festival was to be 
a short Trade Fair for the purpose of exporting British goods and of 
showing to overseas visitors what the country was capable of. The 
wider aspects of the Festival, as seen from the intentions of the 
Festival's organisers, . 
of having 1951 as a period of national 
celebrations in honour of the Great Exhibition of 1851, was hardly 
known at all. In this area the report concluded that: 
if people are to be made more enthusiastic about the Festival, 
this wider significance of the Festival needs to be brought 
home to them. At present they feel they have little part in 
it - they need to be given more personal interest in it. 12 
In spite of this seeming lack of knowledge of an event which 
was discussed on an almost daily basis in the tabloids from 1949 - 
1951, the Festival Organisation continued with their plans for the 
Festival and its Opening Ceremony at St. Paul's on 3 May 1951. In 
the final Festival Programme, there were thirteen Festival 
Organisation-sponsored Official Exhibitions, these were: the 
12. mid. 
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Combined Exhibition on the South Bank, the centre-piece of the 
Festival, which was to open from 4 May until 30 September 19511 the 
Exhibition of Science and Technology at the Science Museum, South 
Kensington, opening form 4 May to 30 September= the Exhibition of 
Architecture, Town Planning and Building Research in Poplar, from 3 
May to 30 September; the Exhibiton of Books at the Victoria and 
Albert Museum, South Kensington, from 3 May to 30 September; the 
Festival Pleasure Gardens at Battersea Park which was to be 
officially opened on 3 May 1951 but due to problems which have been 
discussed opened late, on 28 May, and would function as such until 3 
November. 
13 
The Land Travelling Exhibition was planned around the 
following dates: 'Manchester, 5- 26 May; Leeds, 23 June - 14 July; 
Birmingham, 4- 25 August; and Nottingham, 15 September - 
6 October. The Sea Travelling Exhibition on the Festival Ship 
"Campania" was programmed to visit: Southampton, 4- 14 May; Dundee, 
18 - 26 =May; Newcastle-on-Tyne, 30 May - 16 June; Hull, 20 - 30 
June; Plymouth, 5- 14 July; Bristol, 18 - 28 July; Cardiff 31 July 
- 11 August; Belfast, 15 August -1 September; Birkenhead, 5- 14 
September; and Glasgow, 18 September -6 October. In Scotland, the 
Exhibition of Industrial Power was being displayed at the Kelvin 
Hall, Glasgow, from 28 May - 18 August; an Exhibition of Twentieth 
Century Books and Printing was also being held in Glasgow, from 1 
June - 28 July; there was an Exhibition of Eighteenth Century Books 
being held in the Signet Library in Edinburgh from 3 August - 15 
September. The Living Traditions Exhibition at the Royal Scottish 
13. The Amusement Park of the Pleasure Gardens opened on 11 May 
1951. See pp. 257-259 for the Problems at the Pleasure Gardens. 
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Museum from 25 June -8 September. In Northern Ireland, the 
Ulster Farm and Factory Exhibition was to be displayed in Belfast 
from 1 June - 31 August; and in Wales, the Welsh Hillside Scheme, 
Dolhendre, Merioneth from May to September. These Official events 
were controlled and financed through the Festival Organisation, 
with the exception of the Ulster Farm and Factory Exhibition in 
Belfast which was financed and managed by the Government of Northern 
Ireland. 
14 
In addition to this Official Programme, the Arts Council 
sponsored the Arts Festival which consisted of a London Season of 
the Arts, to be held 'from 3 May - 30 June. There were a further 
twenty-three Arts Festivals held throughout the country. These 
included new Festivals programmed between June and August at 
Aberdeen, 30 July - 13 August; Bournemouth and Wessex, 3- 17 June; 
Inverness, 17 - 30 June; Liverpool, 22 July - 12 August; Norwich, 
18 - 30 June; Oxford, '2 -16 July; Cambridge 30 July - 18 August; 
Perth, 27 may - 16 June; St. David's, 10 - 13 July; Dumfries 23 - 
30 June; and York, 3- 17 June. There were other centres, some of 
which already staged their own established Festivals which, to 
commemorate the significance of 1951, were executing them on a 
larger scale than usual: Aldeburgh, 8- 17 June; Bath, 20 May -2 
June; Brighton 16 July - 25 August; Canterbury, 18 July - 10 August; 
Cheltenham, 2- 14 July; Edinburgh, 19 August -8 September; 
Llangollen, 3-8 July 1951; Llanrwst, 6- 11 August; 
Stratford-upon-Avon, 24 March - 27 October; Swansea, 16 - 29 
14. Work 25/3, The Story of the Festival of Britain 1951, and 
Work 25/230,1951 Exhibition South Bank Festival of Britain 
Catalogue. 
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September; Worcester, 2-7 September; and Belfast, 7 May - 30 
June. 
is Apart from the Official Exhibitions and the Arts 
Festivals, there were Regional Festivals in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland thereby fulfilling both the Lord President's and 
the Festival Organisation's wish that the Festival should be a 
nationwide event. The major events arranged by the Festival of 
Britain Regional Committees for their respective areas were part of 
the Official Festival Programme. In addition to these official 
events there were also local Festivals in England, Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland which were arranged by the Local Councils. 
On the morning of 3 May 1951, the Opening Ceremony of the 
Festival of Britain was held at St. Paul's Cathedral in the form of 
a dedication service in the presence of Their Majesties The King and 
Queen, and other members of the Royal Family. In the Cathedral, a 
congregation of nearly 3,000 was assembled, the guests included: the 
members of the Festival Organisation; the City of London and City 
Livery Companies; members of the Royal Household and the Diplomatic 
Corps; also in attendance there were distinguished visitors from 
abroad; the Government; the members of the Opposition; members of 
the House of Lords representing both parties; members of the 
Northern Ireland Parliament; representatives of Government 
Departments and of the legal profession; the Board of the Admiralty, 
Army and Air Councils; Heads of Local Authorities in Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland; there were representatives from the LCC, the 
British Council of Churches, the Services, Merchant Marine, Trade 
15. Ibid. and Work 25/44, The Arts in the Festival of Britain 1951. 
276 
Union Congress, British Employers Confederation, Police and Fire 
Services, Civil Defence, the nursing profession, the Voluntary and 
Youth organisation; and newspaper proprietors and editors. In the 
service, which was broadcast to the Nation, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury reminded the people that the success of the Festival 
depended upon the manner in which it was approached: 
such a Festival might be a spiritual disaster, a 
self-indulgence, an exhibition of pride, but neither our own 
character nor the harsh circumstances of our times would 
encourage the misuse of such an occasion. But even so the 
Festival might be celebrated in a kind of spiritual emptiness 
devoid of aspiration or inspiration. That would be hardly 
less disastrous for it would be to deny the past and frustrate 
the future. 16 
Following the Service which ended with the singing of William 
Blake's "Jerusalem", the King and Queen, Queen Mary and other 
members of the Royal Family, the Prime Minister and members of the 
Government assembled on the west steps of the Cathedral from where 
the King made his, inaugural address: 
One hundred years ago Queen Victoria opened the Great 
Exhibition in Hyde Park. Its creators were far-sighted men 
moved by the vision of a world in which the spectacular 
advances of art and science would uplift civilisation to 
enduring peace and unclouded prosperity. 
This Festival, a hundred years later, has been planned, 
like its great predecessor, as a visible sign of national 
achievement and confidence. All of us can paint the contrast 
between the calm security of the Victorian Age and the hard 
experience of our own. Peace has not endured, and much of the 
wealth which our forebears created has been dissipated in fire 
and slaughter. Tao world wars have brought us grievous loss 
of life and treasure; and though the nation has made a 
splendid effort towards recovery, new burdens have fallen upon 
it and dark clouds still overhang the whole world. 
Yet this is no time for despondency: and I see this 
Festival as a symbol of Britain's abiding courage and 
vitality. With the spirit of our ancestors renewed in us, we 
can, under God's providence, restore and expand the prosperity 
" 16. Work 25/3, The Story of the Festival of Britain 1951. 
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of which they laid the foundations. We can draw inspiration 
from their staunch example, and confidence from the wonderful 
achievements of our own industry. We have not proved unworthy 
of our past, and we can do better in the years ahead. 
His Majesty emphasised Britain's "rich and vivid past" which 
gave to the country the opportunity to "look back with pride" and 
"forward with resolution and confidence. " On the whole it was a 
speech of joy and thanksgiving that the realm united had made a 
significant effort to provide an occasion whose activities and 
displays would have enduring value. This theme expanded into a 
prayer for peace and plenty, then after welcoming guests to the 
country, his Majesty declared the Festival of Britain Open wishing 
it "universal success". 
17 
Thus, after five years of planning, the Festival of Britain 
was inaugurated. The Labour Government, in particular Herbert 
Morrison, ably supported by Max Nicholson and all the members of 
committees were entitled to feel no small measure of pride at having 
managed to put together a celebration in the circumstances of 
post-war Britain. Beyond this, however, there must have been a 
sense of nostalgia and perhaps sadness that the Festival, being 
linked so often to the Centenary of the Great Exhibition of 1851, 
must have highlighted the differing context of the times. The fact 
that the country was forced to consider hosting a national Festival 
instead of a First-Category International Exhibition, summed up 
eloquently the true reality of post-war Britain. From as early as 
1945, she had already begun to slide to second position in the world 
17. Work 25/7, The King'sSpeech, 3 May 1951. 
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power rankings but further, internally, the nation itself was 
clearly not what it had been one hundred earlier: post-war Britain 
had lost the aggressive assurance of the Victorian era. There can 
be little doubt that during the 1945-1951 period, there was concern 
as to exactly what the new role of Britain would be; the drabness of 
life and continuing economic difficulties in the country were 
undisguised for all to see; what is more the dawning desire for 
self-rule in the nation's possessions was all too evident. The new 
role in world affairs of the united States of America, its land 
untouched by war and still certain of 
confident and aggressive in its ambitions 
the financial and spiritual drain which 
there had to be a new role to replace 
shattered both internally and externally. 
Thus, along with all the other 
its material abundance, 
of leadership emphasised 
had devastated Europe - 
the one which had been 
innovations of the new 
Jerusalem, the Labour Government, through the men of the Executive 
Committee, sought to present Britain with a new role, and a new 
persona. This was not going to be an easy task. From the outset, 
the Executive and its 'great impressario' Gerald Barry, had tried to 
breath optimism and purpose into the Festival. They refused to 
countenance the fact that the Festival was a very poor alternative 
to the First Category International Exhibition, which Barry himself 
had suggested as the way to commemorate 1851. The only way in which 
they could begin to build a new persona was to ignore the fact that 
they were putting on a show which they felt was the second-best 
choice. It was a show planned to suit the exigencies of the time, 
carried out to reveal the best of Britain in hard times. From the 
outset, Barry, Ismay, Morrison, and Princess Elizabeth all imbued 
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the Festival with serious motives: it was to bring new recruits to 
the Arts and Sciences= it was to set standards; disclose a depth of 
British talent that was deemed as almost exclusive. Moreover, it 
was to emphasize these qualities in the nation's life so that the 
notion of British leadership, and indeed supremacy, in culture and 
the humanities could be developed. This was in direct contrast to 
other centuries when the concept of supremacy was based on conquest 
and power. This now seemed undesirable, unrealistic and 
impossible. But then, there is a greatness in searching for ways of 
keeping the peace. The Festival of Britain with its emphasis on 
arts, science and the humanities displayed in such harsh and austere 
times, perhaps unknowingly was finding a new role for Britain in 
world affairs. Barry's ideas were echoed by Herbert Morrison in an 
interview given to The Times Festival Supplement. The Festival he 
said: 
has deliberately focussed on the arts and sciences - on 
showing what we have done in them and on stimulating our 
people to do even better. Few people realise how greatly our 
position in the Arts, for example, has changed for the better 
even since twenty years ago. In the composition of music, in 
ballet, in acting, in film production, in sculpture, and in 
certain branches of industrial design we hold a position which 
most countries can envy. I believe that the richness of the 
Festival programmes will astonish even many of our best 
informed critics, and will give us a new kind of prestige such 
as France and certain other countries have held for many 
generations. 
The Executive and its Director General as well as the sponsors 
of the Festival were attempting to redefine Britain's public image, 
which for centuries had been based on conquest and power, with a 
sweeping and unique exhibition involving as it did the whole of the 
nation. However, one must ask if an exhibition which by its very 
nature is ephemeral could do all this? Ultimately it was hoped that 
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the Festival would produce a status for the people of Britain as 
potent as the tradition and legend of her past. This was summed up 
by Morrison in his interview for the Times: 
I am not prophesying what the lasting value of the Festival 
will be. All I can say is that if it revives some of the 
spirit of 1851, if it cheers up the British people and helps 
them to understand and improve upon, and hold fast to the best 
of their ways of life= if it throws open more widely the doors 
of the Arts and Sciences and their appreciation and use; if it 
tells the world something more of the reasons why Britain has 
been, and is, and will be a great nation and one which every 
traveller should visit; if it stirs up people to brighten and 
tidy and improve their own towns and villagesl if it disperses 
any illusion that the cultures and achievements of the North 
and East and Midlands and West and of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland are in any way inferior to those of London= 
if it helps to bring Londoners to tackle the long-neglected 
redevelopment of their own great city, the Festival of Britain 
will certainly have amply justified itself. 18 
18. The Times Festival of Britain Supplement, May 1951. 
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